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The 2008 financial crisis shed light on the immoral conducts, reckless 
practices and the widespread short-sightedness that affected the entire financial 
sector. As a result, a wave of legislative reforms hit all financial institutions, 
especially in relation to capital and liquidity requirements, but also to corporate 
governance and investor protection regulation in general. 
However, inadequate rules, bad corporate governance and a lack of public 
enforcement cannot fully explain malpractice. On the contrary, the roots of 
misconduct cannot be completely understood without a prior analysis of the various 
cultural and psychological dynamics underlying financial operators’ practices. 
Therefore, a new approach is required, in which legal and economic studies intersect 
with sociology, psychology, anthropology and neuroscience, to get a better 
understanding of the main determinants of human behaviour. We cannot expect 
banking institutions – that are run by human beings – to be ‘fixed’ without 
investigating or even considering why people deviate from lawful conduct rules. 
Moreover, as the nature of the determinants of misconduct is behavioural and 
cultural, and since regulation per se cannot be expected to promote good corporate 
culture, in this thesis I argue that boards and supervisors should be primarily 
responsible for the enactment of a cultural change.  
The thesis consists of two main parts. In the first part, I analyse bank 
governance institutional framework based on the international and European 
agenda. In the second part, I explain why there is a need to reinterpret corporate 
governance principles and practices in the light of sociological and behavioural 
sciences, in order both to avoid financial misbehaviour and induce banks to take part 
of the path towards sustainable development in the light of the UN 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals. In particular, I analyse traditional corporate governance issues, 
such as board composition requirements, leadership, compliance, risk management 
and executive compensation in the light of studies by researchers in behavioural 
economics, organizational culture and neuroscience. Moreover, I analyse how 
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supervisors and institutional investors could play an active role in supporting the 
board in the establishment of a new cultural model. Finally, I describe the recent 
initiatives on sustainable finance, which are undoubtedly going to accelerate the 
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Chapter I 
 
The Role of Corporate Governance in Banking Crises 
 
1.1 The origins of Corporate Governance: A Brief Overview. – 1.2 Corporate Governance of 
Banks: Why are they special? – 1.3 The Role of Corporate Governance in the Financial Crisis: 
does it really matter? 
 
 
1.1 The origins of  Corporate Governance: A Brief  Overview 
 
Although research on corporate governance is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, its birth can be traced back to the foundation of the East India 
Company and other major chartered companies established between the XVI and 
XVII centuries.1 Adam Smith was the first to theorize that conflicts of interests 
between owners and managers limit the efficient management of corporations. In 
particular, he claimed that: 
“The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other 
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should 
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private 
copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they 
are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and 
very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and 
profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the 
affairs of such a company.” 2 
The term 'corporate governance',3 began to be used with a broader meaning – 
as the study of the balance of powers between shareholders, directors and officers – 
in the US in the XX century, in concurrency with the foundation of the first public 
companies. In these large corporations, the separation between ownership and 
																																																								
1 Brian, R Cheffins, ‘The History of Corporate Governance’, ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 
184/2012 available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1975404, 4 accessed 20 September 2018. 
2 Adam Smith, An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations 606–07 (1776), 2005 edition, 
Penn State Press, Book 5, Ch. 1.3.1.2..  
3 The term derives from an analogy with the governance of nations and local communities. See 
Marco Becht & Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Roell, ‘Corporate governance and control’, in G M 
Constantinides & M Harris & R M Stulz (eds), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Elsevier 2003, 1-
109. 
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control, caused by a highly fragmented ownership, led to the need to strengthen 
board monitoring duties and the system of control in general, in order to contrast 
the increasing power of managers.4 Moving forward to the present era, in the mid-
1970s, the federal Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.) put corporate 
governance on the official reform agenda after the discovery of illicit behaviours 
carried out in large companies, due to the alleged lack of efficient monitoring 
activities by the board.5 
Corporate governance gained global interest in the 1990s. In 1991, the 
Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange and the Accountancy 
profession constituted a committee with the task of analysing corporate governance 
in the UK and, as a result, published the ‘Report Of The Committee On The 
Financial Aspects Of Corporate Governance’, better known as the ‘Cadbury Report’. 
The report defined corporate governance as “the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled”6 and set the main responsibilities of boards, directors, 
auditors and shareholders by formalizing widely accepted practices.  
This new concept of  corporate governance7 was fiercely rejected – as still too 
narrow and limitative – by other economists and organizational theorists such as 
Mitroff,8 Williamson,9 Freeman10, Donalson and Preston,11 who supported the so-
called ‘stakeholder theory of  corporation’, where stakeholders include employees, 
customers, suppliers and the society at large. In line with this view, in 1999 the 
OECD definitively granted international recognition to corporate governance, by 
publishing the ‘Principles of  Corporate Governance’ (hereinafter, the “OECD 
Principles”), where it stated that corporate governance  
“involves a set of  relationships between a company’s management, its board, 
its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides 
																																																								
4 The concept was analysed in the studies conducted by Berle and Means on the new form of 
capitalism born in US. See Adolf Berle & Gardiner Means G, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, Macmillan, 1932. 
5 See Cheffins, n 1. 
6 Adrian Cadbury, ‘Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance’ 
(1993) (Cadbury Report), §2.5. 
7 The approach, widely used during the first decades of development of corporate governance 
studies, limited the subject of corporate governance to the mechanisms that allow shareholders to 
monitor managers’ operations, and therefore to the relationships between shareholders, managers 
and directors. See, inter alia, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate 
Governance’, Journal of Finance (1997), 52, 737. 
8 Ian I Mitroff, Stakeholders of the organizational mind, Jossey-Bass Publisher, 1983. 
9 Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Free Press, 1985. 
10 Robert Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach’, Pitman Publishing, 1984. 
11Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, ‘The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, 
Evidence, and Implications’, Academy of Management Review, 1995, 20(1), 70–71. 
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the structure through which the objectives of  the company are set, and the 
means of  attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for 
the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of  the 
company and its shareholders, and should facilitate effective monitoring”12  
 
By issuing the principles, the OECD provided a globally recognized 
benchmark for assessing and improving corporate governance. In this thesis, I will 
refer to “corporate governance” in its broader meaning, which comprises both 
internal and external governance factors.13 
 
 
1.2 Corporate Governance of  Banks: Why are they special? 
 
The debate on the importance of a good corporate governance in banking 
and financial institutions in general started in the 1980s,14 and flourished in the 
1990s, following the Asian Crisis. Scholars conducted researches trying to identify 
the roots of the crisis, and finally laid the blame on poor corporate governance, 
especially on the inefficiency of relationship-based capitalistic systems15 and the 
weak protection of minority shareholders.16 
In 1999, based on the belief  that an effective corporate governance of  
banking institutions is an indispensable condition for financial stability, the Basel 
Committee on Financial Supervision (BCBS), modelled after the OECD Principles, 
issued the guidance ‘Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations’ 
to encourage national supervisors to promote “…the adoption of  sound corporate 
																																																								
12 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), ‘OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance’, 1999, 9. The definition did not change in the last revised version (2015).  
13 For a review on corporate governance studies, see Shleifer & Vishny, n 7, 737-783. 
14  Specifically, the first contributions were published by Douglas W Diamond (‘Financial 
Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring’, The Review of Economic Studies (1984), 51(3), 393-414), 
and Eugene F Fama (‘What’s different about banks?’, Journal of Monetary economics (1985), 15(1), 
29). 
15 Raghuram G Rajan and Luigi Zingales, ‘Which Capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian Crisis’, 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance (1998), 11(3). 
16 According to Jonhson et al., the low protection of minority shareholders’ rights allowed the 
currency depreciation and the consequent crashing of the Asian markets. See Simon Johnson, Peter 
Boone, Alasdair Breach and Eric Friedman, ‘Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis’, 
Journal of Financial Economics (2000), 58, 1, 2. 
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governance practices by banking organisations in their countries”.17 The BCBS 
provided a definition of  corporate governance of  banks, as “…the manner in which 
the business and affairs of  banks are governed by their boards of  directors and 
senior management” in the way they: “set corporate objectives; operate the bank’s 
business on a day-to-day basis; meet the obligation of  accountability to their 
shareholders and take into account the interests of  other recognised stakeholders; 
align corporate activities and behaviour with the expectation that banks will operate 
in a safe and sound manner, and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations; 
and protect the interests of  depositors”.18 By highlighting the importance of  
protecting depositors’ interests, of  including supervisors and government among 
banks’ stakeholders, as well as of  the necessary compliance with a stricter and 
richer set of  rules,19 the guidance also anticipated some of  the common features – 
discussed in academic studies in the following years – which distinguish banking 
from non-financial institutions. However, the BCBS did not ignore the inefficiency 
of  a one-size-fits-all approach, based on the consideration that there are 
“…significant differences in the legislative and regulatory frameworks across 
countries as regards the functions of  the board of  directors and senior 
management”.20  
Starting from the 2000s, not only listed banks and even non-listed 
institutions increasingly highlighted the importance of  establishing a sound 
corporate governance, 21  but academics too conducted several analyses on the 
features of  corporate governance in banking institutions.22 A second wave of  
literature was produced starting from the second year following the 2007 financial 
crisis, after the global recognition of  the failure of  corporate governance in the 
prevention of  the financial turmoil and of  the need to reform it in a substantive 
way.23 
																																																								
17 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), Enhancing Corporate Governance for banking 
organizations (1999), § 6. 
18 Id, § 10. 
19 Id, § 9. 
20 Id, § 5. 
21 Peter O Mülbert, ‘Corporate Governance of Banks after the Financial Crisis - Theory, Evidence, 
Reforms’, ECGI Law Working paper Series, ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 130/2009, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1448118, 5, accessed 30 September 2018. 
22 For a review of the empirical and theoretical literature on the governance of banks before the 2007 
financial crisis, see Mülbert, n 21, note 15 e 16. 
23 At the beginning, studies on the financial crisis did not consider corporate governance as one of 
the main determinants of the crisis. See Mülbert, n 21, 7-8. 
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Given the strong impact financial institutions have on economic 
development and growth,24 several studies tried to identify the main characteristics 
that mark out credit institutions' governance from other institutions. In particular, 
based on previous contributions on the subject,25 we can distinguish among four 
traits: (a) liquidity risk and high leverage; (b) balance sheet opaqueness; (c) high 
interconnection; and (d) heavy regulation and supervision. As a result of  these 
aspects, banks are subject to high reputational and systemic risks26, as well as to 
specific agency costs (e). 
 
(a) High leverage and liquidity risk 
 
Liquidity risks derive from the maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities. For 
their nature, banks heavily rely on the so-called transformation of  maturities, which 
means that their business model consists in borrowing short and lending long.27 In 
other words, banks are highly leveraged firms, since they rely heavily on debt 
instead of  equity.28 This exposes banks to the need for continuous access to liquidity 
for their own survival, and explains the wave of  prudential regulation concerning 
banks’ liquidity risk and management.29 This comes as no surprise also considering 
that, liabilities being for the most part made up by deposits, a bank run poses high 
risks in terms of  financial stability.   
 
(b) Balance sheet opaqueness 
 
Banks, like pension funds and insurance companies,30 are famous for being less 
transparent than other firms. This opaqueness – which leads to information 
																																																								
24 Levine analysed the positive link between the functioning of financial institutions and economic 
development. See Ross Levine, ‘Financial development and economic growth: Views and agenda’, 
Journal of Economic Literature (1997), 35, 688-726. 
25 I especially refer to papers by Mülbert, n 21, Macey & O’Hara, n 25, 91–107, Klaus J Hopt, ‘Better 
Governance of Financial Institutions’ (2013), ECGI Law Working Paper No 207/2013, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2212198, accessed 30 September 2018. 
26 Hopt, n 25.  
27 Mülbert, n 21, 10. As a consequence, public trust is essential for banking system, see Hopt, n 25, 
Armour et al., n 27. 
28 Macey and O’Hara, n 25, 91-107. 
29 At the international level, I refer in particular to the Basel III Framework by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision; at the EU level, we refer to CRD IV package, comprising Directive 
2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) N° 575/2013. 
30 Donald Morgan, ‘Rating banks: Risk and uncertainty in an opaque industry’, American Economic 
Review (2002), 92, 874–888; Gerard Caprio & Jr Ross Levine, ‘Corporate governance in finance: 
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asymmetries between insiders and outsiders,31 and was one of  the major causes of  
the 2007 financial crisis –32 is mostly due to the complexity of  bank loans (their 
quality is not readily observable) and of  the financial products banks invest in (such 
as CDOs). This allows banks to change the risk composition of  their assets more 
quickly without taking new positions.33 
 
(c) High interconnection 
 
Credit institutions are usually tied one to each other because of  the nature of  their 
activities, and relate especially on the interbank, OTC and the foreign exchange 
markets. Therefore, a crisis hitting one bank can affect other banks and, if  contagion 
is severe, the entire financial system.34 This is why banks have been often described 
by using expressions such as “too big to fail”, “too connected to fail” or “too risk-
correlated to fail”.35 
 
(d)  Heavy regulation and supervision 
 
Because of  the special problems explained above – high liquidity risk, 
opaqueness and interconnection –, as well as their systemic importance, banks are 
subject to stronger regulatory intervention and supervisory control.36 Consequently, 
even corporate governance is differently regulated and heavily monitored in credit 
institutions. 
This may have both positive and negative effects for banks. On the one hand, 
banking regulation may limit banks' exposure to risks and set standards for sound 
liquidity management.37 On the other, regulators and governments may discourage 
																																																																																																																																																														
Concepts and international observations’, in R E Litan, M Pomerleano, and V. Sundararajan (eds), 
Financial Sector Governance: The Roles of the Public and Private Sectors, The Brookings Institution, 
2002, 17-50. 
31 Caprio & Levine, n 30, 17-50. 
32 Mülbert, n 21, 11. 
33 Mülbert, n 21; and Caprio & Levine, n 30, 17-50. 
34 Mülbert, n 21. 
35 John C Coffee Jr, ‘The political economy of Dodd-Frank: Why financial reform tends to be 
frustrated and systemic risk perpetuated’, Cornell L. Rev. (2012), 97, 1019; Steven L Schwarcz, 
‘Systemic Risk’, Georgetown Law Journal (2008), 97, 193, 202 et seq.. 
36 Mülbert, n 21. 
37 Mülbert, n 21. 
 
Shanshan Zhu 10 
competition by imposing ownership restrictions,38 limit the power of  markets to 
discipline the banks, its owners and managers,39 or even pursue their own interests 
instead of  social welfare.40 
 
(e)  Agency costs 
 
Due to their specialness, banks suffer from specific corporate governance 
issues from a principal-agency point of  view. 
As a consequence of  bank opaqueness and heavy banking regulation, 
competitive forces – which generally help firms and shareholders to limit and 
discipline managers’ behaviour through the threat of  takeovers – are rather weak in 
banks compared to non financial firms. 41  Moreover, government regulatory 
restrictions – especially those concerning ownership concentration and share 
purchase – though at times being inadequate at limiting family control of  banks, 
actually offered family-controlled banks increased safeguards from takeovers.42  
In banks, the mandatory board orientation towards creditors’ interests, and 
therefore the conflict of  interests between shareholders – who pursue profit 
maximization – and creditors (bondholders and depositors) – who are only 
interested in the bank’s ability to pay their debt – becomes an additional component 
to traditional principal-agency conflicts (majority/controlling vs. 
minority/dispersed shareholders and shareholders vs. managers).43 Thus, a solution 
aimed at maximising shareholder value is neither appropriate nor sufficient.44 
Moreover, the information asymmetries between insiders – shareholders, managers 
and directors – and outsiders – debtholders and other stakeholders – extend the 
																																																								
38 Stephen Prowse, ‘Corporate control in commercial banks’, Journal of Financial Research (1997), 
20, 509–527; Macey & O’Hara, n 25, 91–107. 
39 Penny Ciancanelli & José Antonio Reyes-Gonzalez, ‘Corporate Governance in Banking: A 
Conceptual Framework’ (2000), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=253714, accessed 5 October 
2018. 
40 Arnoud Boot & Anjan Thakor, ‘Self interested bank regulation’, American Economic Review 
(1993), 83, 206–212; James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, University of 
Michigan Press, 1962; and Alexander Hamilton & James Madison & John Jay, ‘Federalist Papers’ 
(1778), in C Rossiter (ed), New American Library, 1961. 
41 Ross E Levine, ‘The Corporate Governance of Banks: A Concise Discussion of Concepts and 
Evidence’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3404/2004, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=625281, accessed 10 October 2018; Prowse, n 38; Ciancanelli, n 39. 
42 Levine, n 41. 
43 Hopt, n 25, 8; Macey & O’Hara, n 25, 98; Mülbert, n 21, 15. 
44 Andy Mullineux, ‘The corporate governance of banks’, Journal of Financial regulation and 
Compliance (2006), 14, 4, 375-382. 
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opaqueness characterizing banks’ balance sheets to their entire operative structure.45 
This creates distortions in the incentive remuneration schemes, as the opacity of  
directors’ compensation packages tempts them to pursue short-term results, thereby 
accepting excessive risk-taking at the expense of  the long-run soundness of  the 
bank.46 Opaqueness also allows insiders to exploit outsiders, as occurred especially 
in most developing countries where a few families held the controlling shareholding 
of  most banks, which lent money incautiously to bank insiders.47  
According to some authors, regulators and supervisors should therefore be 
considered as stakeholders of  the bank.48 Critically, Hopt argues that it makes little 
sense thinking about regulators and supervisors as actors whose interests should be 
protected.49 According to the author, their intervention is external, as it would 
respond to the need to improve corporate governance for the maintenance of  
financial stability. However, I disagree with Hopt’s opinion, since, based on another 
critical approach,50 I doubt that the interests of  regulators and society as a whole 
are automatically aligned. Owing to this higher number of  parties having a stake in 
an institution’s activity, bank boards are burdened with extended responsibilities, 
and for this reason supervisors and regulators are now setting special suitability 
requirements for bank board members (see Section 2.2.3.2).  
 Finally, moral hazard is exacerbated also by deposit insurance, since this 
prevents shareholders from ever internalizing the losses from risky investments.51 
Indeed, with the aim to prevent the systemic risks of  bank runs, many legislators 
have provided safety nets – i.e. the lender of  last resort and the deposit insurance 
components – that not only have pushed shareholders and managers to engage in 
excessive risk-taking52, since depositors are less incentivised to monitor banks, but 
have also contributed to producing banks with very low capital-asset ratios.53 
																																																								
45 Levine, n 41, 7. 
46 Hopt, n 25, 14; Levine, n 41, 7; Macey & O’Hara, n 25, 98. 
47 Caprio & Levine, n 30, 17-50. 
48 Renee B Adams & Hamid Mehran, ‘Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding 
Companies?’, Economic Policy Review (2003), 9, 1, available at SSRN: 
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Principles for Sound Compensation Practices: An Analysis of Executive Pay at European Banks’, 
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1.3 The Role of  Corporate Governance in the Financial Crisis: does it really matter? 
 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, regulators, supervisors and the financial 
community in general started to question the efficacy of corporate governance 
arrangements in preventing misconduct in banks and in ensuring financial stability. 
Most of the official policy documents published after the financial turmoil argued 
that inefficient corporate governance arrangements promoted the illicit behaviours 
that ultimately led to the outbreak of the crisis. The OECD, for instance, concludes 
that the “the financial crisis can be to an important extent attributed to failures and 
weaknesses in corporate governance weaknesses” and, in particular, argued that the 
malfunctioning risk management, distorted incentive schemes which encouraged 
high risk-taking, and the lack of proper competence and expertise on the part of 
directors, led to a weak oversight by the board.54 This conviction was largely shared 
by financial authorities and policy makers.55 The Larosière report56 and the high-
level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU highlighted that corporate 
governance failures – in addition to macroeconomic factors, and the role played by 
credit rating agencies and supervisors – indirectly contributed to the start of the 
crisis. Based on the same premises, a year later the EU Commission in a Green 
paper stated that many deficiencies concerning the role of the board of directors and 
shareholders, and the performance of the risk management, supervision and auditing 
activities played a decisive role in the collapse of the financial institutions.57 The 
Commission, in particular, questioned the adequacy of traditional corporate 
governance principles in the financial services sector, as too broad and lax to ensure 
an effective implementation in such a complex sector suffering from unique agency-
costs issues, especially in relation to the different levels of risk appetite of 
shareholders and creditors (depositors, life insurance policy holders, beneficiaries of 
																																																								
54 Grant Kirkpatrick, ‘The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis’, OECD Journal 
of Financial Market Trends (2009), 1, 61. 
55 See EBA, ‘EBA Guidelines on Internal Governance 3’, 2011; Associacion of Chartered Certified 
Accountants, ‘Corporate Governance and the Credit Crunch’, 2008, 4, available at 
https://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/PDF-technical/corporate-
governance/cg_cc.pdf, accessed 20 October 2018; G20 Working Group 1, ‘Enhancing Sound 
Regulation and Strengthening Transparency’, 2009, available at 
https://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/g20%20working%20group%201%20report.p
df, accessed 20 October 2018. 
56 See the ‘Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU’, chaired by Jacques 
de Larosière, 2009, 7-11. 
57 EU Commission, Green Paper, Corporate governance in financial institutions and remuneration 
policies, Bruxelles, 284 final, 2010. 
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pension schemes).58 Based on the weaknesses and deficiencies highlighted in the 
Green paper, the Commission proposed – and later implemented – significant 
reforms concerning the composition and functioning of the board of directors, the 
risk management function, the role of external auditors and supervisory authorities, 
and the remuneration of the directors of financial listed companies (see 
Section1.2.3). 
Scholars too attempted to clarify the major deficiencies of corporate 
governance as evidenced by the financial crisis. Hopt, for example, identified five 
major causes: (i) failures in risk management and internal control, (ii) incompetence 
and inadequate profile of board members and senior managers, (iii) complex and 
opaque corporate and bank structures, (iv) wrong incentives, (v) and low levels of 
disclosure and transparency.59 
However, these arguments have been challenged by empirical studies that 
showed how corporate governance played no significant role during the crisis.60 For 
instance, Beltratti and Stulz,61 by analysing a sample of ninety-eight large banks 
across the world, found that banks with better governance did not perform better 
than other banks during the crisis. On the contrary, they found that banks with 
more pro-shareholder boards performed worse than others. In another study, 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz found that banks where CEO incentives were better aligned 
with the interests of shareholders “had worse stock returns and a worse return on 
equity.62 
From these findings it emerges that 'traditional' corporate governance 
arrangements – which tend to align the interests of shareholders and managers – 
played no valuable role during the crisis. On the contrary, they led managers to take 
higher risks. As I noticed in the previous section, this can be reasonably explained 
by considering that in the financial services industry the conflict of interests 
between shareholders - seeking high profitability and therefore prone to higher 
risks - and creditors – strongly risk-adverse – challenges the conventional wisdom 
																																																								
58 Id., 4-6. 
59 Hopt, n 25, 10-14.  
60 See Adams, n 349, 14-15.  
61 Andrea Beltratti & René M Stulz, ‘The Credit Crisis Around the Globe: Why Did Some Banks 
Perform Better?’, Charles A Dice Center Working Paper No. 2010-5; Fisher College of Business 
Working Paper No. 2010-03-005, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1572407 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1572407, accessed 15 October 2018. 
62 Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M Stulz, ‘Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis’, Journal of 
Financial Economics (2010), 99, 1, 11. 
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that banks with shareholder-friendly boards have a better governance. Moreover, it 
was reasonably highlighted that “in financial intermediaries a major part of the 
losses are externalized to stakeholders, while gains are fully internalized by 
shareholders and managers”.63 Bank creditors, unlike the creditors of other firms, 
are dispersed, suffer from a lack of oversight rights and therefore have no defensive 
tools against shareholder and manager opportunism.64  
We may conclude that bad corporate governance was not the main 
determinant of  the crisis, but only on the premise that corporate governance in 
banks does not differ from that of  non-financial firms. If  we consider the specific 
governance problems afflicting banks and other financial institutions, we notice that 
the application of  traditional corporate governance best practices to banks by policy 
makers and financial industry participants revealed itself  to be incautious.65 The so-
called 'good corporate governance', in other words, turned out to be a wrong 
governance when applied to banking institutions. Banks’ complexity and 
opaqueness, as well as their high leverage, the weight of  moral hazard (increased by 
government safety nets) and the conflicts among shareholders and a significant 
number of  stakeholders, suggest banks suffer from unique corporate governance 
issues and, therefore, should be subject to a special and tighter regulation compared 
to non-financial firms. As Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of  the 
International Monetary Fund, asserted in her well-known speech at the New York 
Fed “… trading on time, custodian of  savings, merchant of  trust bound by fiduciary 
duty, and beneficiary of  state implied guarantee makes banks indeed very special. In 
today’s world, the financial industry wields immense power over societies, 
economies and people. With this power comes the responsibility to uphold the 
highest ethical standards”66. 
It should be added that capital adequacy and other financial performance 
indicators played a significant role during the crisis. Beltratti and Stulz, for instance, 
found evidence that worse-performing banks before the crisis also did worse during 
and after the crisis, and conclude that the levels of financial returns, Tier 1 capital 
																																																								
63 See Guido Ferrarini, ‘Understanding the Role of Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions: 
A Research Agenda’, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 
347/2017, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2925721, accessed 20 
October 2018, 8.  
64 Armour et al., n 27.  
65 Id. 
66 Speech, Christine Lagarde, ‘The Role of Personal Accountability in Reforming Culture and 
Behavior in the Financial Services Industry’, New York Fed, November 5, 2015. 
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ratio and deposit amounts were the most relevant factors discriminating worst- and 
best-performing banks, as confirmed by other empirical studies.67 
In conclusion, regardless of the actual role played by corporate governance 
in the crisis, there is no doubt that reform was needed in order to face the 
deficiencies detected. Moreover, supervisors and regulators have to play an essential 
role in reducing risk propensity and obliging banks to maintain capital above a 
certain level in order to ensure financial stability.68 However, since, as I discuss in 
Part II, the financial scandals were ultimately caused by a widespread dysfunctional 
culture in the financial sector, and given that regulation per se cannot be expected to 
promote good corporate culture, I argue that the role of corporate governance 





67 See Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Enrica Detragiache & Ouarda Merrouche, ‘Bank Capital: Lessons from 
the Financial Crisis’, Policy Working Paper 5473/2010, World Bank, available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp10286.pdf, accessed 20 October 2018; Allen N 
Berger and Christa H S Bouwman, ‘Bank Capital, Survival and Performance around Financial Crises’, 
Working Paper (2009).  
68 Lawrence White, ‘Corporate Governance and Prudential Regulation of Banks: Is There Any 
Connection?’, in James R Barth, Chen Lin & Clas Wihlborg (eds), Research Handbook for Banking and 
Governance, Elgar Publishing, 2011,available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1836716, accessed 21 
October 2018, note 2, 344. 
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Chapter II 
 
Global Principles and European Banking Union Regulatory Framework 
 
1.2.1 The Global Principles by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Financial 
Stability Board – 1.2.2 The European Banking Union and EU recent reforms. – 1.2.3 Regulating 
Governance in the European Banking Union. - 1.2.3.1 Regulatory and Supervisory Approach. - 
1.2.3.2 The EU Regulatory Framework – 1.2.3.2.1 CRD IV. - 1.2.3.2.2 EBA Guidelines. - 
1.2.3.2.3 ECB regulation. 
 
 
Several significant corporate governance reforms have been enacted over the 
last two decades. In particular, a first wave of reforms took place at the beginning of 
the 2000s, immediately after the Enron bankruptcy and other corporate scandals. 
These reforms concerned in particular the role of auditors and executive 
compensations for both financial and non-financial corporations. The great financial 
crisis triggered the second wave of reforms mainly addressed to financial 
institutions, which implied significant intervention not only in terms of prudential 
regulation and crisis management, but also with reference to compensation 
practices, board composition and risk management functions.  
 
 
1.2.1 The Global Principles by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and 
the Financial Stability Board  
 
Since the crisis, establishing a sound financial system has been regulators’ 
highest priority. As a consequence, the banking sector is still today one of the most 
developed areas of reform. At the present time, the Basel III standards, published by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) set out a global framework 
and provide a foundation for a resilient banking system, by requiring banks to fulfil 
a series of requirements in relation to capital, leverage and liquidity.69 In particular, 
Basel III reforms aim at: (a) improving the quality of bank regulatory capital by 
																																																								
69 BCBS, ‘Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems’, 
December 2010 (later revised in June 2011). 
 ,  
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placing a greater focus on Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital; (b) increasing the 
level of capital requirements; (c) improving risk measurement and management; (d) 
limiting systemic risks; and (e) specifying a minimum leverage ratio requirement to 
constrain excess leverage. Furthermore, the BCBS have introduced an international 
framework for mitigating excessive liquidity transformation, through the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio and Net Stable Funding Ratio. 70 
Many other policy documents specifically addressed corporate governance 
issues of banks. In 1999, the BCBS, based on the OECD’s Principles of Corporate 
Governance published the same year, issued its first corporate governance guidance 
– ‘Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations’ –, later revised in 
February 2006, “to assist banking supervisors in promoting the adoption of sound 
corporate governance practices by banking organizations in their countries71”. In 
October 2010, the BCBS issued a new guidance, the ‘Principles for enhancing 
Corporate Governance’, later revised in 2015 under the name ‘Corporate 
governance principles for Banks’ (BCBS Principles) in which it establishes thirteen 
high-level principles, in order to assist not only banking supervisors, but also 
banking organizations worldwide with the implementation of sound practices. The 
principles should be implemented by any kind of banking organization, regardless of 
size or ownership structure. However, the BCBS Principles specify that “the 
implementation of these principles should be commensurate with the size, 
complexity, structure, economic significance, risk profile and business model of the 
bank and the group (if any) to which it belongs”.72 
According to the new guidelines, a bank’s board, among its other duties, 
should 73  (1) carry out its overall responsibilities for the bank, such as the 
establishment of the bank’s organizational structure, risk governance framework, its 
corporate culture and values, as well as monitoring senior management on the 
implementation of the bank’s strategy; (2) have members with appropriate 
experience in financial activities, professionalism and personal integrity, favouring 
qualified non-executive members in order to enhance board independency and 
objectivity; (3) define appropriate governance practices, for example by establishing 
specialized board committees and setting a formal conflicts of interest policy (paying 
																																																								
70 Id. 
71 See BCBS, ‘Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations’, September 1999   
72 BCBS, ‘Corporate governance principles for Banks’, 2015, 6. 
73 Id., Principles 1,2,3 and 9. 
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close attention to the presence of controlling shareholders); and (4) actively 
supervise the compensation system and review it to ensure its correct operation (in 
particular, it should be aligned with prudent risk-taking). As to senior management, 
this should ensure that a bank’s activities are consistent with its business strategy, 
risk tolerance/appetite and policies approved by the board74. A bank should also 
have an effective internal controls system and a risk management function 
responsible for identifying, measuring, controlling or mitigating, and reporting on 
risk exposures; a Chief Risk Officer or an equivalent should be appointed75. In a 
group structure, the board and senior management should have a good knowledge 
and understanding of the bank’s structure and the risks that this structure poses76. 
Specific principles are also set out in relation to compliance, internal audit, 
compensation, disclosure and transparency, and the role of supervisors.77 
In relation to remuneration, the BSBC refers to the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) ‘Principles for Sound Compensation Practices’ (FSB Principles) and their 
Implementation Standards, which apply to all significant financial institutions.78 
These call for an effective governance of  compensation, and supervisory oversight 
and engagement by stakeholders, but also require financial institutions to align 
compensation practices to prudent-risk taking, which means that they should be 
adjusted for all types of  risk and be symmetric with risk outcomes. Deferred 
compensation should make compensation pay-out schedules sensitive to the time 
horizon of  risks. Moreover, for senior executives, as for other key employees, a 
substantial portion of  variable compensation (from 40 to 60 per cent), should be 
payable under deferral arrangements over a period of  not less than three years, in 
proportion to the level of  seniority and/or responsibility, and, in order to provide an 
incentive for long-term value creation, at least 50 per cent of  variable compensation 
should be awarded in shares or share-linked instruments.  
With reference to bonuses, the FSB considers ‘guaranteed bonuses’ not 
consistent with sound management or the pay-for-performance principle. 
																																																								
74 Id, Principle 4 
75 Id, Principle 6-7. 
76 Id., Principle 5. 
77 Id, Principles 9-13. 
78 See Financial Stability Forum, ‘FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices’, April 2009; and 
Financial Stability Board (FSB), ‘FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices. Implementation 
Standards’, September 2009. 
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Accordingly, clawback mechanisms should operate in case of  negative performance 
of  the firm during the vesting period. 
 
1.2.2 The European Banking Union and EU recent reforms 
 
In October 2008, the EU Commission Chairman José Manuel Barroso chose 
Jacques de Larosière to chair a group of experts to give advice on reforms to be 
enacted in the EU in relation to financial regulation and supervision. The final 
report, published in 2009, discussed a number of key areas in need of regulatory 
reforms: stronger macroeconomic policy and macro-prudential analysis, reform of 
the Basel 2 framework, credit rating agencies' accounting, insurance, 
sanctions/supervisory powers, parallel banking system, securitized 
products/derivatives markets, and investment funds. Building on the report’s 
recommendations, from that moment on the EU Commission started to enact a 
series of significant reforming interventions that are still today shaping the entire 
European financial system. 
In 2010, the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) was 
established, covering both micro-prudential and macro-prudential supervision. In 
relation to micro-prudential supervision, three European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs) were founded: the European Banking Authority (EBA),79 the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA),80 and the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).81 With regard to macro-prudential 
supervision, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) has been established.82 The 
ESFS includes also representatives of supervisory authorities from each Member 
State, and cooperates with many other financial authorities.  
																																																								
79 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 
2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending 
Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC 
80 Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 
2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 
2009/79/EC. 
81 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 
2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), 
amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC. 
82 Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 
2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a 
European Systemic Risk Board.  
 
Shanshan Zhu 20 
To summarize, the ESFS comprises the ESRB, the ESAs and the Member 
States’ competent supervisory authorities. The main objective of the ESFS is to 
ensure the adequate implementation of the rules enacted in the financial sector in 
order to protect consumers, limit the distress of individual financial institutions and 
thus preserve financial stability in general.  
However, the simple coordination activity among supervisory authorities was 
not sufficient to prevent the fragmentation of the European financial market. 
Consequently, in 2012 the Commission proposed the creation of a EU Banking 
Union aimed at further integrating the banking sector. Following the European 
Commission roadmap,83 the EU institutions agreed to create a banking union based 
on three pillars: the single supervisory mechanism (SSM),84 a single resolution 
mechanism (SRM)85 and a European deposit insurance Scheme (EDIS). The first 
two pillars of the banking union have been already fully implemented, which means 
that all EU banks are supervised according to the same standards within the 
framework of the SSM, that the most significant banks are centrally supervised by 
the European Central Bank (ECB) and that in case of failure, banks can be centrally 
resolved following the same standards within the SRM, which is backed by a Single 
Resolution Fund (SRF). However, the third pillar – aiming at establishing a 
common system for deposit protection – has still to be implemented. Moreover, in 
October 2017 the European Commission urged the EU Parliament and the Council 
to quickly adopt further measures in order to complete the Banking Union and 
improve risk management within the banking sector. 86 In this regard, in February 
2018, the Commission published a comprehensive package fostering financial 
stability in the EU by focusing on a mix of complementary policy actions in four 
areas as set out in the ECOFIN Action Plan on NPLs: (i) bank supervision and 
																																																								
83 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, ‘A Roadmap towards a Banking Union’, COM/2012/0510 final. 
84 See Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 which established the SSM and 
conferred specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of 
credit institutions (SSM regulation). 
85 See Regulation (Eu) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 
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certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution 
Fund. 
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Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on 
completing the Banking Union, COM(2017) 592 final. 
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regulation, (ii) national restructuring, insolvency and debt recovery frameworks, (iii) 
secondary markets for distressed assets, and (iv) bank restructuring.87  
On the regulatory side, a Single Rulebook was established in order to provide 
a single set of harmonised prudential rules to be respected throughout the EU. The 
single Rulebook consists of three main pillars: (i) the Capital Requirements 
Directive IV (CRD IV)88 and Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)89  - known as 
the CRD IV Package - which implements the Basel III capital requirements; (ii) the 
Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGSD), which regulates deposit 
insurance in case of a bank’s inability to pay its debts; 90 and the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive (BRRD), which establishes a framework for the recovery and 
resolution of credit institutions and investment firms in danger of failing.91 
At level II, the Single Rulebook includes the Binding Technical Standards 
(BTS) issued by the EBA for the implementation of the main legislative acts, aiming 
at ensuring consistent harmonisation in each area of intervention, and the legislative 
measures adopted by national legislation implementing the directives and the 
provisions issued by each national banking authority. Furthermore, in relation to 
the SSM the Single Rulebook encompasses also the provisions issued by the ECB.92 
 
1.2.3 Regulating Governance in the European Banking Union 
 
As we have already seen in the previous sections, the conduit for creating an 
efficient and harmonized banking system is the implementation of a strong and 
complex reforming process which is still under development, and which involves the 
active intervention of the EU Commission, the EBA, the ECB and national 
supervisors and regulators. However, before analysing the interventions made in 
corporate governance framework, it should be recalled that in the process of bank 
																																																								
87 ‘Overview of Progress in Achieving Risk Reduction Measures (RRMs). A Follow-up Note to the 
February 2018 discussions on EMU deepening’, available at 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35862/riskreduction.pdf, accessed 21 October 2018. 
88 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access 
to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and 
investment firms. 
89 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) 
No 648/2012. 
90 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit 
guarantee schemes. 
91  Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms.  
92 SSM Regulation, Article 4, par 3 and Article 9.  
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governance integration and rationalization, the EU legislator had to deal with many 
issues. The most relevant concerned the choice between a regulatory and a 
supervisory approach.  
 
1.2.3.1 Regulatory and Supervisory Approach 
For many years, corporate governance of banks was subject to non-binding 
‘soft law’ rules issued by the BCBS or agreed documents and contracts, such as 
corporate governance codes. However, the financial crisis marked a shift in this 
approach, and international financial authorities called for stricter regulation and 
supervision of the entire sector. Mülbert describes the relationship between 
corporate governance and banking regulation/supervision as a “functional 
relationship”, as banking regulation and supervision fill the deficiencies in the 
monitoring activities carried out by depositors/debtholders in respect to the 
excessive risk taking by management (serving shareholders’ interests).93  In Europe, 
the most affected area in this regard has been compensation. At the beginning of the 
crisis, public opinion immediately accused bankers of being paid excessive bonuses, 
especially considered the actual performance of the credit institutions, and incentive 
compensation in general started to be conceived as one of the main determinants of 
the crisis. In dealing with the issue, the EU institutions adopted a regulatory 
approach – mainly based on the establishment of ex-ante fixed detailed rules – in 
opposition to the proposed supervisory approach - built on the establishment of 
principles to be flexibly implemented and ex-post overseen by supervisors. In 
particular, the EU introduced detailed rules, which largely reflect FSB principles 
and standards but, to a certain extent, also went beyond by setting out, for example, 
a cap on variable compensation, in order to limit the short-termism.94 A regulatory 
approach was adopted also in relation to the maximum of number of directorships a 
director of the management body can hold.95  
As a consequence, corporate governance in the banking sector, for the reasons 
earlier specified as well as for the strong preventive response EU regulators were 
																																																								
93 Mülbert, n 21, 25,26. 
94 See Guido Ferrarini, ‘CRD IV and the Mandatory Structure of Bankers’ Pay’ in ECGI Law 
Working paper Series, ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 289, 2015, p.20. I further analyse the issue of 
compensation in Chapter IV, this thesis. 
95 Directive 2013/36/EU, Article 91. 
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urgently called to enact, is no longer subject to non-binding soft rules.  
The choice between a supervisory approach and regulatory approach in 
banking governance has been widely debated and the strict regulatory approach was 
subject to criticism. If we consider trust and, in particular, the restoration of public 
trust as one of the main objectives of the entire financial reforming process, the task 
facing corporate governance in banks is clearly complex and one that cannot be 
addressed only by means of a regulatory approach. The necessity to restore trust in 
the financial sector was shared by the EBA in the Guidelines on Internal 
Governance, where it stated that “trust in the reliability of the banking system is 
crucial for its proper functioning and a prerequisite if it is to contribute to the 
economy as a whole. Consequently, effective internal governance arrangements are 
fundamental if institutions, individually, and the banking system, are to operate 
well”.96  
However, as I better explain in Part II, trust is not only a matter of sound 
financial performance, but it largely relates to culture, in particular to the moral 
context in which financial operators behave. And whilst regulation may standardise 
internal control procedures, compensation schemes and risk management functions, 
establishing a sound culture seems to be out of reach, since dishonest bankers will 
always strive to find loopholes to circumvent legal obligations. As noticed by the 
G30, following the crisis, a strong focus was put on regulating risk-based capital, 
liquidity, resolution, and risk management, while no special attention was paid to 
maybe “softer”, but fundamental issues, such as “enhancing supervisor-board 
relations to improve supervisor and board effectiveness, or on the culture of firms, 
which many observers consider to be contributors to the financial crisis.”97 For the 
complex and dynamic nature of some cultural aspects that corporate governance has 
to deal with, a supervisory approach seems to be more suitable (see the DNB case, 
Section 2.5.3). Let us just consider the difficulties regulators may encounter in 
providing strict rules concerning concepts such as ‘independency’, ‘time 
commitment’, and ‘experience’ with reference to key banks’ board members. The 
hard task should be conferred not only to the banks board themselves, but also to 
the supervisory authorities, which should operate a double check on the banks’ 
candidates or at least provide guidelines for the harmonization of the assessment 
																																																								
96 EBA, n 55. 
97 G30, ‘A New Paradigm: Financial Institution Boards and Supervisors’, 2013, 11. 
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criteria. Supervisors, rather than regulators, are able to “…deal(ing) with 
complexity, innovation and continuous change”. 98  Accordingly, the European 
Central Bank recently published a guide to fit and proper assessment –99 which 
applies to the 19 euro area countries - in line with the ‘Joint ESMA and EBA 
Guidelines on the assessment of the suitability of members of the management 
body’.100 The guidelines, as opposed to strict rules, are intended to be practical tools 
for bank boards that should be updated regularly in order to reflect new 
developments as well as experience gained through practice. Similar principles, but 
referring to the specific relationship between supervision and culture, have been 
acknowledged by the FSB,101 the G30102 and also by the De Nederlandsche Bank,103 
as I further analyse in Chapter V, Part II. 
 
1.2.3.2 The EU Regulatory Framework 
In the EU, corporate governance of banking institutions is nowadays 
regulated al Level 1 by Directive EU/2013/36 (CRD IV), at Level 2 by the EBA 
Guidelines and, at the national level, by legislation implementing the EU directives 
and the regulatory measures issued by national authorities. The framework includes 
also the decisions issued by the ECB in its role of competent supervisory authority 
within the European Banking Union. 
1.2.3.2.1 CRD IV 
 
By issuing the Capital Requirements Directive IV (‘CRD IV’) and the 
accompanying Capital Requirements Regulation (‘CRR’), the EU implemented the 
																																																								
98 Keynote, Mr Jaime Caruana (BIS General Manager), ‘Regulatory stability and the role of 
supervision and governance’, Tenth High-level Meeting on Global Banking Standards and 
Supervisory Priorities in the Americas, jointly organised by the Association of Supervisors of Banks 
of the Americas (ASBA), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Financial 
Stability Institute (FSI), Montevideo, 28 October 2015. 
99 ECB, ‘Guide to fit and proper assessments’ (May 2017).  
100 ESMA and EBA, ‘Guidelines on the assessment of the suitability of members of the management 
body and key function holders’ (March 2018), ESMA71-99-598 EBA/GL/2017/12. 
101 FSB, ‘Guidance on Supervisory Interaction with Financial Institutions on Risk Culture: A 
Framework for Assessing Risk Culture’, April 2014. Other related FSB reports include: ‘Principles 
for an Effective Risk Appetite Framework’, November 2013, and ‘Principles for Sound Compensation 
Practices’, April 2009. 
102 G30, ‘Banking conduct and culture: A call for sustained and comprehensive reform’, July 2015. 
103 Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) and De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), 
‘Capacity for change in the financial sector’, 2014. 
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Basel III capital requirements and leverage ratio requirements, but also introduced a 
mandatory set of standards for corporate governance, which applies to credit 
institutions and investment firms.104 Actually, this is not the first attempt by the EU 
to harmonize banking governance, as Article 22(1) of the recast Banking Directive 
2006/45/EC in 2006 required banks to provide robust governance arrangements, 
including a clear organizational structure with well-defined, transparent and 
consistent lines of responsibility, effective processes to identify, manage, monitor 
and report the risks it is or might be exposed to, as well as adequate internal control 
mechanisms, including sound administrative and accounting procedures. 
CRD IV reflects the combination of the first governance arrangements 
established by the previous Directive and the additional standards set out, at the 
international level, by the BSBC105 and the FSB,106 and at the EU level, by the EBA 
in its Guidelines on Internal Governance,107 and the EU Commission in the Green 
Paper on Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and Remuneration 
Policies of June 2010.108 According to Mülbert and Wilhelm, the main regulatory 
purposes of the entire CRD IV framework are: (i) risk mitigation, (ii) stabilization of 
the EU financial Market, and (iii) the promotion of public interest, and the 
underlying conceptions are that “more regulation is better regulation” and that 
“character is the key to good corporate governance at board level (but money ruins 
everything, first and foremost character)”.109  
As a result, CRD IV now provides specific requirements in relation to: (a) 
board duties and composition; (b) risk management; and (c) remuneration policy. 
 
 
a) Board functions and composition 
 
With reference to the first subject, CRD IV establishes that the board is to 
																																																								
104 For an in depth analysis of CRD IV, see Peter O Mülbert & Alexander Wilhelm, ‘CRD IV 
Framework for Banks’ Corporate Governance’, in Danny Busch & Guido Ferrarini (eds) European 
Banking Union, Oxford University Press, 2015, 155, 196-97.  
105 We refer, in particular, to the BCBS Enhancements for the Basel II framework of July 2009, and 
to the BCBS, Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance of October 2010 (an enhanced version 
of the 2006 paper on Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations’). 
106 FSB, n 78. 
107 EBA, n 55.  
108 EU Commission, ‘Green Paper: Corporate governance in financial institutions and remuneration 
policies, COM(2010) 284 Final.  
109  See Peter Mülbert & Wilhelm, n 104, 169.  
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monitor bank’s risk strategy, financial integrity, senior management and the proper 
of disclosure of information.110  
CRD IV requires boards to comprise directors “of sufficiently good repute” 
with “sufficient knowledge, skills and experience to perform their duties”, that 
should be carried out “with honesty, integrity and independence of mind to 
effectively assess and challenge the decisions of the senior management where 
necessary”.111 At the same time, the board should possess “adequate collective 
knowledge, skills and experience to be able to understand the institution’s activities, 
including the main risks”.112 For this purpose, institutions must devote adequate 
human and financial resources to the induction and training of board members.113  
Board members should also devote sufficient time to the task and, to this end, 
there are limitations on the number of directorships a member may hold at the same 
time.114 In particular, unless representing a Member State, board members of a 
significant institution in terms of size, internal organization and nature, scope and 
complexity of its activities shall not hold more than (a) one executive directorship 
and two non-executive directorships or (b) four non-executive directorships at the 
same time, unless duly authorized by the competent authorities or assume one 
additional non-executive directorship.115 Moreover, on the premise that boards 
should reflect “a broad set of qualities and competences”, credit institutions are 
mandated to promote board diversity.116 To this end, “individual board members’ 
attitude should facilitate communication, collaboration and critical debate in the 
decision-making process”. 
Board diversity is in particular seen as a means of fighting the ‘group-think’ 
phenomenon, as well as when the board is dominated by a single, authoritative CEO 
or by a small group.117 As a consequence, nomination committees – that should be 
established in large banks – should introduce targets for the “representation of the 
underrepresented gender” in the board.118 Although CRD IV does not impose 
																																																								
110 CRD IV, Article 88(1). 
111 Id., Article 91(1)(8). 
112 Id., Art 91(7). 
113 Id., Article 91(9). 
114 Id., Article 91(3)(4). In particular, Paragraph 4 mandates that not more than two non-executive 
roles at other organizations may be combined with one executive role, and not more than four non-
executive roles in total may be held by any individual director 
115 Id., Art 91(4). 
116 Id., Article 91(10). 
117 See Section 2.2.4. 
118 CRD IV, Article 91(2)(a).  
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requirements in terms of proportions of independent directors in the board, it sets a 
clear separation between the role of Chair and Chief Executive Officer within the 
same institution, and specific independent requirements for members of the 
nomination, remuneration, and risk committees.119 
As mandated by the Directive,120 EBA issued specific guidelines on board 
composition and requirements (see Section 2.2.3.2).  
 
b) Risk Management 
 
In relation to risk management, CRD IV requires boards to approve and 
periodically review “the strategies and policies for taking up, managing, monitoring 
and mitigating the risks the institution is or might be exposed to”.121 In order to 
perform this function, the board must “devote sufficient time to consideration of risk 
issues”, and that a risk committee be established by significant banks.122 The 
requirement for the introduction of the risk committee undoubtedly represents the 
most significant change. The committee should be composed of non-executive 
directors with “appropriate knowledge, skills and expertise to fully understand and 
monitor the risk strategy and the risk appetite of the institutions”, and it should 
perform several tasks: (i) assisting the board in identifying the institution's current 
and future risk appetite and strategy and in overseeing the implementation of the 
risk strategy by senior managers, and (ii) reviewing whether prices of liabilities and 
assets offered to clients do properly reflect risks in accordance with the business 
model and risk strategy.123 The board or the risk committee is required also to 
ensure that incentive pay packages take into consideration risk, capital, liquidity and 
the likelihood and timing of earnings.  
Credit institutions are also required to ensure they have established a “risk 
management function” independent from the operational functions and should 
ensure that all material risks are identified, measured and properly reported. The 
risk functions should also be involved “in elaborating the institution’s risk strategy 
and in all material risk management decisions”, as well as ensuring that “it can 
																																																								
119 Id., Article 88(1) and 95. 
120 Id., Article 91(12). 
121 Id., Article 76(1). 
122 Id., Article 76(2)(3). 
123 Id., Article 76(3). 
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deliver a complete view of the whole range of risks of the institution”.124 The head of 
the risk management function, which depending “on the nature, scale and 
complexity of the activities of the institutions” should be a dedicated senior manager 
or another senior person, removable only with the prior approval of the board.125 
 
c) Bankers’ compensation 
 
In line with FSB Principles, CRD IV establishes several criteria to be followed 
in the creation of the remuneration policy, all aimed at discouraging risk-taking that 
exceeds the level of institutions’ “tolerated risk”. Compensation policy should be: (i) 
“consistent and promote sound and effective risk management” and not “encourage 
risk-taking that exceeds the level of tolerated risk; (ii) in line with the business 
strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the institution; (iii) adopted 
and periodically reviewed by the board, at least annually”.126 For significant banks, a 
remuneration committee, composed of non-executive directors, should be 
established.127 This has to prepare board decisions regarding remuneration by 
taking into consideration “the long-term interests of shareholders, investors and 
other stakeholders in the institution and the public interest”.128 With reference to 
variable compensation, as mentioned above, CRD IV goes beyond FSB Principles by 
imposing a cap on the amount of variable compensation that could be paid. This 
applies to senior management, but also refers to “risk takers, staff engaged in 
control functions and any employee receiving a total remuneration that takes them 
into the same remuneration bracket as senior management and risk takers, whose 
professional activities have a material impact on their risk profile”.129 Variable 
compensation, established by taking into account both financial and non-financial 
assessment criteria, should not exceed the amount of fixed pay for any individual 
(one-to one ratio) or twice the size of the fixed pay if approved by the supermajority 
																																																								
124 Id., Article 76(5). 
125 Id., Article 76(5).  
126 Id., Article 92(a-d).  
127 Id., Article 95. 
128 Id., Article 95(2). 
129 Id., Article 92(2). Pursuant to Article 94(2), the EU Commission adopted a delegated Regulation 
supplementing CRD IV as regards the identification of ‘risk takers’. See Commission delegated 
Regulation (EU) 640/2014 of 4 March 2014 OJ L 167/30C, based on the respective EBA draft 
regulatory technical standard (EBA/RTS/2013/11) of 16 December 2013.  
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of shareholders.130 Moreover, the Directive establishes that up to twenty-five per 
cent of the bonus may be paid in long-term instruments valued on a discounted 
basis, provided that these are deferred for at least five years.131 With reference to 
variable remuneration, it is also required that at least fifty per cent of it should 
consist of shares or equivalent instruments that adequately reflect the credit quality 
of the institution as a going concern and are appropriate to be used for the purposes 
of variable remuneration. These instruments should be subject to “an appropriate 
retention policy designed to align incentives with the longer-term interests of the 
institution”.132In addition, at least 40% of variable remuneration should be deferred 
over a period which is not less than three to five years.133 Moreover, up to one 
hundred per cent of the variable compensation should be subject to malus or 
clawback arrangements, taking into account the situations of misconduct or failure 
in meeting fitness and propriety standards.134 
From this brief overview, it emerges that the EU legislator provided detailed 
rules on executive compensation, with the aim to prevent the short-term approach 
that was widely recognized as one of the most patent corporate governance failures 
during the crisis. However, as I extensively discuss in depth in Chapter IV, Part II, 
legislators and policymakers, in regulating compensation, based remuneration 
principles and standards on traditional agency theory, and did not take into 
consideration recent behavioural studies on motivation and incentives.  
 
d) Governance structures in CRD IV 
 
By adhering to a functional position, CRD IV does not require the adoption of 
a specific governance structure, but instead keeps a substantive neutrality vis-à-vis 
the model of governance each bank chooses to adhere to.  
By recognizing the presence of differences in governance structures across the 
Member States, the Directive itself clarifies that the definitions used in many 
provisions – such as “management body” and “management body in its supervisory 
function” – should “embrace all existing structures without advocating any 
																																																								
130 Id., Article 94(1)(a)(g). 
131 Id., Article 94(g)(iii). 
132 Id., Article 94(l). 
133 Id., Article 94(m). 
134 Id., Article 94(n). 
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particular structure”. 135  Accordingly, the term ‘management body’ is used to 
indicate the “institution's body or bodies […] which are empowered to set the 
institution's strategy, objectives and overall direction, and which oversee and 
monitor management decision-making, and include the persons who effectively 
direct the business of the institution”, while the expression “management body in its 
supervisory function” refers to “the management body acting in its role of 
overseeing and monitoring management decision-making”.136 
In line with CRD IV, the EBA, in its current Guidelines on Internal 
Governance137 specifies that the terms “‘management body in its management 
function’ and ‘management body in its supervisory function’ are used throughout 
these guidelines without referring to any specific governance structure”, and that 
“references to the management (executive) or supervisory (non-executive) function 
should be understood as applying to the bodies or members of the management 
body responsible for that function in accordance with national law.”  
The EU regulator therefore seems to have followed the same line adopted by 
the BCBS in its guidelines.138 However, according to Mülbert, 139 although CRD IV 
formally embraced a neutral approach to governance structure, this is actually built 
on the one-tier board structure model, since many provisions would not easily apply 
to two-tier board systems.140 This would, to a certain extent, cause an unjustified 
discrimination. First of all, the separation of CEO and board chair141 clearly refers 
to the one-tier board system.142 Second, the key definitions of “management body” 
and “management body in its supervisory functions” are evidently tailored to one-
tier board structures and therefore create an unjustified ambiguity in the application 
of certain provisions for two-tier board systems. Due to these implementation 
																																																								
135 Id., Recital 55.  
136 Id, Article 3(7)(8). 
137 EBA, Guidelines on internal governance under Directive 2013/36/EU (2017), 
(EBA/GL/2017/11), 8 (§22). 
138 The BCBS clarified that the guidelines are “intended to guide the actions of board members, 
senior managers, control function heads and supervisors of a diverse range of banks in a number of 
countries with varying legal and regulatory systems, including both Committee member and non-
member jurisdictions. The Committee recognises that there are significant differences in the 
legislative and regulatory frameworks across countries which may restrict the application of certain 
principles or provisions therein”. See BCBS, n 72 §15  
139 Mülbert & Wilhelm, n 104, 168. 
140 Jaap Winter, ‘The Financial Crisis: Does Good Corporate Governance Matter and How to 
Achieve it?’, in Eddy Wymeersch, Klaus J. Hopt, and Guido Ferrarini (eds), Financial Regulation and 
Supervision, Oxford University Press, 2012, 12.21. 
141 CRD IV, Article 88(1)(e). 
142 Mülbert & Wilhelm, n 104, 173. 
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difficulties, the Directive itself clarifies that the “Member State(s) shall identify the 
bodies or members of the management body responsible in accordance with its 
(their) national law”, and therefore confers excessive regulatory discretion to 
national legislators. However, the core of criticism refers to the concept of 'senior 
management', which is defined as “those natural persons who exercise executive 
functions within an institution and who are responsible, and accountable to the 
management body, for the day-to-day management of the institution.”143 In two-tier 
board systems – such as the typical German model – the definition actually refers to 
the members of the management board, who are “responsible and accountable for 
the day-to-day management of the undertaking”.144  Board requirements under 
Article 91 therefore apply to all members of senior management. On the contrary, 
the management body in the one-tier board system is not responsible for day-to-day 
management, and hence the same provisions apply only to members of senior 
management who are also members of the management body as executive directors, 
while the remaining senior managers are subject only to the requirements under 
Article 91(1). The result is that in two-tier board systems only members of the 
managing board may serve as Chief Risk Officer, while in one-tier systems also non-
executive directors can be selected. Another consequence is that, since the 
remuneration committee is tasked with the direct supervision of the remuneration of 
“senior officers”,145 the rule would apply only to members of the managing board in 
two-tier board companies, but also to lower-ranked executives in one-tier board 
banks. 
Notwithstanding the fact that most CRD IV rules are undoubtedly inspired by 
the most commonly adopted one-tier board system, and many ambiguities and 
inconsistencies make the implementation somehow troublesome, it should be argued 
that the alternative of providing different sets of rules would cause even more 
confusion and complexity. Moreover, we should also keep in mind that many 
scholars and practitioners in Germany advanced some legislative proposals that 
would allow companies to choose between alternative board models to better align 
with EU common practices.146 
																																																								
143 CRD IV, Article 3(9). 
144 Id., Recital 56. 
145 Id., Article 92(2)(f). 
146 Carsten M Jungmann, ‘The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance in One-Tier and Two-Tier 
Board Systems - Evidence from the UK and Germany’, European Company and Financial Law 
Review (2006), 428-429. 
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1.2.3.2.2 EBA Guidelines  
 
Since the publication of the Guidelines on Internal Governance in 2011 
(revised in 2017),147 the EBA has exercised its coordinating and supplementary 
functions to promote further harmonization of the banking system in relation to the 
specific internal governance arrangements, processes and mechanisms within the 
EU. The EBA should be also informed of the imposition of administrative penalties 
and other administrative measures, and it should maintain a central database of 
administrative penalties communicated to it, which is accessible to competent 
authorities.148 However, the EBA does not share with the ESMA and the EIOPA 
direct supervisory powers on banks. 
CRD IV entrusts the EBA with the development of technical standards, 
guidelines, and recommendations on specific aspects of banks’ governance, to be 
incorporated in the Rulebook. In particular, the EBA is mandated for the issuance of 
guidelines concerning: (a) banks’ governance arrangements, risk management and 
internal control mechanisms;149 (b) sound remuneration policies, taking into account 
the 2009 Commission Recommendations and co-operating closely with ESMA;150 
and (c) various requirements applicable to the management body, including the 
notions of sufficient time commitment, adequate collective knowledge, skills and 
experience, honesty, integrity, independence of mind, and diversity.151 Consistently, 
the EBA in 2013 issued Guidelines on sound remuneration policies,152 followed in 
2018 by the updated version of the Guidelines on Internal Governance153, and by 
the Guidelines on the assessment of members of the management body and key 
function holders under Directive 2013/36/EU and Directive 2014/65/EU.154   
It is useful to recall that the EBA guidelines are non-binding steps addressed 
to the competent national supervisory authorities, which they can decide to adhere 
																																																								
147 EBA, n 55.  
148 CRD IV, Arts 64-72.  
149 Id., Article 74(3). 
150 Id., Article 75(2). 
151 Id., Article 91(12). 
152 EBA, Guidelines on sound remuneration policies under Articles 74(3) and 75(2) of Directive 
2013/36/EU and disclosures under Article 450 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, 
EBA/GL/2015/22 (5 August 2016) 
153 EBA, n 137. 
154 EBA, n 137.  
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to by a compliance-or-explain mechanism.155 With reference to the concept of 
“competent national supervisory authorities”, it should be noted that, pursuant to 
Art 4(1)(e) of the SSM Regulation, the ECB has exclusive competence to ensure the 
compliance with the measures imposing “requirements on credit institutions to have 
in place robust governance arrangements, including the fit and proper requirements 
for the persons responsible for the management of credit institutions, risk 
management processes, internal control mechanisms, remuneration policies and 
practices and effective internal capital adequacy assessment processes, including 
Internal Ratings Based models”. It means that the ECB – instead of national 
authorities – should declare its intention to comply with the Guidelines, as 
confirmed by the ECB in its opinion CON/2015/31. As a result, in 2016 the ECB 
notified the EBA its intention to comply with the Guidelines on sound remuneration 
policies,156 and in 2018 with the latest version of the Guidelines on Internal 
Governance157, as well as the Guidelines on the assessment of members of the 
management body and key function holders. 158  As for national competent 
authorities, they should not hinder the correct implementation of the directive or 
issue any binding regulatory provisions that may impede the soft nature of the 
provisions established in the directive and limit ECB supervisory powers.159 
 
1.2.3.2.3 ECB regulation  
According to the SSM Regulation, in order to execute the tasks conferred at 
Article 4(1) and supervisory powers defined at Article 9 of  the SSM Regulation, the 
ECB “shall apply all relevant Union law, and where this Union law is composed of  
Directives, the national legislation transposing those Directives”. With reference to 
regulations granting options for Member States, “the ECB shall apply also the 
national legislation exercising those options”.160 
																																																								
155 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, Article 16. 
156 EBA, n 152. 
157 EBA, n 137. 
158 EBA, n 100.  
159 In Italy, for instance, the Bank of Italy made provisions on corporate governance of banks 
binding. 
160 SSM Regulation, Article 4(3). 
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Since the establishment of  the SSM, the ECB has, by cooperating with the 
national supervisory authorities – in compliance with the two-level competency,161 
exercised its supervisory function on banks corporate governance through a 
constant dialogue with banks, by means of  documentation assessments, meetings 
with key function holders, fit and proper assessments and conferences dedicated to 
governance. For instance, at the Second Supervisory Conference held on 22 March 
2018, 162 the ECB highlighted four main governance issues to be addressed in banks: 
fit and proper assessments, board independence, risk appetite frameworks and risk 
reporting and data aggregation. In the first area, the ECB, which is responsible for 
the assessment of  the appointment of  all members of  the boards of  significant 
banks under its direct oversight, in May 2017 published the ‘Guide to fit and proper 
assessments’,163 whose contents are aligned in May 2018 with the joint ESMA and 
EBA Guidelines on the assessment of  members of  the management body and key 
function holders but also with the EBA Guidelines on Internal Governance. Both 
the EBA Guidelines, far from being replaced by the ECB Guidelines, should serve to 
“provide(s) explanations on the processes conducted by the ECB and specifies the 




161 As mentioned before, the ECB directly supervises the ‘more significant bank’, defined by the 
SSM Regulation as those meeting at least one of the following criteria: (a) a total balance sheet assets 
exceeding € 30 billion, (b) being significant for the specific country or the EU economy as a whole, 
(c) having a total value of its assets exceeding €5 billion and the ratio of its cross-border 
assets/liabilities in more than one other participating Member State to its total assets/liabilities 
being above 20%; (d) having requested or received funding from the European Stability Mechanism 
or the European Financial Stability Facility. See respectively Articles 6(4). The less significant banks 
are supervised directly by the competent national authorities, even though the supervision performed 
by the national authorities is framed by issuing regulations, guidelines and general instructions. 
162 Speech, Danièle Nouy, ‘Governance expectations for banks in a changing financial environment’, 
22 March 2018, available at 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2018/html/ssm.sp180322_1.en.ht
ml, accessed 30 Oct 2018. 
163 ECB, n 99. 
164 Id., 6. 
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Chapter III 
 
Restoring Investors’ Trust within EU Regulatory Framework* 
 
1.3.1 Introduction. – 1.3.2 Investor protection: the EU path towards harmonisation. – 1.3.2.1 
Disclosure of product information. – 1.3.2.2 Conduct of business (COB) rules. – 1.3.2.3 Product 
governance and intervention. – 1.3.2.4 Financial Education. – 1.3.3 Conclusion. 
 
1.3.1  Introduction 
 
In addition to the specific initiatives regulating the banking sector, in 
September 2015 the EU Commission published its Action Plan on building a Capital 
Markets Union (CMU) to further integrate the financial markets and harmonize the 
financial system.165 The Action Plan, by setting out a list of key measures166 to 
foster the creation of a single market by 2019, requires the enactment of legislative 
and non-legislative initiatives indirectly involving the banking sector too. In June 
2017, the Commission published its Communication on the Mid-Term Review 
identifying the nine key priorities for the second half of the Juncker Commission’s 
term.167  
																																																								
*This Chapter is drawn from a previous work: Michele Siri & Shanshan Zhu, ‘EU Investor’, in A. 
Bartolini et al. (eds), Dictionary of Statuses within EU Law, Springer, 2019, 209-217. 
 
165 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Action 
Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, COM(2015) 468 final. The Communication was 
preceeded by a Green Paper on Capital Markets Union, COM(2015) 63 final. 
166 These are: (a) financing for innovation, start-ups and non-listed companies, (b) facilitating the 
access to the public markets, (c) promoting long term and sustainable investment, (d) fostering retail 
investment, (e) strengthening banking capacity to lend, (f) strengthening the capacity of EU capital 
markets, and (g) facilitating cross-border investment. 
167 The nine new priority actions are: (i) reinforcing effectiveness and consistent supervision across 
the EU; (ii) delivering a more proportionate regulatory environment for SME listing on public 
markets; (iii) reviewing the prudential treatment of investment firms; (iv) assessing the case for an 
EU licensing and passporting framework for FinTech activities; (v) presenting measures to support 
secondary markets for non-performing loans (NPLs) and explore legislative initiatives to strengthen 
the ability of secured creditors to recover value from secured loans to corporates and entrepreneurs; 
(vi) ensure follow-up to the recommendations of the High Level Expert Group on Sustainable 
Finance; (vii) facilitating the cross-border distribution and supervision of UCITS and alternative 
investment funds (AIFs); (viii) providing guidance on existing EU rules for the treatment of cross-
border EU investments and an adequate framework for the amicable resolution of investment 
disputes; and (ix) proposing a comprehensive EU strategy to explore measures to support local and 
regional capital market development. See European Commission, Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee Of The Regions on the Mid-Term Review of the Capital Markets Union Action 
Plan, COM(2017) 292 final. 
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Following the financial turmoil in 2007, and considered the increasing 
complexity of financial markets, the EU strengthened its regulatory efforts to set a 
proper level of protection and transparency in investment services.168 In particular, 
by introducing the Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID)169, the 
related Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR),170 the Insurance 
Distribution Directive171 and the Regulation on key information documents for 
packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs)172, the EU 
recently provided the main – sometimes overlapping – criteria to be followed by 
financial intermediaries in the performance of their activities.  
In the regulatory development of the Capital Markets Union, we registered a 
shift towards a sort of ‘paternalistic’ approach, intended to prevent further episodes 
of financial misbehaviour. In particular, the objective of the recent cross-sectorial 
reforms can be identified in the attempt to establish an investor protection regime 
harmonised in all banking, investment and insurance sectors that encompasses the 
largest number of financial services and instruments.  
 
1.3.2 Investor protection: the EU path towards harmonisation 
We can define ‘investor protection’ as the set of rules and principles expected 
to preserve the interests and the rights of a person in its role as the investor, or the 
‘defensive protection of the vulnerable investor against unscrupulous market 
participants’.173 The aim of the regulation concerning investor protection is to allow 
the investors to make informed financial decisions that are better aligned with their 
interests and profile. 
																																																								
168 See Directive 2014/65/EU, Recital 3 and 4. 
169 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and 
Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council 
Directive 93/22/EEC (MiFID I), recently revised with the Directive 2014/65/EU, Directive 
2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial 
instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (MiFID II). 
170 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on 
OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories. 
171 Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 January 2016 on 
insurance distribution (recast). 
172 Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 
2014 on key information documents for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products 
(PRIIPs Regulation). 
173 Robert C Clark, ‘The soundness of financial intermediaries?, Yale Law Journal (1976), 86, 1, 1-
102. 
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In particular, based on previous contributions on the subject,174  we can 
distinguish among four main dimensions of EU investor protection regulation: (1) 
disclosure of product information, (2) conduct of business (COB) rules, (3) product 
governance and intervention and (4) financial education.175 
 
1.3.2.1 Disclosure of product information 
The first focus area addressed by the EU financial authorities is represented 
by the obligation to disclose information on the provided financial product. The 
disclosure of information – aiming not only at protecting unsophisticated investors’ 
trading in the securities market but also at ensuring the efficiency of the financial 
markets and reducing agency costs176 – has become an essential requirement since 
the introduction of the obligation to produce a prospectus.177 This obligation, which 
was first harmonised at the EU level in 1985 and initially targeted only 
undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS funds),178 
evolved in order to introduce the so-called ‘Key Investor Information Document’ 
(KIID), a two-page document containing the essential features of the fund,179 and 
finally extend to a larger range of financial products with the ‘Key Investor 
Document’ (KID).  
The KID, modelled after the UCITS KIID and introduced with the PRIIPs 
Regulation, 180  targets ‘PRIIP manufacturers’ (i.e., fund managers, insurance 
undertakings, credit institutions and investment firms).181 Moreover, it applies to 
‘all products, regardless of their form or construction, that are manufactured by the 
																																																								
174 See Veerle Colaert, ‘Building blocks of investor protection: All-embracing regulation tightens its 
grip’, Journal of European Consumer and Market Law (2017), 6, 229-244; Niamh Moloney, How to 
protect investors: Lessons from the EC and the UK, Cambridge University Press, 2010; Niamh Moloney, 
‘Regulating the retail markets’, in N Moloney, E Ferran and J Payne (Eds), The Oxford handbook of 
financial regulation , Oxford University Press, 2015, 736-765. 
175 In this Chapter, I decided not to treat enforcement mechanisms in order to focus on ex-ante 
mechanisms. 
176 Luca Enriques & Sergio Gilotta, ‘Disclosure and financial market regulation’, in N Moloney, E. 
Ferran and J Payne (Eds), The Oxford handbook of financial regulation, Oxford University Press, 2015, 
511-536. 
177 Directive 1985/611/EEC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS Directive), Arts 
27 and 28. 
178 Id., Article 1. 
179 Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the 
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for 
collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS IV), Article 78. 
180 PRIIPs Regulation. 
181 Id., Recital 12. 
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financial services industry to provide investment opportunities to retail investors’; 
therefore, it covers financial instruments pertaining to the banking, investment and 
insurance sector.182 The KID should be a three-page, stand-alone document that is 
clearly separated from other marketing material, easily readable and contain 
‘accurate, fair, clear and not misleading’ information.183  
The European Commission recently proposed to introduce a similar 
requirement in the context of a Regulation on a pan-European Personal Pension 
Product (PEPP).184 This regulatory effort can be explained with the EU’s intention 
to deal with the problems of information overload,185 investors limited rationality, 
deviant behaviour186 and non-uniformity among different types of financial products. 
 
1.3.2.2 Conduct of business (COB) rules 
COB regulation, originally deriving from the fiduciary doctrine,187 aims at 
protecting investors from harm caused by the conduct of financial intermediaries 
during the operations performed for the investors or on their behalf. The first 
attempt to provide a minimum harmonised set of standards among the Member 
States was realised in 1993, with the issuance of the Investment Services Directive 
(ISD),188 which is modelled after the International Conduct of Business Principles, 
published by the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in 
1990.189 However, this original and rather simple regulatory scheme did not provide 
sufficient investor protection, nor did it establish a completely harmonised 
system.190 
																																																								
182 Id., Recital 6. 
183 PRIIPs Regulation, Arts 6(1), (2) and (4). 
184 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a pan-European 
Personal Pension Product (PEPP) (COM (2017) 343 final), Article 23.  
185 Troy A Paredes, ‘Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities 
Regulation’, Washington University Law Quarterly (2003), 81, 417-485. 
186 For a review of the literature on behavioural finance, see Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, ‘A 
survey of behavioural finance’, in G Constantinides, M Harris, & R M Stulz (Eds), Handbook of the 
economics of finance: Financial markets and asset pricing, North Holland , 2003, 1051-1121.  
187 Andrew F Tuch, ‘Conduct of business regulation’, in N. Moloney, E. Ferran & J. Payne (Eds), The 
Oxford handbook on financial regulation, Oxford University Press, 2015, 537-567. 
188 Directive 93/22/EEC Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in 
the securities field (ISD). This followed the European Recommendation to introduce some basic 
COB rules (Recommendation 77/534/EEC, OJ L 212/37). 
189  International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), ‘International Conduct of 
Business Principles’ (1990).  
190 Ryan J Davies, Alfonso Dufour, and Brian Scott-Quinn, ‘The MiFID: Competition in a new 
European equity market regulatory structure’, in G. Ferrarini & E. Wymeersch (eds), Investor 
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A more extensive set of rules was introduced in 2004 with the ‘Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive’ (MiFID I)191 and its Implementing Directive 
(2006/39/EC), which replaced the ISD standards and revised many times during 
the years that followed.192 Under the Directive 2014/65/EU (MiFID II) and its 
implementing Standards, the current COB rules provides a stricter and more 
detailed set of rules governing a large range of financial services. MiFID II, in 
particular, applies to all investment firms, credit institutions and UCITS 
management firms when providing investment services or ancillary services; thus, it 
generally requires financial intermediaries to ‘act honestly, fairly and professionally 
in accordance with the best interests of (their) clients’.193 
Within this complex reforming process, we can identify some fundamental 
tendency lines that were followed by the European authorities. These concern: (1) 
widening the scope of the COB rules, (2) distinguishing between independent and 
non-independent financial advice, (3) specifying the duty to act in the client’s best 
interest and (4) strengthening the information obligation. 
The first relevant change concerns widening the scope and target of the COB 
rules. Even though the Investment Services Directive covered investment services 
in general, some common practices (such as financial advice and commodity 
derivatives) were not included since they were not identified as financial services. 
MiFID I upgraded investment advice from an ancillary service to a core investment 
service, and certain commodity derivatives were included among the financial 
instruments.194 Moreover, MiFID II now draws a distinction between independent 
and non-independent financial advice. In detail, investment firms are required to 
disclose whether they provide investment advice on an independent basis,195 and in 
such a case, they should assess a sufficiently diverse range of financial products – in 
																																																																																																																																																														
protection in Europe: Corporate law making, the MiFID and beyond, Oxford University Press, 2006, 163-
198). 
191 MiFID I. 
192 See Directive 2006/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 
amending directive 2004/39/EC on markets in financial instruments, as regards certain deadlines; 
Directive 2007/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007 
amending Council Directive 92/49/EEC and Directives 2002/83/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2005/68/EC 
and 2006/48/EC as regards procedural rules and evaluation criteria for the prudential assessment of 
acquisitions and increase of holdings in the financial sector; Directive 2008/10/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008 amending Directive 2004/39/EC on markets in 
financial instruments, as regards the implementing powers conferred on the Commission. 
193 MiFID II, Article 24(1) .  
194 Id., Section 1, Annex I (5), Recital 4 and Par. I, Annex II. 
195 Id., Recital 72 and Article 24(4). 
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terms of issuers and product providers – before making their recommendation.196  
In order to avoid conflicts of interest, MiFID II establishes specific 
restrictions to the possibility for investment firms to accept or retain fees, 
commissions or any monetary and non-monetary benefits from third parties 
(‘inducements’). With reference to independent advice, these should be immediately 
returned to the clients, except for certain minor non-monetary benefits that are 
capable of enhancing the quality of service provided – investment research 
included197 – which should, however, be clearly disclosed.198 As for non-independent 
advice, inducements are allowed if they are (a) designed to enhance the quality of 
client services, (b) consistent with the firm's duty to act in a client's best interest and 
(c) clearly disclosed to the affected client. Thus, the European legislator chose not to 
follow the United Kingdom (UK) experience of the Retail Distribution Review, 
which put an inducement ban on both ‘independent’ and ‘restricted’ advice.199 In the 
Commission proposal for a PEPP regulation, the EU authorities introduce a similar 
CBR for PEPP distributors.200 
The third area of EU intervention is regarded as the general principle to 
which investment firms should act in the clients’ best interests when dealing.201 
MiFID II strengthened this general standard that represents a key interpretation of 
what is further specified in other provisions,202 such as those concerning conflict of 
interest,203 inducements,204 staff remuneration practices,205 best execution206 and the 
																																																								
196 Id., Recital 73 and Article 24(7)(a).  
197 Silverentand, Larissa, Sprecher Jasha, and Lisette Simons, ‘Inducements’, in D. Busch & G. 
Ferrarini (eds), Regulation of the EU financial markets: MiFID II and MiFIR, Oxford University Press, 
2017, 205-225. 
198 MiFID II, Recital 74 and Article 24(7)(b).  
199 Paolo Giudici, ‘Independent financial advice’, D. Busch & G. Ferrarini (eds), Regulation of the EU 
financial markets: MiFID II and MiFIR, Oxford University Press, 2017, 147-163. 
200 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a PEPP, Article 23. 
201 MiFID II, Article 24(1).  
202 Luca Enriques & Matteo Gargantini, ‘The overarching duty to act in the best interest of the client 
in MiFID II in D. Busch & G. Ferrarini (eds), Regulation of the EU financial markets: MiFID II and 
MiFIR, Oxford University Press, 2017, 85-122. 
203 MiFID II, article 23 and Recital 56. MiFID II does not define or prohibit conflicts of interest. 
Instead, conflicts of interest shall be avoided, taken into account and managed. See Martin Brenncke, 
‘Commentary on MiFID II conduct of business rules’, in M. Lehmann & C. Kumpan (Eds), Financial 
Services Law,1 edition, Hart Publishing, 2017, Arts 21-30 MiFID II; Jonathan Herbst, A practitioner's 
guide to MiFID II, 2nd edition, Sweet & Maxwell/Thomas Reuters, 2016, 94. For further discussion, 
see also Stefan Grundmann & Philip Hacker, ’Conflict of interest’, in D. Busch & G. Ferrarini (eds), 
Regulation of the EU financial markets, Oxford University Press, 2017, 165-204. 
204 MiFID II, Arts. 24(8) and (9).  
205 MiFID II, Article 24(10). Staff should not be remunerated in such a way that they recommend a 
particular financial instrument without taking into account the retail client’s best interest. 
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suitability or appropriateness assessment.207  
The fourth fundamental subject of reform is represented by the strengthened 
information obligations. While the ISD provided only the obligation for the 
investment firm to adequately disclose the ‘relevant material information on its 
dealings with its client’,208 MiFID I – as well as MiFID II – poses a new set of 
information duties on financial intermediaries. All information addressed from the 
investment firm to clients or potential clients should be ‘fair, clear and not 
misleading’.209 Appropriate information should include the investment firm and its 
services, the financial instruments and proposed investment strategies, execution 
venues, appropriate guidance on and warnings of the risks associated and the costs 
and associated charges. In reference to financial advice, investment firms should also 
inform the client on whether their advice is based on a broad or on a more restricted 
analysis of different types of financial instruments, especially if the firm will 
periodically assess the suitability of the recommended financial instruments.210 
Specific information duties have been introduced in relation to investment services 
offered together with other services or as a part of a package.211 Moreover, MiFID 
II now requires the producers to provide information about the product; therefore, 
an amplified cooperation with product manufacturers is necessary.212 
 
1.3.2.3 Product governance and intervention 
In opposition to the approach previously adopted by the EU policymaker,213 
the last financial crisis and the recent scandals showed the need to protect clients 
from harmful financial products by preventing them to even access to the market. 
																																																																																																																																																														
206 MiFID II, Article 27. Investment firms shall take all reasonable steps to obtain the best possible 
result in the execution of clients’ orders, with a different regime depending on the nature of the 
investor (i.e., either professional or retail). 
207 MiFID II, Article 25(2) and (3). In particular, the suitability assessment requires that portfolio 
managers and financial advisors shall gather information about their client's knowledge, experience, 
investment objective and risk tolerance – in relation to investment products and services – in order 
to recommend to the client the investment services and financial instruments that are best aligned 
with the client's profile. The appropriateness requirement provides that the investment firm gathers 
information on the client in order to assess if the product or services offered or demanded were 
appropriate.   
208 ISD, Article 11.  
209 MiFID II, Article 24(3). 
210 Id., Article 24(4)(a). 
211 Id., Article 24(11). 
212 Colaert, n 174, 229-244. 
213 In the past, in order to support market innovation, the EU legislator avoided to impose any 
quality requirement for financial products. See Colaert, n 174, 229-244. 
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The first attempts to govern the quality of financial instruments were realised by 
the UCITS Directive,214 which regulated the conditions under which an investment 
fund could be allowed to use the label ‘UCITS’. Other attempts were made by the 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD),215 which intervened on 
(non-UCITS) funds’ managers by requiring them to fulfil certain quality 
requirements.  
In the meantime, some Member States, such as the UK, started issuing some 
principles regulating product governance.216 Finally, encouraged by the ESMA 
opinion, 217  MiFID II and IDD established specific product governance and 
intervention rules.  
Investment and insurance intermediaries shall now undergo a product 
approval process before marketing and distributing a financial instrument. In 
particular, they shall 
‘specify an identified target market for each product, ensure that all 
relevant risks to such identified target market are assessed and that 
the intended distribution strategy is consistent with the identified 
target market, and take reasonable steps to ensure that the insurance 
product is distributed to the identified target market’.218  
 
Moreover, a review process shall be regularly performed in order to assess 
whether the financial instrument remains consistent with the needs of the identified 
target market and whether the intended distribution strategy remains appropriate. 
In such a way, the quality assessment of financial product covers its entire life cycle, 
starting at the design phase and ending with the review phase. MiFID II clearly 
assigns to the management body the duty to define, oversee and implement the 
policy in relation to the products offered or provided.219  
In addition, MiFID II and PRIIPs Regulation, in order to address an investor 
protection concern or preserve the integrity of the financial system, attributed some 
																																																								
214 Originally directive 1985/611/ECC. 
215 Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD). The 
Directive was introduced in order to protect investors in the non-UCITS sector. 
216 See Colaert, n 174, 229-244. 
217 ESMA, ‘Opinion. Structured Retail Products – Good practices for product governance 
arrangements’, ESMA/2014/332, March 2016. 
218 MiFID II, Article 16(3), IDD, Article 25. See also ESMA, ‘Final Report: Guidelines on MiFID II 
product governance requirements’ (2017), ESMA35-43-620. 
219 MiFID II, Article 9(3)(b).  
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product intervention powers to European Supervisory Authorities,220 according to 
which these authorities may temporarily prohibit the marketing, distribution and 
sale of certain products to retail investors or a type of financial activity or 
practice.221 These stricter ex-ante and ex-post product governance mechanisms will 
probably entail some extra costs for firms, but they are deemed acceptable, 
especially considered the damages that can derive from an inadequate investor 
protection framework.222 
 
1.3.2.4 Financial education 
A final segment of intervention for the reinforcement of investor protection 
concerns the improvement of financial literacy in the context of Member States. In 
the view of EU authorities, the financial crisis confirmed that ‘financial education is 
not a substitute for consumer protection, but a key element of the consumer 
protection framework’; however, since it fails to represent ‘the underlying cause for 
the crisis . . . it may have contributed to worsening the impact of the financial crisis 
in Europe in the autumn of 2008”.223 As one of the ‘post-crisis top priorities’, 
financial education has been at the centre of many institutional documents and 
initiatives. At the international level, it has been mainly promoted by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and its 
International Network on Financial Education (INFE), whereas it took form at the 
domestic level, especially in terms of cooperation between supervisors and various 
entities involved in consumer protection and of cooperation between supervisors 
and schools and the academic sector.224  
In 2017, the European Banking Authority (EBA) established a repository in 
which is gathers financial education initiatives promoted by national authorities and 
those that fall within the scope of its competence.225 To date, the repository consists 
of 84 initiatives, most of which are established in Ireland, Portugal and Sweden and 
																																																								
220 To ESMA for financial instruments, to EBA with reference to structured deposits, to the EIOPA 
in relation to insurance-based investment products. 
221 MiFIR, Arts 40-41, and PRIIPs Regulation, Article 16. 
222 Danny Busch, ‘Product governance and product intervention under MiFID II/MiFIR’, in D 
Busch & G Ferrarini (eds), Regulation of the EU financial markets: MiFID II and MiFIR, Oxford 
University Press, 2017, 123-146. 
223 Expert Group on Financial Education, ‘The Financial Crisis and Financial Education’ (2009). 
224 EIOPA, ‘Report on Financial Literacy and Education Initiatives by Competent Authorities’ 
(2011).  
225 EBA, ‘EBA Financial Education Report 2017/2018’ (2018). 
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consist of online resources. However, in line with the strive to reach harmonisation 
at a cross-sectoral level among financial services, the objective for the future is to 
publish reports via the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities 
(i.e., ESMA, EBA and EIOPA).226 
 
1.3.3 Conclusion 
Starting from the publication of the de Larosière Group report, 227  the 
European initiated an increasingly intense process of reforming investor protection 
instruments in the context of the European Capital Markets Law, marking a shift 
from a minimum to a maximum harmonisation approach.228 Nowadays, all financial 
intermediaries on a cross-sectorial basis – pertaining to the securities, banking and 
insurance sector – shall provide all the information necessary for both retail and 
professional investors to make the investment choices that are aligned with their 
best interests. Even though the new rules concerning the obligation to provide a 
KID or KIID, the distinction between financial and non-financial advice, the related 
limitation to inducements and the new process of product governance and 
intervention have been the most discussed, however, their effectiveness has to be 
evaluated in the next years.  
However, notwithstanding the high number of legislative reforms enacted in 
the financial sector and briefly described in this Part, an in-depth analysis of the 
main cultural root causes of misconduct should still be conducted. Hence, Part II of 
this thesis will focus on the evaluation of corporate governance arrangements under 
the lights of behavioural sciences, in order to show how an interdisciplinary 
approach is necessary to make investor protection initiatives more effective and 




226 EIOPA, n 224.  
227 See n 56.  
228 Tomas M J Möllers, ‘European legislative practice 2.0: Dynamic harmonisation of capital markets 
law – MiFID II and PRIIP’, Banking & Finance Law Review (2016), 31,1, 141-176. 
 










TOWARDS A SOUND CULTURE AND 




229 This part is partially drawn from my previous work Guido Ferrarini & Shanshan Zhu, ‘Culture of 
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Chapter I 
 
Culture in Financial Institutions 
 
2.1.1 Introduction. – 2.1.2 A new approach to financial reform. – 2.1.3 Culture and morals: an 




Only in the last few years financial regulators, supervisors, and scholars have 
focused on the role of ethics and culture in the financial services industry as 
determinants of either good or bad behaviour. The current attention to ethics and 
culture can be easily understood considering the disdain that followed the shocking 
misconducts carried out by financial firms both in the United States230 and in 
Europe. 231  Inadequate rules, bad corporate governance and lack of public 
enforcement cannot fully explain malpractice. Neither can they clarify why financial 
firms apparently operating in similar contexts, under similar rules and incentive 
structures, did not reach the same outcomes in terms of viability and performance. 
In order to get to the root of the problem, it is necessary to first assert 
something obvious: banks are run by human beings. As a consequence, to 
understand how to fix banks, it is necessary to first understand how to fix people’s 
behaviour. In terms of policy, scholars and authorities should pay renewed attention 
to corporate governance structures in the financial sector in addition to regulation. 
However, following the traditional lawyerly approach to corporate governance 
based on the standards and procedures described in the previous chapters may not 
																																																								
230 The Wells Fargo case will be considered below. See Susan M Ochs, ‘The Leadership Blind Spots 
at Wells Fargo’, Harvard Business Review, 6 October 2016, available at 
https://hbr.org/2016/10/the-leadership-blind-spots-at-wells-fargo, accessed 14 January 2018. 
231 For instance, the J. P. Morgan’s London Whale case, the Libor and Forex manipulation scandals, 
and the infamous episodes involving BSI, Swiss Bank, BNP, Deutsche Bank and Danske Bank. See 
Thomas C Baxter, ‘Reflections on the New Compliance Landscape, Remarks at The New Compliance 
Landscape: Increasing Roles Increasing Risks Conference’, New York City, 2014. See Paolo Giudici, 
The Venetian Banks’ Collapse, in D. Busch, G. Ferrarini and G. van Solinge (eds), Governance of 
Financial Institutions, Oxford University Press, 2019, Forthcoming; Maribel Sáez and María Gutiérrez, 
‘The Spanish Banking Crisis’, in D. Busch, G. Ferrarini and G. van Solinge (eds), Governance of 
Financial Institutions, Oxford University Press, 2019, Forthcoming; José Engrácia Antunes, ‘Anatomy 
of a Banking Scandal in Portugal’, in D. Busch, G. Ferrarini and G. van Solinge (eds), Governance of 
Financial Institutions, Oxford University Press, 2019, Forthcoming; and Bas de Jong, ‘Governance 
Problems in Dutch Financial Institutions from 2007 to 2017’, in D. Busch, G. Ferrarini and G. van 
Solinge (eds), Governance of Financial Institutions, Oxford University Press, 2019, Forthcoming for an 
in-depth analysis of banking scandals in Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands respectively. 
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be sufficient, while the risk of adding costs and bureaucracy within financial 
institutions is high. Governance models should be rather analysed with a focus on 
the organizational and cultural aspects of institutions. Scholars in this area should 
therefore undertake in-depth studies on the determinants of human behaviour, the 
relevant processes, and the motivations leading people to act the way they do. A 
number of research questions should be asked in particular, such as the following: 
(i) What drives white-collar criminals, who often are wealthy and highly 
educated professionals, well paid and highly esteemed in influential parts of 
society, to risk their success, reputation, and prospected incomes when 
committing fraud? 
(ii) How did it happen that some financial firms awarded for their good 
corporate governance system were heavily hit by scandals? 
(iii) What makes codes of ethics just valueless and ineffective pieces of 
paper? 
These questions should be answered from an interdisciplinary perspective, 
involving not only law and economics, but also other social sciences, such as 
anthropology, sociology, and psychology, which offer fundamental insights on the 
determinants of financial misconduct. This will better explain why financial scandals 
not only concern ‘bad apples’, but also good people acting in highly unethical 
contexts (‘bad barrels’), where they confront moral dilemmas (‘bad cases’).232 
The idea that a cultural shift is needed in the financial industry is already 
widespread amongst national and international regulators, as will be better 
explained in the next section. Contrary to Milton Friedman’s suggestion that the 
only responsibility of business is to maximize shareholder value, many are 
convinced today that firms should also pursue ethical values and that this goal is not 
opposite to profit.233 As highlighted for the first time by Bowen in 1953,234 in order 
to create long-term value, financial institutions should enhance the ability of people 
working for them at each level to make decisions in a responsible manner.235 The 
																																																								
232 Jennifer J Kish-Gephart, David A Harrison, and Linda Klebe Treviño, ‘Bad Apples, Bad Cases, and 
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Shanshan Zhu 48 
UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC), in its 2016 ‘Report on Corporate Culture 
and the Role of Boards’, similarly stated: “a healthy culture both protects and 
generates value. It is therefore important to have a continuous focus on culture, 
rather than wait for a crisis”. According to a recent paper by Shefrin, psychological 
phenomena – as illustrated by analysing five specific cases (UBS, Standard & Poor’s, 
American International Group, the investment committee for the town of Narvik, 
Norway, and the U.S. SEC) – caused most of the worst consequences of the 2008 
crisis, as “point–induced risk seeking, excessive optimism, overconfidence, and 
categorization were at work”.236 
According to the Group of Thirty (G30), the most recent business scandals 
have been caused by a combination of sociological and governance reasons, such as 
lack of diversity, presence of dominant companies, high dependence on specialized 
skills, misaligned incentives, and ineffective leadership and managerial skills.237 
To be sure, there is a significant literature on the determinants of 
organizations’ culture, its connection with firm performance,238 and the ways to 
measure and change it for the better,239 but few have studied organizational culture 
with specific reference to financial institutions. 240  This Part suggests a new 
approach to the study of culture in financial institutions, which could assist the 
regulatory reform and the revamping of the financial sector and prevent malpractice 
																																																																																																																																																														
relevant in determining a bank’s value in a study on Latvian banks. See Jelena Titko and Inga Shina, 
‘Non-financial Value Drivers: Case of Latvian Banks’, Procedia Engineering (2017) 178, 192–9. 
236 Shefrin Hersh, How Psychological Pitfalls Generated the Global Financial Crisis (December 15, 
2009). Laurence B Siegel (ed.), Voices of Wisdom: Understanding the Global Financial Crisis, 
Charlottesville, VA: Research Foundation of CFA Institute. 
237 G30, ‘Banking Conduct and Culture: A Permanent Mindset Change’, 2018, 11. 
238 See, e.g., Benjamin E Hermalin, ‘Economics and Corporate Culture’, in Cary L Cooper, Sue 
Cartwright, and P Christopher Earley (eds) The International Handbook of Organizational Culture and 
Climate, Wiley, 2001, 217–61; Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales, ‘Does Culture Affect 
Economic Outcomes?’ Journal of Economic Perspectives (2006), 20, 23–48; John P Kotter and James 
L Heskett, Corporate Culture and Performance, Free Press, 1992; Jesper B Sørensen, ‘The Strength of 
Corporate Culture and the Reliability of Firm Performance’ Administrative Science Quarterly (2002), 
47, 1, 70–91; Daniel R Denison, Corporate Culture and Organizational Effectiveness, Wiley, 1990; 
George G Gordon and Nancy Di Tomaso, ‘Predicting Corporate Performance from Organizational 
Culture’, Journal of Management Studies (1992), 29, 83–798. 
239 See, e.g., Sonia A Sackmann,‘Uncovering Culture in Organizations’, The Journal of Applied 
Behavioural Science (1991), 27, 3, 295–317; and John R Graham et al, ‘Corporate Culture: Evidence 
from the Field’, Duke I&E Research Paper No 33/2016, available at  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2805602, accessed 30 October 2018. 
240 See Andrew W Lo, ‘The Gordon Gekko Effect: The Role of Culture in the Financial Industry’ 
FDRNY Economic Policy Review (2016), 18; Anjan Thakor, ‘Corporate Culture in Banking’, 
Economic Policy Review, Issue August 5–16 2016, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2828071, 
accessed 30 October 2018; Gordon Gwendolyn and David T Zaring, ‘Ethical Bankers’ The Journal of 
Corporation Law (2017), 42, 3, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2932317, accessed 30 October 
2018. 
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with the help of concepts and methodologies drawn from social sciences other than 
law and economics. Regulation, to quote Winter, “often is not the best way to deal 
with the persistent governance problems, either because it cannot deal with the 
intricacies of corporate and human reality… or because it will be ineffective as long 
as underlying generally held beliefs, world views, assumptions and paradigms 
remain unaffected (…) It takes courage not to regulate and seek alternative avenues 
to address such problems.”241 
The rest of the Part proceeds as follows. The current Chapter briefly offers an 
overview of the scholarly definitions of culture in social sciences and of the models 
suggested to diagnose it. Chapter II discusses the role of leadership in shaping 
culture. Chapter III analyses internal controls, with specific reference to risk culture 
and the psychology of compliance. Chapter IV recommends a new approach to 
incentives and remuneration schemes, which is grounded on a critical view of the 
same as currently used in financial and non-financial firms. Chapter V discusses the 
role of institutional investors and supervisory authorities in shaping culture.242 
Finally, Chapter VI focuses on the current development of sustainable finance 
initiatives, which may contribute to the shift towards a long-term oriented culture 
in the financial sector. 
 
2.1.2 A new approach to financial reform 
 
The need for approaching financial reform also in terms of a change in 
corporate culture has been increasingly highlighted by eminent figures of the 
financial community. William Dudley, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York and Vice-Chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, in 2014 
stated that ‘improving culture in the financial services industry is an imperative . . . 
in order to ensure financial stability over time, but also to ensure the public trust in 
our financial system’.243 The Group of 30 in 2015 issued a report providing several 
suggestions to encourage boards and supervisors to establish sound culture, values, 
																																																								
241 Winter, n 140. 
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and behaviour, since “problematic cultural norms, and subcultures within large 
banks, have caused widespread reputational damage and loss of public trust”. 244 
A proactive inclusion of cultural and ethical issues in banking supervision has 
been accomplished by the De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), which became in 2010 the 
first banking supervisor globally to treat culture and behaviour as risk factors in 
supervision (see 2.5.3).245  
At EU level, the EBA Guidelines on common procedures and methodologies 
for the supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP)246 make reference to 
culture and ethics in banks. Besides providing standards for the evaluation of their 
business model and strategy, capital, and liquidity adequacy, Title V of the 
Guidelines provides criteria for the assessment of the internal governance and 
controls of banking institutions, which should have an “appropriate and transparent 
corporate structure that is ‘fit for purpose’ in line with EBA Guidelines on internal 
governance”. Amongst the elements considered, the need is highlighted for a 
transparent organizational culture, a clear distribution of responsibilities between 
corporate bodies, an effective communication to all relevant staff, and attention to 
the institution’s ethical corporate and risk culture. Specifically, it is suggested that 
this should establish an environment of effective challenge in which decision-making 
processes promote a range of views. 
In its final report,247 among several suggestions, the High-Level Expert 
Group (HLEG) added the establishment of a corporate culture that considers 
sustainability issues as key factors. In particular, the report suggests an update of 
“the ‘fit and proper’ tests to include an assessment of the individual and collective 
ability of the members of governing bodies in financial institutions to address 
sustainability risks, to understand the broader stakeholder context and to take 
account of clients’ sustainability preferences”. In order to fulfil their duties, 
including the duty to evaluate the impact of the business strategy on society and the 
environment, board members are recommended to participate in specific education 
and training measures. 
Most of the documents and standards just reviewed do not clearly indicate 
what should be intended by ‘culture’, nor how to evaluate and measure it. Therefore, 
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the next section offers an overview of the studies on culture and the measuring 
methodologies applied within different fields of the social sciences. 
 
 
2.1.3 Culture and morals: an ethical perspective 
 
Before defining culture and suggesting how to implement a sound culture 
which constrains illicit behaviour and fraudulent phenomena, the ethical approach 
on which this Part is based is briefly explained. For centuries, moral philosophers 
have tried to address questions like: What is justice? What kind of behaviour can be 
claimed to be fair? Nowadays they are still struggling to solve them. This thesis, 
does not intend to give conclusive answers to those issues, nor to cope with complex 
philosophical questions. Rather, it follows an approach developed by virtue ethicists. 
Confucius was perhaps the first philosopher to have built his view on moral 
virtues, whereas in Western culture Aristotle’s ‘Ethica Nicomachea’ notably laid the 
foundation for modern virtue ethics.248 In opposition to moral models based on 
universal principles—such as Kant’s deontological approach—or utility 
maximization—developed in Adam Smith’s and utilitarian philosophers’ theories—
virtue ethicists do not intend to identify all-inclusive rules that should shape human 
behaviour, since there are no such fixed and reliable rules. Rather, moral virtues and 
sound character offer some practical guiding criteria to face complex reality.249 
According to Aristotle, well-being, the so-called eudaimonia,250 can be achieved 
only through a virtuous life. And a virtuous life is defined as an existence conducted 
in accordance with the essential function of human nature, which is being sociable 
and rationale.251 Virtues, which can be divided into soul-related moral virtues 
(courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, gentleness, 
																																																								
248 See, among others: Gertrude E M Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, in Roger Crisp and 
Michael Slore (eds) Virtue Ethics, Oxford University Press, 1997, 26–44; Philippa R Foot, ‘Virtues 
and Vices’ in Roger Crisp and Michael Slote (eds), Virtue Ethics, Oxford University Press, 1997, 163–
77; Craig Walton, ‘Character and Integrity in Organizations: The Civilization of the Workplace’, 
Business and Professional Ethics Journal, (2001), 20, 105–28; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 
University of Notre Dame Press, 3rd ed, 2007); Geoff Moore, ‘Humanizing Business: A Modern 
Virtue Ethics Approach’, Business Ethics Quarterly (2005), 15, 237–55; and Edwin M Hartman, 
Virtue in Business. Conversations with Aristotle, Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
249 Hartman, n 248, 9–11. 
250 Many studies use Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia, which has been translated into ‘happiness’, 
‘flourishing’ or ‘well-being. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia’, Phronesis (1972), 17, 
252–59;William J Prior, ‘Eudaimonism and virtue’, Journal of Value Inquiry, 35, 325–42. 
251 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, Clarendon Press, 1894, Book I, Ch 7.  
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friendliness, truthfulness, wittiness, and justice) and intellectual-based virtues (art, 
knowledge, practical judgment, wisdom, and intellect) — and lay in the mean 
between two vices, excess and defect—252 can be mastered only by constant training 
and experience. In other words, virtue manifests itself in action and, as a skill, 
requires both practice and rational deliberation.253 Practical wisdom, for instance, 
can help solve dilemmas deriving from apparent conflicting values and principles. 
According to this approach, immoral and irrational behaviour derives from a failure 
of perception and/or a weakness of will, problems solvable by constant and correct 
training. 
MacIntyre, one of the best known virtue ethicists, defines virtues as 
“dispositions not only to act in particular ways but also to feel in particular ways”, 
and states that to act virtuously ‘is to act from inclination formed by the cultivation 
of the virtues’. 254  However, building on Aristotle’s philosophy, he condemns 
capitalism and businesses as they ‘provide(s) systematic incentives to develop a type 
of character that has a propensity to injustice’,255 while Moore has developed the 
idea that business character can be trained towards the achievement of internal 
goods and, as a consequence, applies MacIntyre’s notions to business 
organizations.256 In particular, Moore distinguishes between virtues and values, as 
‘valuing is something we do, while virtues are something we have (or not)’. 
Specifically, virtues are tools that are trained in order to live according to specific 
values, since ‘it takes courage not to tell a lie’ and ‘it takes temperance to say “No” to 
a bribe’.257 
In the last decade, this vision has been confirmed by the social sciences and 
neuroscientific research in particular, which study individual, organizational, and 
economic phenomena by looking for more than universal principles, common 
practices, and behaviours.258 In line with this approach, Hartmann’s Aristotle-
oriented lessons to businesses are espoused.259 Rather than following strict rules 
and principles, people should develop virtues always with practical wisdom, which is 
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endowed with the flexibility and creativity needed in each situation. Moreover, 
individual interest and collective interest do not necessarily conflict, while dialectics 
can enhance ethical thinking. 
 
2.1.4 Defining Culture 
 
“As regulators focus on culture, Wall Street struggles to define it” was the 
heading of an article in The Wall Street Journal,260 which went on, stating: “culture is 
the buzzword of the moment at banks and a puzzle that regulators and Wall Street 
firms are wrestling to solve”.  
Also in the social sciences, despite the rich body of studies on culture 
developed over a relatively long period of time, the slippery nature of this concept 
has made it difficult to reach a common definition.261 
The term ‘culture’ derives from the Latin ‘còlere’ whose meaning indicates the 
cultivation of the soil. The first modern definition of culture was given by the 
British anthropologist Edward Tylor in 1871,262 according to whom culture is “that 
complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, arts, morals, law, custom, and any 
other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society”. In the 
twentieth century, anthropologists analysed the concept of culture in an attempt to 
make its definition more precise. The so-called evolutionary/ecological theories 
viewed culture as all those means that serve human communities adapting to their 
ecological surroundings.263 The attention later moved to a semiotic notion of 
culture, 264  focused on language and symbols. Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 265  in 
particular, wrote that “culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for 
behaviour acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive 
achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artefacts”. 
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As organizational culture studies emerged and developed in the 1980s,266 
anthropologic theories were applied to investigate organizational environments. 267 
In 1996, Lundy and Cowling offered a well-known definition of culture as “the way 
we do things around here”.268 A more structured definition was given by Schein,269 
as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group . . . that has 
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to problems”.270 
The same view of culture as a collection of shared values and norms accepted by a 
given group was shared by Pettigrew,271 O’Really, and Chatman,272 and Brown.273 
Some scholars described it as the software of an organization,  a sort of “collective 
programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category 
of people from others”.274 
Even though definitions of culture are numberless, Hofstede in 1990275 
identified some common traits, describing culture as: (i) holistic; (ii) historically 
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Deal, Corporate Cultures as the Rites and Rituals of Corporate Life, Addison-Wesley, 1982; Robert H 
Waterman, Jr and Tom Peters, In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America’s Best-Run Companies, 
Harper & Row, 1982; Cary L Cooper, and Sue Cartwright, ‘The Role of Culture Compatibility in 
Successful Organizational Marriage’, Academy of Management Executive (1993), 7, 2, 57–70; Kim S 
Cameron and Robert E Quinn, Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture, Prentice Hall Series 
in Organizational Development, 2011. 
267 For a detailed review of some cultural theories developed by anthropologists, see Roger M 
Keesing, ‘Theories of Culture’, Annual Review of Anthropology (1974), 3, 1, 73–97. 
268 Olive Lundy and Alan Cowling, Strategic Human Resource Management, Routledge, 1996, 168. 
269 Edgar Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, Jossey-Bass, 2004, 17. 
270 In literature, the term ‘climate’ is often used, and sometimes confused with the term ‘culture’. 
However, ‘climate’ refers to how things are, whereas culture concerns why things are the way they 
are. For a definition of climate, see Arnon E Reichers and Benjamin Schneider, ‘Climate and Culture: 
An Evolution of Constructs’, in Benjamin Scheider (ed), Organizational Climate and Culture, Jossey 
Bass, 1990, 5–39, and Michael W Grojean et al, ‘Leaders, Values, and Organizational Climate: 
Examining Leadership Strategies for Establishing an Organizational Climate regarding Ethics’, 
Journal of Business Ethics (2004), 55, 3, 223–41. For a further explanation on the difference between 
the two concepts, see Daniel R Denison, ‘What is the Difference between Organizational Culture and 
Organizational Climate? A Native’s Point of View on a Decade of Paradigm Wars’, The Academy of 
Management Review (1996), 21, 3, 619–54. 
271 Andrew M Pettigrew, ‘On Studying Organizational Cultures’, Administrative Science Quarterly 
(1979), 24, 4. Pettigrew conceives culture as the system of publicly and collectively accepted 
meanings operating for a given group at a given time. It is constituted of several concepts: symbol, 
language, ideology, belief, ritual, and myth. 
272 Charles A O’Reilly and Jennifer A Chatman, ‘Culture as Social Control: Corporations, Culture, 
And Commitment’ (1996), in Barry M Staw, Larry L Cummings (eds), Research in Organizational 
Behaviours, 1996, JAI Press, 18, 157–200, 166. According to the authors, corporate culture is ‘a 
system of shared values that define what is important, and norms that define appropriate attitudes 
and behaviours for organizational member’. 
273 Andrew Brown, Organizational Culture, Pitman, 1995, 9, 33, 176.  
274 Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind, McGraw-Hill, 1991, 4. 
275 See Geert Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values, Sage, 
1980 and Geert Hofstede, ‘Measuring Organizational Cultures: A Qualitative and Quantitative Study 
across Twenty Cases’, Administrative Science Quarterly (1990), 35, 1, 286–316. 
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determined; (iii) related to anthropological concepts; (iv) socially constructed; (v) 
soft; and (vi) difficult to change. This last trait derives from another common 
assumption, which resides in the fact that culture is a multilevel concept, made of 
observable artefacts (visual organizational structure and processes), espoused values 
(strategies, goals, and philosophies), and basic assumptions (implicit beliefs, 
perceptions, and feelings).276 It can be visualized like an onion277—the layers of 
which, from outside in, consist of symbols, heroes, rituals, and values278—or an 
iceberg,279 the upper visible part of which is made of corporate artefacts, verbal and 
nonverbal behaviours, while the hidden part consists of basic beliefs, which are tacit 
and emotionally anchored. 280  As a consequence, any cultural change in the 
organization should affect all levels, not only common practices—which by 
themselves reveal little about an institution—but also beliefs and values, which 
undoubtedly require longer time and a basic genetic compatibility among team 
members (that is the reason why the hiring function is so decisive). 
Economists have developed a different approach to corporate culture since the 
’90s, linking it to firm performance.281 For them culture is a means to economic 
efficiency serving as an informal and flexible tool to cope with new contingencies in 
a more cost-effective way. Kreps stresses that corporate culture plays a role in firms’ 
game-theoretic interactions involving incomplete contracts, coordination, 
reputation, unforeseen contingencies, and multiple equilibria. 282 In this respect, 
corporate culture is useful to the extent that it helps to select among multiple 
equilibria categorizing unforeseen contingences. By substituting explicit 
communication283 and homogenizing beliefs,284 culture leads to lower monitoring 
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costs, faster coordination, and higher utility.285 This enables the organization to 
delegate more effectively 286 by providing—in a sort of hereditary way — “the 
method, context, values, and language of learning, and the evolution of group and 
individual competences”. 
 
2.1.5 Diagnosing culture 
 
In addition to defining corporate culture, socio-economic studies tried to 
diagnose it and to understand how it relates to corporate performance. These 
studies mainly used surveys and interviews, as well as group discussions and 
participant observation.287 
As for corporate culture identification, Hofstede did one of the first empirical 
studies and developed a model based on five dimensions differentiating one national 
culture from another: (i) power distance; (ii) collectivism versus individualism; (iii) 
femininity versus masculinity; and (iv) uncertainty avoidance. Two other 
dimensions have been added later, that is, long-term orientation versus short-term 
orientation and indulgence versus restraint.288 This study’s ideas have been widely 
applied with some variations in other researches.289 Thakor290 diagnosed culture 
under the Competing Values Framework (CVF) 291 and identified firm culture along 
four tendencies: (i) collaborative; (ii) competitive; (iii) control-centred; and (iv) 
creative, which correspond respectively to: (i) a partnership culture; (ii) a 
competitive, individual-performance-oriented culture; (iii) a risk-minimization 
culture; and (iv) a culture focused on product innovation and organic growth. 
According to Thakor, in order to shape the cultural structure of a firm, one should 
first be aware of these tendencies, of the intersections between them, and of the fact 
that the adoption of an approach automatically excludes another. Then the firm 
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287 About the different methods adopted, see Sackmann, n 239; and Graham et al, n 239. 
288 Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, and Michael Minkov, Cultures and Organizations: Software of 
the Mind, Rev 3rd ed, McGraw-Hill, 2010, 235–96. 
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could hire, train, and allocate resources in accordance with the choice of one cultural 
model rather than another. If the current actors in the financial sector are analysed, 
it is immediately apparent that it is almost entirely shaped in terms of competitive 
culture. 
As for the relation between firm culture and performance, the prevailing 
research claims that ‘strong corporate cultures’ leads to better firm performance, in 
line with the economists’ belief that high consistency in norms, values, and practices 
shared in a group leads to better coordination and control. Quantitative analyses 
have shown that in certain circumstances companies characterized by a strong 
culture, mostly measured by the consistency of responses to survey items across 
people, outperformed companies with a weak culture,292 and have a more stable (less 
variable) performance in relatively stable environments. 293  Graham et al 294 
published another significant empirical study based on an anonymous survey 
directed to detect how the role of culture was perceived within firms operating in 
several industries. The results highlighted that culture was considered important 
with reference to firm performance as well. 
However, in almost all studies conducted on both culture diagnosing and on 
the relationship between corporate culture and performance, only CEOs, CFOs, and 
managers were interviewed, while other levels of the firm organization were not 
considered. Moreover, studying only the consistency in corporate behaviour does 
not give any information on the quality of firm culture. Short-term strategies, illicit 
behaviour aimed at high profit at any cost became common goals and values in some 
top executives’ perceptions and their firms did not perform in a sustainable way. 
It can therefore be suggested that all (levels of) employees’ convictions, 
practices, and opinions should be included in future studies in order to provide a 
wider and more complete vision of a company profile. Moreover, research studies 
should also evaluate the quality of the relevant culture, in order to assess its 
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A firm’s identity is largely shaped by the rules and practices enacted by the 
person/people who is in charge, the so-called ‘leader(s)’. We might call it either 
‘tone at the top’295—if we want to emphasize a leader’s statements and appearance—
or ‘character at the top’296 focusing on the leader’s behaviour. However, there is no 
doubt that leadership personality, charisma, and authority influence board 
composition and practices,297 as well as employees’ behaviours and habits at all 
levels. That is why the hiring processes, training courses, and remuneration 
schemes were recently put under the spotlight within organizations’ dynamics. 
The issue of leaders’ expertise, competence and integrity has been addressed 
by EU financial authority, as they are at the centre of the guidelines recently 
published by jointly ESMA and EBA298 and the ECB299. At the meantime, we should 
recall that banks board members are directly liable towards the bank and its 
shareholders, and indirectly towards other stakeholders. Given the impact of 
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misconduct in financial sector, many scholars even support the idea of enlarging 
directors’ liability by restricting the scope of business judgement rule (BJR).  
In this Chapter, I discuss director’s liability and BJR scope in banking sector, 
introduce board composition issues, and analyse some specific criteria taken into 
consideration by financial authorities during board suitability assessments. The 
Chapter then focuses on specific organizational and cultural factors, already 
analysed by social and management studies, that deeply shape and influence the 
culture of the firms, and that specifically relate to the role of leadership. 
 
 
2.2.2 Directors’ liability  
 
As already described, the corporate governance of banks has been one of the 
most developed areas subject to the process of harmonization within the European 
Banking Union. However, the same effort has not been placed for the creation of 
sanctioning systems that are able to promote a uniform compliance to rules.  
EU institutions have to deal with many challenges. First of all, banks’ 
directors are subject to both common corporate law and banking law. Therefore, 
they can incur in both civil and administrative liability (and sanctions). Moreover, 
the strong autonomy attributed to Member States may lead to fragmentation. From 
a civil perspective, dissimilarities may derive from differing judicial approaches to 
the evaluation of directors’ breach of fiduciary duties. From an administrative 
perspective, discrepancies can be detected by simply confronting general and 
abstract rules.  
 
2.2.2.1 Directors’ civil liability 
 
From a civil point of view, we can identify two types of fiduciary duties for 
corporate officers and directors: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. However, 
before analysing in depth the content of these duties, we should first analyse which 
kind of interests directors should strive to serve, and therefore give an overview of 
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2.2.2.1.1 Beyond Shareholders versus Stakeholders Approach 
 
The theoretical conflict between shareholder primacy and stakeholder theory 
has been subject to a long-standing debate, and it ultimately deals with the purpose 
and role of corporations in the society. According to the shareholder primacy view, 
directors should solely serve shareholders’ interest, and their decisions should focus 
primarily on shareholder wealth maximization.300 On the contrary, the stakeholder 
theory argues that, since other stakeholders – such as employees, suppliers, 
creditors and the society –
 
are greatly impacted by corporate decisions and 
practices,301 directors should consider all stakeholders’ interests and act to safeguard 
the long term stakes of each group. The underlying assumption on which the theory 
is based is that “boards exist not to protect shareholders per se, but to protect the 
enterprise-specific investments of all the members of the Corporate “team”, 
including shareholders, managers, rank and file employees, and possibly other 
groups, such as creditors”.302  Even though many academics heavily criticized 
shareholder primacy theory and embraced stakeholder theory, 303  shareholder 
primacy was widely supported by most of financial scholars.304 
A trade-off between the two approaches was theorized by Jensen in his 
“enlightened shareholder theory” (see also Section 2.4.4.2), according to which 
shareholders’ value maximization on the long-term cannot be ensured by ignoring 
or mistreating other stakeholders, since “we cannot create value without good 
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in the pages of the New York Times Sunday magazine that because shareholders "own" the 
corporation, the only "social responsibility of business is to increase its profits." However, before 
him, in 1930s, Berle stated that the “all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a 
corporation … [are] exercisable only for the ratable benefit of shareholders”. See Adolph A. Berle, 
‘Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust’, 45 Harv. L. Rev. (1932), 45, 1049, 45. The theory has been 
approached also in relation to the banking sector, see Hamid Mehran, Alan Morrison and Joel 
Shapiro, ‘Corporate Governance and Banks: What Have We Learned from the Financial Crisis?’, 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Report no. 502/2011, 4.  
301 The main representative of this theory is Freeman. See Edwards R Freeman & John McVea, ‘A 
Stakeholder Approach to Strategic Management’, Darden Business School Working Paper No. 01-
02, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=263511 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.263511, 
accessed 3 November 2018. However, before them, Merrick Dodd, opposing to Berle’s shareholder 
approach, favoured a view of the business corporation as an economic institution which has a social 
service as well as a profit-making function." Edwin Merrick Dodd, ‘For Whom are Our Corporate 
Managers Trustees?’, Harv. L. Rev. (1932), 35, 1144, 1148.  
302 See Margaret M Blair, Lynn A Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’, Virginia 
Law Review (1999), 85, 2, 248-328. 
303 See, for a review of stakeholder literature, André O. Laplume, Karan Sonpar, Reginald A. Litz, 
‘Stakeholder Theory: Reviewing A Theory That Moves Us’, Journal of Management (2008), 34. 
304 See Shleifer & Vishny, n 7; and Jean Tirole, The theory of Corporate finance, Princeton University 
Press, 2006, Chapter 1. 
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relations with customers, employees, financial backers, suppliers, regulators and 
communities”.305  
This is even more true for banking sector, considered the systemic risks 
related to banking activity and the well-known need to ensure a stronger protection 
for stakeholders, especially debtholders. Recently, in line with this view, the 
enlightened shareholder theory developed – in financial sector – into the new notion 
of long-term value creation, involving the company ambition “to optimise its 
financial, social and environmental value in the long term”,306 as well as to pursue 
not only shareholder value but instead shareholder welfare. This means that 
shareholders should internalize the externalities that are usually internalized by 
stakeholders.307 Lipton theorized this emerging corporate governance framework as 
a New Paradigm,308 which considers corporate governance as “a collaboration 
among corporations, shareholders and other stakeholders working together to 
achieve long-term value and resist short-termism”, where institutional investors, in 
line with their stewardship role, assist the board, CEO and management team in 
refusing to follow short-term value maximization without considering the impact on 
the long term. 
While the EU law does not clearly adhere to a specific theory or approach. 
Indeed, the EU Commission in the 2011 Green Paper309 gave a definition of 
corporate governance that is not but a compromise between shareholder and 
stakeholder theory, on the contrary, the BCBS leaned towards the stakeholder 
theory. This is apparent in its Guidelines310 at §2 – according to which “the primary 
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objective of corporate governance should be safeguarding stakeholders’ interest in 
conformity with public interest on a sustainable basis” – and at §20 – that states that 
“the suitability of the appointed board member is as critical as their awareness of the 
responsibility to look after the interests of the bank as a whole, not just of the 
shareholders”.  
Although claiming that stakeholders’ interests should be taken into 
consideration by banks board is now indisputable, especially after the financial crisis, 
the way to concretely internalize stakeholders’ interests in the board’s decision-
making process is more complicated. In a well-known paper, Hopt311 criticized 
various proposals made by scholars. First, introducing labour representatives in the 
board (like in the German codetermination model) might sound reasonable since 
workers are interested in the stability of the bank. However, practice reveals that 
workforce is usually only concerned of maintaining and improving wages and 
working conditions, even at the expense of a proper risk-taking. As to the idea of 
including representatives of the deposit insurer or of the bank supervisor in the 
board of the bank, the solution is troublesome as well, since it would imply both a 
dangerous political influence on the bank and the co-responsibility of supervisors for 
bad decisions. In relation to the suggested usage of constituency clauses, the author 
objects that these proved ineffective in determining better risk-taking, since they 
leave to the board the full discretion in how to weight the interests involved, and 
ultimately favour stakeholders’ interests only when not conflicting with 
management interests. The author rejects also the US proposal to make directors 
liable towards debtholders, since it would not fit with EU private enforcement 
system. Other more radical solutions – such as denying limited liability to banking 
industry – should be excluded according to Hopt’s view. The author finally 
concludes – and I espouse his view – that there is “no single safe way to ensure good 
corporate governance of banks”, but a careful combinations of regulatory and soft 
law measures should be made, avoiding over regulation.312  
In conclusion, far from requiring the establishment of the so-called 
‘stakeholder supremacy’, banks’ managing bodies should take into account the 
interests of stakeholders, especially depositors and other debtholders.313 To do that, 
however, a structural change of the culture of banking institutions is needed, and 
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the change should involve – as I explain further - especially the selection, training 
and compensation of individuals holding a leading position in the bank, as a board 
member or senior manager. 
 
2.2.2.1.2 Duty of care 
 
In relation to the specific content of bankers’ fiduciary duties, I here limit my 
analysis to the duty of care. The identification of breaches of the duty of loyalty is 
indeed difficult, especially considered the typical opacity and complexity 
characterizing banks activities.  
The duty of care requires that directors manage the company with reasonable 
care, prudence, and diligence. For the specific case of EU, even though some 
commentators suggested that the scope of fiduciary duties should be expanded in 
the case of banks, by requiring directors to be held liable in a higher number of 
cases, 314  the actual proposal has been rejected by the vast majority of the 
respondents to the Green Paper on Corporate Governance of Financial 
Institutions.315 In fact, this expanded liability would translate into an excessive risk-
adverse decision-making and would discourage ideal candidates from taking the 
position, considered the excessive amount of related responsibilities. 
However, according do some scholars,316 CRD IV appears to have already 
increased the risk for bank directors to be considered liable, and as a consequence, to 
pay damages or face administrative sanctions. In particular, the directive provides 
that each “member of the management body shall act with honesty, integrity and 
independence of mind to effectively assess and challenge the decisions of the senior 
management where necessary and to effectively oversee and monitor management 
decision-making”.317This vague provision would enlarge the number of cases where 
the directors may be considered liable for failing in adequately exercise their 
monitoring duties on senior managers’ decisions.  
																																																								
314 Macey & O’Hara, n 25, 91  
315 Feedback Statement– Summary responses to Commission Green Paper on Corporate Governance 
in Financial Institutions, 18. See also Hopt, n 25, 56. 
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In line with CRD IV,318 the EBA further clarified notions of “honesty”, 
“integrity” and “independence of mind”. The concepts of “honesty” and “integrity” 
are associated with good reputation requirements, and basically concern the 
evaluation of existing criminal or administrative records or investigations regarding 
the directors.319 This suggests that the related provision in CRD IV is not but an 
explication of duties board members implicitly already had. The same cannot be said 
with reference to the independence of mind requirement. This concerns not only the 
presence of conflicts of interests, but also the fact that board members should have 
“necessary behavioural skills”, that include:320  (a) the courage, conviction and 
strength to effectively assess and challenge the proposed decision of other directors, 
(b) the ability to ask questions to other directors, and (c) the capability to resist 
‘group-think’ phenomenon. During the assessment, the actual past and on-going 
behaviour of the assessed board member, especially within the institution, should be 
considered. 321 This would translate in the assessment of the quality of the director’s 
intervention in the board minutes and ultimately increase their risk of liability. In 
fact, CRD IV not only requires Member States to provide for administrative 
penalties if “an institution allows one or more persons not complying with Article 
91 to become or remain a member of the management body”,322 but it also specifies 
that individual board members breaching  those duties may be subject to 
administrative pecuniary penalties of considerable amount,323 to be published by 
financial competent authority without delay on their official websites. 324  As 
accurately argued by Enriques and Zetzsche, 325  it would not be difficult for 
supervisory authorities finding, in case of harmful decision-making by the managers 
of the institution, that a member of the board did not properly exercise those 
“necessary behavioural skill”.  
If we combine these provisions with those concerning the specific suitability of 
board directors, that legally require them a greater financial expertise and 
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competence compared to those generally required to non-financial companies (see 
2.2.3), we can conclude that the directive undoubtedly expands directors duties and 
liabilities. 
However, directors’ duty of care cannot be analysed without taking into 
account its concrete judicial enforcement, especially in relation to the application of 
the business judgement rule in the banking sector.  
 
2.2.2.1.3 Business Judgement rule in banking sector 
 
Under the Business Judgment Rule, courts presume that “in making a business 
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and 
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company.”326 
Even though the rule was established to avoid the direct interference by courts in 
business decision-making, in practice the standard left to courts a great 
discretionary power to determine the conditions under which the protection of the 
business judgment rule may be available. Notably, national courts applied the 
business judgment rule with different levels of severity, depending on historical and 
cultural more than legal reasons.327 
In relation to banking sector, some scholars argued that the application of the 
business judgment rule would lead to excessive risk-taking when systemic risks are 
concerned, because of the typical opacity and complexity of banks.328 In the authors’ 
opinion, banks directors should be therefore responsible for the level of risk-taking 
as well as strategy, and not just for complying with legal norms. However, the 
argument was criticized by other scholars that highlighted how removing or 
limiting the scope of business judgment rule would be detrimental for 
entrepreneurship and innovation, since it would excessively discourage risk-
taking,329 and prevent banks’ ability to earn returns for investors.330 Moreover, 
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expanded fiduciary duties and liability risk would discourage skilled persons from 
serving on bank boards. 
Finally, as explain below (Section 2.2.2.2), the EU regulation already provides 
administrative pecuniary penalties in case of breach of fiduciary duties, and therefore 
there seems not to be a need for corporate law to increase the risk for directors’ civil 
liability.331 
 
2.2.2.2 Directors’ administrative liability 
 
As described in 2.2.1.2, CRD IV assigns to Member States a broad 
discretionary power as to the power to establish proper administrative penalties and 
other measures for governance-related breaches regulated under Articles 66 and 67.  
We can find other provisions concerning the breach of governance rules 
within the SSM regulation that attributes to the ECB the power to adopt, in the 
event of specific circumstances, a series of measures. In relation to corporate 
governance, the ECB may: (a) require the reinforcement of the arrangements, 
processes, mechanisms and strategies; (b) require boards to present a plan to restore 
compliance with supervisory requirements and set a deadline for its implementation; 
(c) demand institutions to limit variable remuneration as a percentage of net 
revenue; and (d) to remove members from the management body when not fulfilling 
the suitability requirements.  
The ambiguity of these provisions, combined with the large discretionary 
power left to Member States, cannot but lead to an inefficient enforcement system. 
A way to avoid this inefficiency is represented by the establishment of a single 
enforcement handbook which would integrate the existing single rulebook and 
single supervisory handbook, bridging the gap between the two in practice.332 This 
would make more clear which principles and objectives are pursued by financial 
supervisors in the exercise of their competence, and give support to the 
implementation of the common approach to supervision. The establishment of a 
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single enforcement rulebook would be by no means a challenge, made difficult 
especially for the dissimilarities among national judicial systems. However, the step 
is necessary in order to strengthen EU financial integration. 
 
2.2.3 Board composition and structure 
 
Board composition and structure has been one of the most debated issues since 
corporate governance has been studied and formalized in guidelines and standards. 
With reference to the banking sector, independency and competency requirements, 
as well as diversity and suitability requirements were the most discussed. 
 
 
2.2.3.1 Non-executive and independent directors 
 
The role of non-executive and independent directors in the board has been at 
the centre of corporate governance debate for more than twenty years.333 The 
requirement of having independent directors on the board – by mandatory rules or 
corporate governance codes - is nowadays diffused worldwide,334  but national 
regulators have declined it in various ways.335  
In the EU, the Commission – in its Recommendation on the role of non-
executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of the 
(supervisory) board - defined ‘independent’ a director who “is free of any business, 
family or other relationship, with the company, its controlling shareholder or the 
management of either, that creates a conflict of interest such as to impair his 
judgement”.336 However, the Commission confers to the Member States the task of 
adopting specific criteria for the assessment of the independence of directors – both 
by means of laws or corporate governance code – taking into account the guidance 
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set out in Annex II of the Recommendations.  However, the determination of the 
nature of independence is fundamentally an issue for the (supervisory) board itself to 
determine. Clearly, the combination of hard and soft law, as well as the different 
implementation of independency requirements across national governance systems, 
caused deep divergences in the interpretation of the concept among Member 
States.337 
With specific reference to banks, according to the BCBS and the FSB, an 
independent directors is “a non-executive member of the board who does not have 
any management responsibilities within the bank and is not under any other undue 
influence, internal or external, political or ownership, that would impede the board 
member’s exercise of objective judgment”.338 In the EU, a general definition of 
independence for banking institutions should have been set within the CRD IV, by 
leaving boards free to adapt it to the specific characteristics of their banks, and make 
then the chosen solution subject to the ECB assessment. On the contrary, CRD IV 
does not provide a definition of independency, even though it makes some general 
reference to it.339 A more specific definition and description of the independency 
requirement – conceivably provided in order to distinguish it from the 
‘independency of mind’ requirement – was recently given by EBA and ESMA in the 
‘Guidelines on the assessment of the suitability of members of the management body 
and key function holders’.340  
According to the guidelines, independent members should play a key role in 
enhancing the effectiveness of checks and balances within the credit institution by 
improving oversight of management decision-making, and specifically ensure that: 
(i) all stakeholders’ interests are duly taken into account in the discussions and 
decision making of the board; (ii) board is not dominated by any individual or a 
small group of individuals; and (iii) conflict of interests are properly managed.  
The guidelines then specify that “‘being independent’ means that a member of 
the management body in its supervisory function does not have any present or 
recent past relationships or links of any nature with the CRD-institution or its 
management that could influence the member’s objective and- balanced judgement 
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and reduce member’s ability to take decisions independently”.341 Without prejudice 
to national requirements, the guidelines suggest setting a required number of 
independent members that varies based on the principle of proportionality.342 The 
guidelines then provide a list of situations in which a member of a bank’s 
management body in its supervisory function is regarded as not ‘being 
independent’.343 Many situations are clearly drawn from the criteria provided by the 
Commission Recommendation of 2005 to help the (supervisory) board to determine 
whether a non-executive or supervisory director may be regarded as independent.344 
However, the guidelines specify that the mere fact of meeting one or more of the 
listed situations does not automatically qualify a member as not being independent. 
On the contrary, the interested bank, in the event a member falls under one or more 
of the situations described, may demonstrate to the competent authority, by giving 
proper justification, that the member should be considered independent as the 
situation does not affect his/her ability to “exercise objective and balanced 
judgement”.345 
The assumption that having independent directors would be concretely 
beneficial in terms of performance, as it would lead to better monitoring of 
managers and preventing abuses,346 was highly criticized.347 With specific reference 
to banking sector, scholars excluded the existence of a positive relationship between 
independency of the board and performance. An empirical study conducted by 
Adams and Mehran found that the proportion of independent outsiders on the board  
is not significantly related to performance.348 Another study by Adams found that 
banks that received TARP funds had a higher number of independent members in 
the board compared to other banks.349 
There is no doubt that the presence of independent directors was not sufficient 
to prevent financial scandals, and for many reasons.350 First of all, as independent 
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directors usually work part time and are not involved in day-to-day operations, they 
do not possess a sufficient knowledge of the firm where they serve,351 and suffer 
from information asymmetries in respect to managers.352 Moreover, strict standards 
of independency make it problematic for companies to select directors having 
sufficient expertise and knowledge about the firm,353 and this difficulty is worsened 
by the limited compensation perceived by non-executives. 354  Considered the 
complexity of certain banking and financial activities and of the related risks, these 
weaknesses are particular exacerbated in banking sector. 
 
 
2.2.3.2 Directors’ suitability 
 
The increased complexity of financial products and processes, combined with 
the new aim to ensure investors’ protection and banks’ compliance to a massive 
number of EU rules, enlarged the scope of competences required to banks’ directors. 
This need is even more justified by the fact that the lack of expertise and 
competence was considered one of the key factors that contributed to the worsening 
of the crises.355 However, empirical evidence does not unanimously confirm this 
argument. For instance, while it is true that the board at Lehman Brothers 
comprised – among others – a theatrical producer, an actress, the chairman of a 
pharmaceutical company and three executives of firms operating in the IT, auction 
and energy sectors,356 it is also true that more than half of the directors at Bear 
Stearns was represented by individuals with a banking background.357 Moreover, 
the requirement for a large number of outside and independent directors might be 
one of the main reasons for the lack of specific competences in banking boards.  
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Regardless of the effective role played by boards’ lack of competence before 
and during the crisis, possessing a good knowledge and expertise in financial – but 
also non-financial sector – is nowadays considered an essential requirement for 
board members in order to ensure that banks activities are soundly managed and 
monitored. The BCBS Guidelines, for example, require boards to possess 
competence and expertize in relevant areas comprising “capital markets, financial 
analysis, financial stability issues, financial reporting, information technology, 
strategic planning, risk management, compensation, regulation, corporate 
governance and management skills” 358 . Requiring a specific knowledge of 
information technology, in particular, enhances the quality of monitoring activities, 
considered that banks’ opacity is generally reinforced by complex IT systems. 
Moreover, having members specialized in various professional areas promotes 
diversity of views and avoids the consequences of group-thinking. To this end, the 
Guidelines require directors’ to act in a way that facilitates communication, 
collaboration and critical debate in the decision-making process.359 
Moreover, the BCBS specifies that board members should be selected taking 
into account their independence of mind (especially in the case of non-executives), 
absence of conflict of interests, the circumstances that they have a record of 
integrity and good repute, sufficient time to carry out their responsibilities and the 
ability to promote a smooth interaction between board members.360 Induction and 
on-going training programs should be established in order to ensure that “board 
members acquire, maintain and enhance their knowledge and skills”.361 The board 
should also dedicate sufficient time and resources in performing its 
responsibilities.362 The BCBS mandates the supervisory authorities with the task of 
evaluating the processes and criteria used by banks in the selection of board 
members, and ensuring their suitability on an on-going basis. 
In the EU, as already explained [see Section 1.2.3.2.1(a)], CRD IV followed 
the BCBS provisions, by requiring boards to possess ‘adequate collective knowledge, 
skills and experience to be able to understand the institution’s activities, including 
the main related risks.363 Going even further compared to the BCBS guidelines, 
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CRD IV establishes a limited number of directorships a member may hold at the 
same time. 364  Moreover, to promote diversity, it requires that nomination 
committees should introduce targets for the ‘representation of the underrepresented 
gender’ in the board.365 
CRD IV entrusts the EBA with the development of guidelines to clarify the 
requirements set out at Article 91, with specific reference to the notions of 
“sufficient time commitment”, “adequate collective knowledge, skills and 
experience”, “honesty, integrity and independence of mind”, “adequate human and 
financial resources devoted to the induction and training of members of the 
management”, and “diversity”.366  The related guidelines,367  issued in 2018, are 
addressed to credit institutions,368 financial holding companies,369 mixed financial 
holding companies370 and investment firms,371 but also to national supervisory 
authorities and to the ECB, which should ensure that the specified financial 
institutions are compliant through a specific assessment process. 
In the event the outcome of the assessment concludes that the candidate 
member is not sufficiently proved to be suitable, the competent authority should 
alternatively objet or not approve the appointment of that person, “unless the 
identified shortcomings are remediable and can be overcome by other measures 
taken by the institution(s)”.372 Moreover, the competent authority can take further 
measures, from requiring the organization of specific training sessions for board 
members to the removal of members from the management body or the imposition 
of administrative penalties or other measures.373 
The ECB, in drafting its updated version of the ‘Guide to fit and proper 
assessments’374 follows some of the evaluation criteria at the centre of ESMA and 
EBA Guidelines, namely reputation, experience, conflicts of interest and 
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independence of mind, time commitment to perform the functions involved and the 
collective suitability of the board. The guide is not a legally binding document and 
shall not in any case substitute the relevant legal requirements stemming either 
from applicable EU law or applicable national law, nor does it introduce new rules 
or requirements. To the extent possible, the guide follows the terminology used in 
the CRD IV and the Joint ESMA and EBA Guidelines on suitability and the EBA 
Guidelines on internal governance.  
Given the vast number or criteria designed by the EU authorities for the 
assessment of board members, my analysis is limited to the diversity requirement, 
one of the most debated factors from a sociological perspective.  
 
2.2.4 Decision making in the boardroom: diversity 
 
As implied by the guidelines issued by EU financial authorities, boards’ 
decision-making should be studied from the perspective of their complex social 
dynamics. Empirical research should not be limited to the composition of boards and 
the number of their members, but should extend to the actual functioning of these 
groups both inside and outside the boardroom.375 Indeed, the lack of trust between 
managers and the board, the absence of critical analysis of corporate information by 
the latter, and the non-consideration by either boards or managers of the claims of 
whistle-blowers (as shown by the case of Wells Fargo) are common features of 
many failures and scandals in the financial and non-financial sectors. 
Restoring an effective decision making in boards is crucial in order to prevent 
misbehaviour in financial institutions. Boards should be able to balance the need for 
trust and collaboration with that for control and constructive conflicts.376 While a 
collaborative board may promote the sound and transparent management of an 
organization, cognitive conflicts377 involving ‘the consideration of more alternatives 
																																																								
375 See Andrew M Pettigrew, ‘On Studying Managerial Elites’, Strategic Management Journal 
(1992), 13, 163–182. 
376  Chamu Sundaramurthy and Marianne Lewis, ‘Control and Collaboration: Paradoxes of 
Governance’, The Academy of Management Review (2003), 28, 3, 397–415. 
377 Amason distinguishes between cognitive affective (personal) and cognitive (task-related) conflict. 
While the former can prevent boards from functioning, the latter improve decision-making 
processes. See Allen C Amason, ‘Distinguishing the Effects of Functional and Dysfunctional Conflict 
on Strategic Decision Making: Resolving a Paradox for Top Management Teams’, Academy of 
Management Journal (1996), 39, 123–48. 
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and the more careful evaluation of alternatives’378 can also be beneficial. Indeed, too 
much cohesiveness amongst directors may translate into a weak board dominated 
by an imperial CEO, as shown by the failure of the Anglo Irish Bank.379  
For these reasons, both CRD IV and the ESMA and EBA guidelines 
recommend that board diversity should be fostered to the extent that it improves an 
exchange of views and ideas between the directors.380 In this regard, recital 60 of 
CRD IV describes the lack of diversity as the cause of ‘group think’ phenomenon 
that lead to weak monitoring by boards, and states that: 
“To facilitate independent opinions and critical challenge, management 
bodies of institutions should therefore be sufficiently diverse as regards age, 
gender, geographical provenance and educational and professional 
background to present a variety of views and experiences. Gender balance is 
of particular importance to ensure adequate representation of population”. 
The same notion of diversity is followed in ESMA and EBA guidelines,381 
whereas diversity requirement is not explained in the ECB guide. 
If variety in professional experience is undoubtedly fundamental to avoid 
group-thinking, narrow framing and ethical blindness phenomena (see Section 
2.3.3.3), it cannot be asserted the same for the other factors taken into consideration 
by CRD IV. As for age diversity, for instance, even though some studies found that 
demographic similarity among board members enhance group-think phenomenon 
and weak monitoring of managers,382 the concrete implementation of age diversity 
provision is quite troublesome. Given that strong competency and experience are 
essential requirements for members to perform their duties, it is inevitable that 
board members are close in age. Similar doubts can be raised in relation to the 
requirement for a diverse geographical provenance of board members. Even though 
the requisite seems to make sense, especially for institutions that operate 
internationally, the involvement of different languages and cultures would make 
information flow more complex and probably reduce the debate within the 
boardroom.  
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As for gender diversity, some observed how the impulse to increase the 
number of female directors in the boards seems to follow political rather than 
functional reasons.383 Some studies show that banks have less gender diverse boards 
than other firms, especially due educational reasons (in particular, gender gaps in 
math scores).384 However, studies on the relationship between gender diversity and 
board effectiveness and firm performance are quite mixed. Even though some 
scholars found that gender diversity improve some aspects of board behaviour385 – 
such as attendance at board meetings – they also found that it is linked to poor firm 
performance.386 Moreover, gender diversity would not reduce risk-taking, as argued 
by Renée Adams and Patricia Funk, as female directors’ values differ from women’s 
values in general, and are even more risk-loving than male directors.387 As to the 
few empirical studies specifically focusing on the financial sector, the results are 
again mixed, as some scholars found that firms with more gender-diverse boards 
were less involved in sub-prime lending,388 while others found that more diverse 
boards would be more risk prone.389  
As a consequence to these arguments, many criticized the EU Commission 
choice to require the nomination committee to set “a target for the representation of 
the underrepresented gender in the management body and prepare a policy on how 
to increase the number of the underrepresented gender in the management body in 
order to meet that target”.390 Enriques and Zetzsche, for instance, argue that 
gender diversity could be beneficial in terms of bank’s performance and risk-taking, 
																																																								
383 See Jens Hagebdorff, ‘Corporate Governance’, in Berger, Molyneux, Wilson (eds), The Oxford 
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but only in relation to the specific circumstances of each bank and of each market 
for bank directorships.391 
It should be observed that also in the organizational psychology literature, 
board diversity in general was broadly discussed, and empirical research seems to 
have found no positive relationship between diversity and board performance.392 
Lau and Murnighan even tried to rationalize potential negative effects of 
demographic diversity on the basis of the notion of ‘faultlines’,393 that would lead to 
the creation of sub-groups and therefore to conflicts. ‘Faultlines’ “divide a group's 
members on the basis of one or more attributes” such are gender, race or age.394 
Like the faults in the earth’s crust, that can go unnoticed for many years, before 
suddenly generating an earthquake, group faultlines can lead to conflicts between 
subgroups. Interestingly, the authors found that moderate group diversity would 
generate strong faultiness and therefore conflicting subgroups, while very diverse 
group would perform better and show more social integration.395 Other scholars 
also noted that when diversity is factional (i.e. board members are representatives of 
stakeholder factions), diversity is likely to affect decision-making leading to 
conflicting management, but would not reflect individual perspectives.396 Diversity, 
in other words, is more complex than how implied by regulators, and could reveal 
ineffective in building better functioning boards. 
We can conclude that promoting diversity – especially in terms of 
professional background and education – can be beneficial to enhance debate within 
the boardroom and avoid groupthink phenomenon, provided it is founded on 
reciprocal trust and common values. However, establishing strict diversity 
requirements in terms of gender, age and geographical provenance could increase 
the risk of high board fragmentation without effective benefits in terms of board 
monitoring. As group dynamics are complex and the effects of diversity may differ 
in relation to diverse circumstances, EU authorities should avoid setting out too 
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2.2.5 Leadership from a cultural perspective 
 
In order to get a full comprehension of how board candidates and key function 
holders behave and which ethical profile they should have in order to ensure a sound 
corporate culture, we should first try to realize when, how and why they misbehave. 
Since leaders design the ‘soul’ of an organization by transmitting their values 
and beliefs to the corporate structure,397 they can also encourage their subordinates 
to carry out unethical behaviour 398  by sending messages that influence their 
readiness to comply with legal and/or ethical standards.399 It is enough here to 
consider the case of John Gutfreund, CEO of Salomon Brothers, whose “leadership 
led to a culture that was tailor-made for greedy and power-hungry employees whose 
commitment to ethical behaviour was suspect”.400 Gutfreund sent very clear but 
wrong messages to his employees by rewarding aggressiveness and linking the 
incentive system to the bank’s short-term performance. He reacted to crises in the 
organization by covering-up illicit behaviours and made betrayal the key to his 
success in the company. 401 His policies for promoting and firing employees were 
vague. As a result of this leadership and management style, Salomon Brothers ran 
into what became known as the Treasury bond scandal of the ’90s.402 
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Dysfunctional leadership also characterized the history of Deutsche Bank in 
the last two decades and the scandals in which it was embroiled.403 The cultural 
shift from the traditional German bank to an Anglo-American style investment 
bank after 1994 provoked an identity crisis, which resulted in the appointment of an 
all-powerful CEO, Josef Ackermann, and of senior managers like Edson Mitchell, 
who once introduced himself as ‘God’, in addition to many traders hired directly 
from the United States.404 Wrongly incentivized employees, a weak compliance 
function, inadequate risk management, and lack of internal controls created the 
perfect conditions for the bank to take part in many illicit and abusive practices.405 
Wells Fargo and its Chairman and Chief Executive Officer John Stumpf offer 
another meaningful example. The latter managed the bank according to the ‘Gr-
Eight’ philosophy,406 setting up a high-pressure environment, which ultimately led 
first-line employees to open more than two million fake accounts. The toxicity of 
the bank’s corporate culture was so deeply engrained that during his testimony 
before the House’s Financial Services Committee Stumpf claimed, with no shame 
nor sense of guilt, that he ‘care(ed) about outcomes, not process’.407 It is no wonder 
that it was then reported that many employees had been fired after speaking-up 
about the unethical practices carried out within the firm, and that a petition, signed 
by five thousands employees, had just been ignored during the years preceding the 
outbreak of the Wells Fargo scandal.408 
The topic of the ‘imperial CEO’ has been largely studied by scholars in the last 
decades.409 It is worth noticing in this regard that a recent judgment of the Milan 
Tribunal410 upheld the decision of an international company leader in the insurance 
brokerage and risk-management sectors, to fire its CEO because of the corporate 
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climate he had built in the company — which was described as ‘unnecessarily 
authoritarian’ and ‘de-motivating’, while abuse of power and of competencies were 
the rule — despite the fact that he had led the company to huge profits and to a 
better market position than previously. 
Those just reported are simply a few examples of rotten practices at financial 
institutions which were widely acknowledged by policymakers and supervisors in 
their recent statements and reports. Sutherland 411  was the first scholar to 
acknowledge that criminal offences committed by white-collars workers are as 
frequent as the crimes committed by lower-class individuals, but less prosecuted and 
punished than the latter. In his opinion, the reaction of society and even of the crime 
perpetrators once convicted seemed to be rather weak considering the serious 
consequences produced by the same; which sounded as absurd given that ‘the 
financial cost of white-collar crime is probably several times as great as the financial 
cost of the crimes which are customarily regarded as the crime problem’.412 A 
possible explanation is that the lack of physical harm and the ‘abstractness’ of the 
crime make us perceive these kinds of offences as different,413 which can also explain 
the lack of guilt that offenders feel after being convicted. 
A rich literature links bad leadership to bad firm performance.414 Managerial 
over-optimism, overconfidence, dominance, narcissism, arrogance, self-absorption, 
and miscalibration are some of the common traits describing unethical and 
ineffective leadership.415 Brennan and Conroy analysed a bank CEO’s letters to 
shareholders included in annual reports, finding evidence of narcissistic and hubris 
symptoms from a clinical perspective.416 Other studies proved that a substantial 
percentage of corporate executives present psychopathic traits, which are commonly 
perceived as associated with ‘good communication skills, strategic thinking, and 
creative/innovative ability’. 417  To give an idea of CEOs’ overconfidence, an 
unnamed executive of Anglo-Irish Bank, one of the first casualties in the banking 
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crisis, was quoted as saying that the bank CEO, Sean Fitzpatrick, ‘began to think he 
could walk on water’.418 Similarly it was reported that Goldman Sachs’ Chief 
Executive, Lloyd Blankfein, while defending bankers’ high compensation, stated he 
was just ‘doing God’s work’.419 
 
2.2.6 The ethical leader 
 
Given that leaders might compromise a firm’s future performance and 
reputation, as they influence workers’ behaviour, they should first be looked at for 
establishing an ethical corporate culture.420 William Dudley similarly noted that 
“the problems originate from the culture of firms, and this culture is largely shaped 
by the firms’ leadership”, 421 so that solutions “need to originate from within the 
firms, from their leaders”. This topic has been developed by the literature on 
transformational leadership, which was defined as the process in which “leaders and 
followers help each other to advance to a higher level of morale and motivation”.422 
Other leadership theories have followed a different path, 423  such as 
transactional leadership, which is a performance-based system where employees are 
rewarded for reaching performance objectives agreed through contracts, without a 
long-term vision or high social purpose. 424 This type of approach, focusing on the 
																																																								
418 Shane Ross, The Bankers: How the Banks Brought Ireland to its Knees, Penguin, 2010. 
419 Matt Phillips, ‘Goldman Sachs’ Blankfein on Banking: “Doing God’s Work”’, Wall Street Journal, 9 
November 2009 https://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2009/11/09/goldman-sachs-blankfein-on-
banking-doing-gods-work/ accessed 30 Octboer 2018.  
420 Ronald R Sims, ‘The Challenge of Ethical Behaviour in Organizations’, Journal of Business Ethics 
(1992), 11, 505–13; Lynn Sharp Paine, Cases in Leadership, Ethics, and Organizational Integrity: A 
Strategic Perspective, Irwin, 1997; and W Edward Stead, Dan L Worrell, and Jean Garner Stead, ‘An 
Integrative Model For Understanding and Managing Ethical Behaviour in Business Organizations’, 
Journal of Business Ethics (1990), 9, 233–42. 
421 Dudley, n 243. 
422 James MacGregor Burns, Leadership, Harper and Row, 1997, 20. 
423  Among these are, the Great Man theory, Trait theory, Contingency theory, Situational 
Leadership, Behavioural theories, and Transactional theory. For a review on leadership theories and 
styles, see Rose Ngozi Amanchukwu et al, ‘A Review of Leadership Theories, Principles and Styles 
and their Relevance to Educational Management’, Management (2005), 5, 1, 6–14; and Richard 
Bolden et al, ‘A Review Leadership Theory and Competency Frameworks’, Centre for Leadership 
Studies, (2003). For a comparison between transactional and transformational leadership theories, 
see Bernard M Bass, ‘From Transactional to Transformational Leadership: Learning to Share the 
Vision’, Organizational Dynamics (1990), 18, 3, 19–31. For a critical response, see Colin W Evers 
and Gabriele Lakomski, Exploring educational administration: Choherentist applications and critical 
debates, Elsevier Science, 1996; and Gary Yukl, ‘An Evaluation of Conceptual Weaknesses in 
Transformational and Charismatic Leadership Theories’, Leadership Quarterly (1999), 10, 2, 285–
305. 
424 Bernard M Bass and Bruce J Avolio, Improving organizational effectiveness through transformational 
leadership, Sage, 1994. 
 
Shanshan Zhu 81 
fulfilment of performance goals in view of the organization members’ and leaders’ 
selfish needs, has dominated the financial industry over the last decades. In contrast, 
transformational leadership would require leaders and employees to set aside their 
self-interests and move ‘toward higher and more universal needs and purposes’,425 
to a sense of mission, by means of charisma, inspirational motivation, intellectual 
stimulation, and individualized consideration. 426  CEO’s ability to intellectually 
stimulate the firm’s employees, inducing them to question old assumptions and 
beliefs so as to deal with new contingencies in an innovative way,427 seems to 
determine the firm’s propensity to engage in corporate social responsibilities (CSR). 
The notion of ‘ethical leader’ combines transformational leadership with 
engagement in CSR issues. Reference is made to the honest, trustworthy decision 
maker, who behaves ethically in her personal and professional life, by frequently 
communicating values to followers, setting clear ethical standards, role modelling, 
and using the reward system linked to those standards.428 Grojean et al identify 
several ways leaders may transmit ethical values to members of an organization.429 
They pay special attention to the establishment of a clear vision through codes of 
conduct enforced by training courses and coaching. 
Another famous distinction between management styles was developed by 
McGregor, who labelled two kinds of leadership styles as Theory X and Theory 
Y.430 Leaders following Theory X structure their organization on the assumption 
that workers dislike their work, are lazy, and can only be motivated by money. 
Under this pessimistic view, leaders set up strict rules and controls, performance 
appraisals, and ‘carrot and stick’ schemes. On the contrary, those following Theory 
Y believe that their employees like their job, are moved by purpose, are happy to 
take initiatives, and can be self-motivated by their own passion. This optimistic view 
assumes a strong relationship of trust, which leads to a collaborative, innovative, 
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and happier workplace. According to McGregor’s view, workers will adapt their 
values and behaviour to the expectations set by the leaders. Fear will lead to fear, 
whereas trust will develop a trustworthy workforce. 
In the case of financial institutions, therefore, executives should first set a 
higher purpose transcending financial results, such as serving customers, 
employees, or society’s interests. 431  Second, they should get to know their 
institution by conducting a cultural diagnostic survey432 to identify culture groups 
within it.433 Third, they should better communicate with lower levels, so as to 
prevent the establishment of subcultures conflicting with the main culture. 434 In the 
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and Foreign Exchange (FOREX) 
manipulation scandals, for instance, unlawful practices spread out across banks 
horizontally through strong traders’ networks with no control by senior 
management.435 Fourth, caution has been suggested before finalizing a merger, since 
the compatibility between firms’ cultures should be tested in advance.436 Of course, 
the adoption of a leadership style and strategy should take into account the 
dimension and business model of the financial institution, as well as the national 
culture in which it operates. 
To conclude this brief review on leadership, neuroscientific studies analysed 
brain processes influencing moral judgement437 and offered tools which in theory 
could be used to assess the leaders’ profiles—other than through traditional surveys 
and interviews conducted by financial supervisors such as the ECB — and to 
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enhance ethical leadership.438 Just to mention a few, a high degree of frontal right 
hemisphere coherence — which is defined as the coordinated electrodes’ activity in 
the right frontal region of the brain measured by means of quantitative 
electroencephalogram (qEEG) technique — has been found to be related to greater 
emotional balance and socialized vision of the future. Similarly, the analyses of 
chemicals in the brain may allow to develop new individual-specific leadership 
development programmes.439 Coaching and training should therefore be promoted 
for developing ethical leadership skills.440 
In the light of the considerations above, EBA and ESMA guidelines, as well as 
the ECB guide, should consider board candidates and key function holders’ social 
and ethical profile. Competence, experience, independency of mind and good repute 
might reveal insufficient for the establishment of a sound culture, since concrete 
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Financial authorities’ formal interest towards the sound internal control 
system of banking institutions dates back to 1998, when the Bank of International 
Settlement (BIS) published a framework for internal control systems for banks, 
where it stated that: 
“A system of effective internal controls is a critical component of bank 
management and a foundation for the safe and sound operation of banking 
organisations. A system of strong internal controls can help to ensure that the 
goals and objectives of a banking organisation will be met, that the bank will 
achieve long-term profitability targets, and maintain reliable financial and 
managerial reporting. Such a system can also help to ensure that the bank will 
comply with laws and regulations as well as policies, plans, internal rules and 
procedures, and decrease the risk of unexpected losses or damage to the bank’s 
reputation.”441 
Currently, the main responsibilities for the internal control system in a bank 
are distributed along the so-called “three lines of defence”.442 The first line is 
represented by the business line, that has “ownership” of risk, whereby it 
acknowledges and manages the risk that it incurs in conducting its activities taking 
into account the bank’s risk appetite and its policies, procedures and controls.443 The 
second line of defence includes: (a) the independent risk management function, 
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which is responsible for identifying, measuring, monitoring and reporting risk on an 
enterprise-wide basis; and (b) the compliance function, which should routinely 
monitor compliance with laws, corporate governance rules, regulations, codes and 
policies to which the bank is subject. The third line of defence consists of an 
independent and effective internal audit function, that should provide independent 
review and objective assurance on the quality and effectiveness of the bank’s internal 
control system. The independency of the second and third lines of defence is 
highlighted also by the recommendations concerning compensation, as the BCBS 
requires that “for employees in control functions (eg risk, compliance and internal 
audit), remuneration should be determined independently of any business line 
overseen, and performance measures should be based principally on the achievement 
of their own objectives so as not to compromise their independence”. 444 
Within this complex system, the board should ensure that three lines of 
defence are properly positioned, staffed and resourced and carry out their 
responsibilities independently, objectively and effectively. 445 The board should also 
regularly review key policies and controls with senior management and the heads of 
the risk management, compliance and internal audit functions, in order to identify 
and address significant risks and issues as well as determine areas that need 
improvement. 
The EU formal adherence to the above described internal control framework 
is confirmed by both first level rules – specifically by CRD IV provisions –446 and 
second level rules – by the EBA guidelines.447 
In this chapter, I focus on the specific functions responsible for the second line 
of defence – namely risk management and compliance function – as by no means 
they are some of the most influential determinants of a bank overall organizational 
culture. In particular, following a brief overview of international and EU regulatory 
framework, I specifically address the role of a sound risk culture in a banks and 
investigate the main socio-psychological factors underlying the failure of compliance 
systems. 
																																																								
444 Id., §147. 
445 Id., §44. 
446 In particular, Recital 54 states that “[…] Member States should introduce principles and 
standards to ensure effective oversight by the management body, promote a sound risk culture at all 
levels of credit institutions and investment firms and enable competent authorities to monitor the 
adequacy of internal governance arrangements”. See also CRD IV, Article 74. 
447 See EBA, n 137, 10-11. 
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2.3.2 Risk Management 
 
Financial institutions, for their own nature, have to deal with many risks,448 
that should be properly managed by means of a risk governance framework. Even if 
it is still not clear whether corporate governance was a key factor for the outburst of 
the financial crisis, it is clear that many members of the managing bodies of the 
banks involved were not even aware of what management was doing. An improper 
internal control system and, in particular, an inadequate risk management function, 
can therefore be said to have been a common trait in the banks involved in the 
scandals.449  
Interestingly, a research conducted by Ellul and Yerramilli in 2012 found that 
– in a set of 74 large U.S. bank holding companies – those with strong and 
independent risk management function had lower enterprise-wide risk both before 
and during the crisis.450 In particular, the authors, by collecting data from 1995 to 
2010, created a Risk Management Index to measure the levels of strength and 
independence of risk management function. The results found that banks with 
higher levels of RMI in 2006 performed better during the crisis, as they: (i) had 
lower exposure to private-label mortgage-backed securities and trading assets, (ii) 
were less active in trading off-balance sheet derivative securities, (iii) had a smaller 
fraction of non-performing loans, and (iv) had lower downside risk. More recently, 
																																																								
448 Carey and Stulz distinguish among six types of risks: (i) market risk, associated with fluctuations 
in prices of traded financial instruments; (ii) credit risk, that is the risks that the obligor of a financial 
instrument held by a financial institution will fail to fulfil its obligation; (iii) operational risk, that is 
‘the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems, or from 
external events’ (as defined by the BCBS); (iv) liquidity risk, that can take the form of a market 
liquidity risk (i.e. the risk that a bank is unable to transact in a financial instrument at a price near its 
market value) and funding liquidity risk (i.e. the risk that a company or bank may be unable to meet 
short term financial demands); (v) strategic risk, that is the risk that a bank suffer an operating 
income shortfall due to a decrease in revenues which cannot be compensated by cost reduction; and 
(vi) business risk, associated to the bank’s ability to generate sufficient revenue to cover its 
operational expenses. In addition to these risks, we can mention also reputational risks, systemic 
risks and legal risks. More recently, financial authorities started taking into consideration also the 
so-called ‘conduct risk’, see Antonella Sciarrone Alibrandi and Claudio Frigeni, ‘Managing Conduct 
Risk: From Rules to Culture’, in in D. Busch, G. Ferrarini and G. van Solinge (eds), Governance of 
Financial Institutions, (Oxford University Press, 2019), Forthcoming. See Mark Carey, Rene M. Stulz, 
‘The Risks of Financial Institutions’, NBER Working Paper No. 11442/2005, and BCBS, 
Operational Risk – Supervisory Guidelines for the Advanced Measurement Approaches, June 2011. 
449  See, among others, Federal Reserve Senior Supervisors Group, ‘Observations on Risk 
Management Practices during the Recent Market Turbulence’, 2008; BCBS, n 105. At the EU level, 
see EU Commission, Green Paper Corporate Governance in financial institutions and remuneration 
policies, 2010; ESMA and EBA, n 100; CRD IV, Recital 53. In literature, see, among other, Hopt, n 
25, 49 and 50.  
450 Andrew Ellul & Vijay Yerramilli, ‘Stronger Risk Controls, Lower Risk: Evidence from U.S. Bank 
Holding Companies’, The Journal of Finance (2013), 5, 1757-1803. 
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an empirical study performed on 81 EU banks showed a link between a sound risk 
culture and better stress indicators (derived from the 2014 ECB stress test), with 
particular reference to capital adequacy and risk exposure.451  
Based on these results, financial regulators and supervisors widely supported 
– and intervened accordingly to – the view that strengthening risk management 
function requirements would play an important role in lowering enterprise-wide 
risk at banking institutions, with a particular focus on systemic risk prevention.452 
However, it should be recalled that risks are not bad risks per definition, and 
therefore risk management function does not have the only task of reducing risk-
taking, as “taking actions that reduce risk can be costly for shareholders when lower 
risk means avoiding valuable investments and activities that have higher risk”.453 
The main function of risk management, on the contrary, is to properly identify and 
measure the risks the bank is taking, avoid and eliminate bad risks but also ensure a 
risk level aligned with the risk appetite of the bank. The establishment of a well-
functioning risk management system is therefore a complex task, as it requires a 
certain level of flexibility that can be satisfied with the imposition of strict rules, but 
with softer solutions, such as appropriate incentives and a sound risk culture454.  
 
 
2.3.2.1 International principles and EU regulatory framework 
 
In 2013, the FSB issued a thematic review in which it recognized the 
improvement made by national authorities in the regulatory and supervisory 
oversight of risk governance at financial institutions after the crisis. However, in 
order to ensure the continuous improvement of risk governance practices and avoid 
progress made to be fruitless, the FSB recommended further strengthening of risk 
management function.455 
																																																								
451 Sebastian Fritz-Morgenthal, Julia Hellmuth & Natalie Packham, ‘Does Risk Culture Matter? The 
Relationship Between Risk Culture Indicators and Stress Test Results’, Journal of Risk Management 
in Financial Institutions (2016), 9, 71–84.  
452 ‘Systemic risk’ was defined as the risk that a trigger event (e.g. an economic shock or institutional 
failure), causes a chain of bad economic consequences ‘domino effect’. See Schwarcz, n 35.  
453 See Rene M Stulz, ‘Governance, Risk Management, and Risk-Taking in Banks’, European 
Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 427/2014, available 
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2457947, accessed 21 November 2018. 
454 Id. 
455 FSB, 338, 4 et seq. The recommendations concerned, among other things: (i) the improvement of 
communication procedures between the risk committee and the board and across other board 
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Based on the FSB thematic review, the BCBS focused most of its attention on 
risk governance provisions in the design of its guidelines. In particular, the 
strengthening of board’s responsibility for the oversight and risk governance of the 
bank was one of the primary objectives of the revision of the guidelines. 456 
Moreover, the BCBS clarified and emphasized key concepts such as risk culture, risk 
appetite457  and their relationship to a bank’s risk capacity.458 Accordingly, the new 
guidelines establish that it is the board’s main task to establish, along with senior 
management and the Chief Risk Officer (CRO), the bank risk appetite, oversee the 
respect of the Risk Appetite Statement (RAS),459 of risk policy and risk limits.  
At the EU level, the CRD IV devotes a high number of provisions to the 
internal risk governance of institutions, and – in consistency with BCBS Principles 
– it emphasizes the key role played by the board. Pursuant to Article 76(1), the 
board has to approve and periodically review the strategies and policies for taking 
up, managing, monitoring and mitigating the risks the bank might be exposed to. 
As already highlighted (see 1.2.3.2.1), the main novelty introduced by the directive 
is the requirement for the establishment of a risk committee in significant banks. 
Moreover, institutions have to established a ‘risk management function’ 
independent from the operational functions and that should ensure that all material 
risks are identified, measured and properly reported, and that should be lead by a 
dedicated senior manager or another senior person, removable only with the prior 
approval of the board.460  
The EU approach is consistent with Ellul and Yerramilli findings, but also 
with the outcomes of other studies conducted on risk governance,461 especially in 
relation to board functioning and CRO status. For instance, Lingel and Sheed, using 
																																																																																																																																																														
committees; (ii) the independence and competence requirements of board members; (iii) facilitating 
CRO involvement in bank activities and decisions, (iv) the annual performance of a independent 
assessment on the design and effectiveness of the risk governance framework. 
456 BCBS, n 72, 4. See also BCBS, ‘Principles for the Sound Management of Operational Risk’ (2013).  
457 The risk appetite is “the aggregate level and types of risk a bank is willing to assume, decided in 
advance and within its risk capacity, to achieve its strategic objectives and business plan”. See BCBS, 
n 72, Glossary; and FSB, n 101. 
458 This is the “maximum amount of risk a bank is able to assume given its capital base, risk 
management and control capabilities as well as its regulatory constraints. See BCBS, n 72, Glossary. 
459 The RAS is defined as “the written articulation of the aggregate level and types of risk that a bank 
will accept, or avoid, in order to achieve its business objectives. It includes quantitative measures 
expressed relative to earnings, capital, risk measures, liquidity and other relevant measures as 
appropriate. It should also include qualitative statements to address reputation and conduct risks as 
well as money laundering and unethical practices”. See BCBS, n 72, Glossary; and FSB, n 101.  
460 Id., Article 76(5).  
461 See, for example, Mehran, Morrison and Shapiro, n 300, 12. In particular, the authors stressed the 
importance of risk management function. 
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a sample of the largest listed banks from 2004 to 2010, show that better board 
oversight by the risk committee (i.e. the level of banking experience found on this 
committee and also the frequency of meetings) in a given year is associate with 
lower risk the following year. The same study reveals that banks with CROs of 
higher status – in relation to their role as top executives and their compensation - 
have less risks. However, the authors did not find evidence that good risk 
management had a good impact on bank performance during the crisis.462 On the 
contrary, Aebi, Sabato, and Schmid show that banks where the CRO reported 
directly to the board performed significantly better during the financial crisis, while 
banks where the CRO reported to the CEO performed significantly worse then 
other banks in the analyzed sample (573 banks in total).463 
 
2.3.2.2 Risk Culture 
 
The notion of ‘risk culture’ is crucial within the risk governance framework. 
The FSB defines it as the “bank’s norms, attitudes, and behavior related to risk 
awareness, risk-taking and risk management and controls that shape decisions on 
risks”.464 The specific risk culture established in an institution not only influences 
the decision-making processes of management and board members, but also deeply 
shapes employees’ day-to-day practices. 
Given the complexity and the high number of variables of the phenomenon, 
financial supervision – rather than regulation – is entrusted with the proper 
addressing and monitoring of bank risk culture, ensuring that the board put in place 
a proper structure for the correct management of risks across all the business lines. 
Consistently, in 2014 the FSB issued a guidance addressed to financial supervisors 
for a proper interaction with financial institutions on risk culture, in order to 
monitor the state of progress in risk culture of supervised entities.465 In particular, 
supervisors should assess how the board and senior management systematically 
assess the risk culture of the institution. To do so, the FSB recommends to 
																																																								
462  Anna Lingel & Elizabeth Sheedy, ‘The influence of risk governance on risk outcomes – 
international evidence’, unpublished working paper (2012).  
463 Vincent, Aebi, Gabriele Sabato & Markus Schmid, ‘Risk management, corporate governance, and 
bank performance in the financial crisis’, Journal of Banking and Finance (2012), 36, 3213-3226.  
464 FSB, n 101. 
465 Id.  
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supervisory authorities to perform a large set of monitoring activities, based – but 
not limited to – the assessment of a series of indicators (see Table 1).  
At the EU level, the EBA followed the FSB approach to the assessment of risk 
culture in its Guidelines on Internal Governance. 466  In particular, the EBA 
recommends to banks the development of a proper risk culture by means of several 
activities and tools, such as policies, communication and staff training. 467  In 
accordance with FSB guidance, the EBA identifies four main drivers of a strong risk 
culture 468  - tone from the top, accountability, effective communication and 
challenge, and incentives.  
To summarize, after the financial crisis, the supervisory commitment to 
promote the resilience of the financial system translated into an increasingly active 
role in the monitoring or risk-taking behaviours. However, the task is by no means 
a massive challenge for financial authorities, and becomes even harder for the 
ECB,469 since it must perform its supervisory powers on significant institutions 
across all member states (within the euro area). As an institution’s risk culture is 
also determined by national culture,470 this should be taken into consideration by 
the EU supervisor during the performance of its periodic assessment, a task that 
may reveal particularly challenging and subject to a significant margin for error. 
Moreover, supervisors need to develop broad-based experience and a set of 
appropriate skills to assess risk culture, as well as new management and 
organizational tools.471. We may stress that, currently, the culture of banking 
supervision is under evolution, and the main trends are:472 (i) an orientation towards 
learning and knowledge sharing, (ii) better communication with other authorities, 
markets, institutions and individuals, (iii) increased attention to the selection, 
development and retention of human resources, (iv) excellence in research, and (v) 
establishment of shared vision of values, objectives, and organizational behaviour.  
  
																																																								
466 EBA, n 137. 
467 Id, §96. 
468 Id, §98. 
469  Risk culture features prominently in the ECB document ‘SSM supervisory statement on 
governance and risk appetite’, published in June 2016, that states that expectations are that a strong 
risk appetite framework will help build a sound risk culture. 
470 Marco Di Antonio, ‘Risk Culture in Different Bank Businesses’, in A. Carretta, Franco Fiordelisi, 
and Paola Schwizer (eds), Risk Culture in Banking, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, 42. 
471 Alessandro Carretta and Paola. Schwizer, ‘Risk Culture in the Regulation and Supervision 
Framework’, in A. Carretta, Franco Fiordelisi, and Paola Schwizer (eds), Risk Culture in Banking, 




Table 1:  FSB Risk Culture Indicators (2014) 
Main determinant              Indicator 






















Learning from past 
experiences 
• The board and senior management have a clear view of the risk culture to which they aspire, 
systematically monitor, assess and address weakness related to it.  
• The board and senior management promote a risk culture that expects integrity and a sound 
approach to risk management. 
• The board and senior management promote openness to challenge within the board. 
• The board and senior management are committed to establishing, monitoring, and adhering 
to an effective risk appetite framework, supported by appropriate risk appetite statement. 
• Mechanisms are in place to ensure decision-making is not dominated by any one individual or 
small group. 
• Senior management is subject to the same expectations for integrity, risk governance, and risk 
culture as all other employees; that is, mechanisms are in place to subject senior management 
to incentive structures. 
• The board and senior management systematically aff at all levels. 
• The board and senior management assess whether the institution’s risk appetite framework 
and business strategy are clearly understood and embedded in the decision-making and 
operations of the business.  
• Appropriate mechanisms are in place to ensure the risk appetite, risk management strategy, 
and business strategy are effectively aligned and embedded in decision- making and operations.  
• The board and senior management have clear views on the business lines considered to pose 
the greatest challenges in the management of risk. 
• The board and senior management systematically monitor how promptly and effectively issues 
raised by the board, supervisors, and all control functions are addressed by management.  
• Processes are in place to review deficiencies in risk management are reviewed. 
• Assessment and communication of lessons learnt from past events are seen as an opportunity 
to enhance the institution’s risk culture, and to enact real changes for the future.  
 





















• Clear expectations are set with respect to the monitoring and reporting of, and response to, 
current and emerging risk information across the institution.  
• Mechanisms are in place for the sharing of information on emerging, as well as low probability, 
high impact risks, both horizontally across business lines and vertically up the institution.  
• The CEO, senior management and employees are held accountable for their actions and 
understand the consequences if they are not aligned with the institution’s core values, risk 
appetite and risk culture.  
• Appropriate escalation processes are established to support risk management and clear 
consequences for non-compliance with escalation procedures are defined. Systematic 
assessments are conducted on whether employees are aware of escalation processes and 
believe the environment is open to critical challenge.  
• Mechanisms are established for employees to elevate and report concerns when they feel 
discomfort about products or practices, even where they are not making a specific allegation of 
wrongdoing.  
• Appropriate whistleblowing procedures are in place. 
• Consequences are clearly established, articulated and applied for anyone engaged in, or 
supporting, risk-taking that is excessive relative to the financial institution’s risk appetite 
statement. 
• Breaches in internal policies, procedures and risk limits, and internal codes of conduct, are 
understood to have a potential impact on an individual’s compensation, responsibilities, career 







Open to alternate views 
 
Stature of control 
functions 
 
• Alternate views or questions from individuals and groups are encouraged and valued. 
• Mechanisms are in place so that alternate views can be expressed in practice.  
• Control functions (e.g. risk management, internal audit, compliance) share the same stature as 
the business lines, actively participate in committees and are proactively involved in all relevant 
risk decisions and activities.  
• Control functions operate independently, have appropriate direct access to the board and 
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senior management and a process is in place for them to periodically report to the board.  
• Control functions, including their respective representatives, have sufficient stature not only to 
act as advisors, but to effectively exert control tasks with respect to the institution ́s risk culture.  














• The compensation structure supports the institution’s espoused core values and promotes 
sound risk-taking behaviour and is supported by a well-documented process.  
• Remuneration and performance metrics consistently support and drive the desired risk- taking 
behaviours, risk appetite and risk culture of the financial institution. 
• Annual performance reviews and objectives-setting processes are linked to promoting the 
institution’s desired core values and behaviours as well as compliance with policies and 
procedures, including addressing in a timely manner deficiencies highlighted by internal audit 
and supervisory findings.  
• Incentive compensation programs systematically include individual and group adherence to the 
financial institution’s core values and risk culture. 
• Succession planning processes for key management positions include risk management 
experience. 
• Understanding key risks, essential elements of risk management, and the institution’s culture  
• Job rotation between control functions and business lines.  
• Training programs are available for all staff to develop risk management competencies. 
	
However, notwithstanding financial institutions’ new attention to risk 
culture factor – as well as the advanced debate among practitioners –473 the 
academic literature addressed the issue with a certain delay, maybe due to the 
need of an interdisciplinary approach to it,474 but also to the difficulties found in 
measuring it. 475  In particular, some authors highlighted how risk culture 
communication can be misleading, due to the opposition between ‘espoused 
values’ – values included in bank statements and codes of ethics or codes od 
conduct – and real practices - what bank staff actually do, based on values and 
behaviours really rooted in the institution.476 
Only recently some scholars started to specifically study risk culture in 
financial institutions. Power et al., for instance, found some common patterns 
among the vast number of risk-cultural approaches. 477 At a high level, they 
distinguish between ‘organic approaches’ to risk culture and ‘engineered 
programmes’, where the former category is based on a confident informal 
approach to change risk culture in the organization over long timescales with 
emphasis on ethics and mission, while the latter is advisor and regulator-driven, 
based on metrics and performance incentives and tend to favour shorter 
timeframes for change. Below this level, firms have to deal with numerous 
tensions and trade-offs that cannot be fully categorized.478 
As for the main determinants of different risk cultures, Di Antonio479 
identified both structural/endogenous factors, and contingent/external factors. 
The first category includes: (i) the activities performed and their embedded risks, 
(ii) the nature and role of customers, and (iii) the economics of business. The 
contingent risks include several factors, such as market competitiveness, 
																																																								
473 See, for a review, Michael Power, Simon Ashby & Tommaso Palermo, ‘Risk Culture in 
Financial Organizations: A Research Report’, London School of Economics (2013).  
474 See Alessandro Carretta, Franco Fiordelisi, and Paola Schwizer (eds), Risk Culture in Banking, 
Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2017, 2. 
475 See Stulz, n 453. 
476 Di Antonio, n 470, 38. 
477 Power, Simon & Palermo, n 473. 
478 However, the authors identify some visible trade-offs, based on the balancing of: (i) the 
commercial and regulatory authority of the risk function, (ii) the use of formal organisational 
arrangements with interactive approaches to risk management, (iii) risk support for disciplined 
business decisions against the risks of imposing excessive controls, (iv) the use of advisors with 
‘going it alone’, (v) regulator and regulated culture, and (vi) ethics and incentives as levers over 
behavioural change. 
479 Di Antonio, n 470, 40 ss. 
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regulation, history and evolution of the business, size and diversification of the 
financial institution, ownership model, national culture, strategic orientation, 
organisational systems and practices, and employees’ individual culture.  
In light of all the considerations above, it should be definitely confirmed 
the inadequacy of regulators’ intervention on the field of banks’ risk culture 
governance, and again the essential role of boards and supervisors financial 
supervision in managing this dynamic and constantly changing framework. 
 
 
2.3.3 Compliance function 
 
Together with risk management, compliance function forms the “second 
line of defence” within the internal control system. 
The importance of compliance have greatly expanded in the last years, 
mainly for the increase in complexity of financial products and in the 
diversification of risks incurred by institutions. Especially in the EU, banks are 
now required to perform a very high degree of vigilance on the concrete respect 
of rules, a task that is becoming progressively difficult, considered the still 
evolving flow of new financial regulation. 
However, compliance is by no means also an expression of the culture of 
the bank, as it is associated with the way board members, managerial staff and 
employees within the institution perceive and value the respect of rules, 
standards and practices. And if financial regulators have for years approached 
compliance with a ‘detect-and-punish’ method, behavioral studies show that rule-
breaking can be avoided also by changing the ‘choice architecture’ of compliance 
decisions.480 Only by understanding which contextual factors can induce people 
to break rule, regulators and banks can successfully play their key role in the 
promotion of a sound culture of compliance, where moral values are deeply 
integrated in conduct and behavior of individuals at all levels. 
 
																																																								
480  FCA, ‘Behaviour and Compliance in Organisations’, Occasional Paper 24/2016 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/occasional-papers/op16-24.pdf, accessed 20 November 
2018. 
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2.3.3.1 International principles and EU Framework 
 
At the international level, the BCBS provided basic standards and 
principles for compliance function in the 2005 guidance “Compliance and the 
compliance function in banks’. 481 In particular, the BCBS defines the notion of 
“compliance risk” as “the risk of legal or regulatory sanctions, material financial 
loss, or loss to reputation a bank may suffer as a result of its failure to comply 
with laws, regulations, rules, related self-regulatory organization standards, and 
codes of conduct applicable to its banking activities”.482 The guidance also 
specifies that “compliance starts at the top” and “it will be most effective in a 
corporate culture that emphasises standards of honesty and integrity and in 
which the board of directors and senior management lead by example”.483 In 
particular, the senior management is responsible for establishing and 
communicating the bank’s compliance policy, as well as for reporting to the 
board of directors on the management of the bank’s compliance risk and 
establishing a permanent and effective compliance function,484 while the board of 
directors should approve it and ensure its proper implementation. 485  
The compliance function should assist senior managers by offering its 
advice, providing guidance and education to the staff, identifying, measuring and 
assessing compliance risks associated with the bank’s business activities, and 
monitoring, testing and reporting on compliance.486 The independence of the 
compliance function should be properly ensured, and possible conflicts of 
interests should be avoided.487 Moreover, to be effective, the compliance function 
must have sufficient authority, stature, independence, resources and access to the 
board.488 To this end, an executive or senior staff member – usually called ‘head 
																																																								
481 BCBS, ‘Compliance and the compliance function in banks’, April 2005. 
482 Id., § 3. 
483 Id., § 2. 
484 Id., §15-19. 
485 Id., § 14. 
486 Id., § 35-41. 
487 Id., § 20. 
488 Id., § 22. 
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of compliance’ – should be nominated, with the overall responsibility for 
coordinating compliance-related activities.489 
The same compliance principles have been included in the BCBS Corporate 
Governance Principles for Banks.490 Interestingly, these guidelines even suggest 
that an ethics and compliance committee should be established within the 
board.491 
At the EU level, the discipline concerning compliance function, which is 
aligned with international standards, is provided in the EBA guidelines on 
internal governance. Some references are made in the CRD IV, that specifies that 
the management body is responsible for the integrity of compliance systems,492 
and that the remuneration committee or the board in its supervisory function 
should directly oversee the compensation of senior officers in the compliance 
function.493 
However, a thorough study of compliance cannot overlook the analysis of 
rule-breaking phenomena, that requires to focus on certain underlying 
psychological group dynamics. 
 
 
2.3.3.2 The failure of compliance 
 
As Baxter correctly said in relation to compliance, “if organizational values 
do not support the rules that organizations use to guide the behavior of 
employees, and worse, if organizational values actually conflict with those rules, 
the organization is headed for troubled territory”.494 Thus, ensuring compliance 
to rules became the core task of compliance function in banks. However, a real 
change cannot be realized until we move from a model of compliance to rules to 
system of compliance to values, values that should necessarily be aligned with 
the rules, standards and practices established and implemented in the bank. 
																																																								
489 Id., § 22. 
490 BCBS, n 72 Principle 9. 
491 Id., § 77. 
492 CRD IV, Article 88(1)(b). 
493 CRD IV, Article 92(2)(f). 
494 See Baxter, n 231. 
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Moreover, it should be always kept in mind that compliance involves a large set 
of organizational aspects – such as leadership, incentives, governance, controls –, 
that it interests, in particular, the entire human resource management function – 
from the hiring process, to training and compensation -, and should be consistent 
at each level of the organization, starting from the top.  
In other words, monitoring-based systems – which usually have high costs 
– should be replaced by an integrity-based system based on persuasion instead of 
commandment, so that “an ethical framework becomes no longer a burdensome 
constraint within which companies must operate, but the governing ethos of an 
organization”. 495 Moreover, designing compliance-based system only based on 
legal violations detection and punishment is not enough to create a culture that 
encourages organization ethicality and to identify and address underlying 
altered cognitive processes. In fact, many behavioral biases may affect individual 
ability to meet compliance goals, by altering their preferences, beliefs and 
decision-making. An FCA occasional paper496 identified seven behavioral biases – 
namely ‘present bias’,497  ‘endowment effects and loss aversion’,498  ‘omission 
bias’,499 ‘overconfidence’,500 ‘confirmation bias’,501 ‘salience and vividness’,502 and 
‘groupthink’503 - able to increase the likelihood of rule breaking. This suggests 
that a holistic approach – instead of a narrow legalistic approach -504 is the only 
																																																								
495 Lynne Paine, ‘Managing for Organizational Integrity’, Harvard Business Review (March-
April 1994), 106.  
496 FCA, n 480. 
497 Individuals generally prefer to obtain something now rather than later. Therefore, short-term 
gain may seem preferable than long-term reward, and more immediate and concrete than a 
possible future punishment.  
498 Individuals tend to value something they have more than something they have not, and 
consequently are excessively attached to existing compliance processes. 
499 Omission is usually preferred to action. For this reason, the likelihood of people breaching a 
rule that prohibits an act is lower than the likelihood they fail to comply to a required behaviour. 
500 Overconfidence leads individual to have excessive faith in their own abilities, making them 
believe that the likelihood of being punished is low, while the likelihood of succeed is particularly 
high. 
501 People tend to seek evidence that support their beliefs and ignore evidence proving the 
contrary. 
502  Judgements are mostly based on salient and vivid available information, not on all 
information. The way rule breaches punishment are communicated may lead individual to focus 
more on some rules than others, at the expenses of other provisions. 
503 As I analyse in the next Section, people tend to act in a different way in group-context. 
504 Linda Klebe Trevino et al., ‘Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and What 
Hurts’, Cal. Mgt. Rev. (Winter 1999), 41,131. 
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reasonable approach to face this complex reality, and this should vary depending 
on the specific institution and context analyzed. 
In the next sections, I specifically analyse two aspects of compliance failure 
– collective psychological pressures and ineffective design and implementation of 
codes of conducts - and provide suggestions to build a better choice architecture 
to promote better decision-making. 
 
 
2.3.3.3 The psychology of compliance: group dynamics 
 
Specific group pressures may alter individuals’ tendency to comply to rules, 
norms, standards and codes of conduct. However, in order to better understand 
how these pressures affect behaviour, some misconceptions should be first 
handled.  
It is a common belief that only immoral individuals, the so-called ‘bad 
apples’, commit serious misbehaviour. Nevertheless, it is well established that 
corporate crimes often involve people within an organization who are not ‘bad 
apples’, but ‘ordinary men and women’.505 Indeed, when individuals act under a 
particular cognitive framing or in a group context their behaviour may deviate 
from the rational norm and their decision making and judgemental processes 
may be altered. 506  Many studies concern group behaviour both in social 
psychology507 and behavioural economics.508 Common results from these studies 
																																																																																																																																																							
 
505 Saul W Gellerman, ‘Why “Good” Managers Make Bad Ethical Choices’, Harvard Business 
Review (1986), 6, available at https://h br.org/1986/07/why-good-managers-make-bad-ethical-
choices, accessed 21 November 2018. 
506 This is well explained in the contraposition between the expected-utility theory and the 
prospect theory, in Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Rational Choice and the Framing of 
Decision’, The Journal of Business (1986), 59, 4, 251–78, and Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk’, Econometrica (1979), 47, 2, 
263–92. 
507 For a review see, inter alia, James H Davis, ‘Some Compelling Intuitions about Group 
Consensus Decisions, Theoretical and Empirical Research, and Interpersonal Aggregation 
Phenomena: Selected Examples, 1950-1990’, Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision 
Processes’ (1992), 52, 3–38. A famous experiment on the effects of cognitive framing was 
conducted by Tversky and Kahneman; see Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘The Framing of 
Decisions and the Psychology of Choice’, Science (1981), 211, 453–58. 
508 For a review see, inter alia, Michael J O’Fallon and Kenneth D Butterfield, ‘A Review of The 
Empirical Ethical Decision-Making Literature’, Journal of Business Ethics (2005), 59, 375–413; 
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are that cognitive frames matter 509 and that decision makers do not always 
follow profit maximization as the main criterion for acting. Compliance and 
conformity might depend on authority and obedience, social norms, 
reciprocation, ‘rejection-than-moderation’ procedures,510 all based on three main 
motivations: accuracy, affiliation, and the maintenance of a positive self-
concept.511 In a famous experiment, Asch proved that people’s opinion usually 
changed if they were put under conformity pressure in a group context, even if 
following the majority trend meant giving clearly wrong answers during a 
test. 512  Another experiment by Milgram shed light on the dangerous 
implications of authority’s pressure on ethical behaviour,513 as later confirmed by 
a survey which found superiors’ behaviour as the most influential factor leading 
to unethical actions.514 
Moreover, the use of an aggressive corporate language,515 such as one 
recalling war and fear in a Hobbesian way, is also common amongst unethical 
leaders, who have led unethical working teams. Deutsche Bank’s senior manager 
Edson Mitchell and his team, for example, used to refer to themselves as 
‘mercenaries’ and ‘conquistadors’.516 According to an experiment run by McNeil 
in 1982,517 the way information is spread within an organization is likely to 
																																																																																																																																																							
and Christopher Engel, ‘The Behaviours of Corporate Actors: A Survey of the Empirical 
Literature’ Journal of Institutional Economics (2010), 4, 445. 
509 A frame is defined as ‘a stable, coherent cognitive structure that organizes and simplifies the 
complex reality that a manager operates in’; J Eward Russo and Paul J H Schoemaker, 
‘Managing Frames to Make Better Decisions’, in Stephen J Hoch and Howard C Kunreuther 
(eds), Wharton on Making Decisions, Wiley, 2001, 131–55. 
510 This strategy, based on the norm of reciprocation, implies that one makes an excessive 
request (likely to be rejected), but later makes some concessions. Because of these concessions, 
‘the target feels a normative obligation to reciprocate the influence agent’s concession with a 
concession of his or her own’ and, as a consequence, he would probably accept to comply to the 
new request. See Robert B Cialdini and Noah J Goldstein, ‘Social Influence: Compliance and 
Conformity’, Annual Review of Psychology (2004), 55, 591–621. 
511 Ibid. 
512 Solomon E Asch, ‘Opinions and social pressure’, Scientific American (1955), 193, 31–355. 
513 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, Harper and Row, 1974. 
514 Blake E Ashforth and Vikas Anand, ‘The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations’, 
Research in Organizational Behaviour (2003), 25, 1–52. 
515 Patelli & Pedrini, n 398, 3–19; Guido Palazzo, Franciska Krings, and Ulrich Hoffrage, ‘Ethical 
Blindness’ Journal of Business Ethics (2011), 109, 3, 323–38; Kevin Allen, ‘How Language 
Shapes Your Organization’, Harvard Business Review, 2012, available at 
https://hbr.org/2012/07/how-language-shapes-your-organization, accessed 5 November 2018. 
516 Fichtner, Goos & Hesse, n 403. 
517 Barbara J McNeil et al, ‘On the elicitation of preferences for alternative therapies’, New 
England Journal of Medicine (1982), 306, 1259–62. 
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influence its members’ decision making under risk, especially when information 
is limited and members rely on a very limited number of biasing heuristics.518 
However, risks arise both from inside and outside the organization. If a 
broad view of the current financial system is adopted, the institutional context is 
often characterized by a systemic moral disconnection of companies and their 
members from the societal context. 519  An organization may promote 
misbehaviour by encouraging values such as aggressiveness, competitiveness, 
and profit at all costs. 520  Specialization and a competence-based model of 
professional behaviour increase efficiency, but may reduce the agents’ attention 
to other aspects and dimensions of decision making,521 causing a sort of ‘moral 
disengagement’ from the real issues that they are dealing with.522 In other 
words, common people who find themselves in strong unethical contexts, in ‘bad 
larders’,523 sometimes commit crimes being unaware of the unethicality of their 
conduct. Some scholars talk about ‘ethically blind’ individuals,524 as a result of 
group pressures. Ethical blindness is defined as the ‘temporary inability of a 
decision maker to see the ethical dimension of a decision at stake’.525 The 
individual hence deviates from her own values and beliefs as a result of some 
psychological processes that narrows its cognitive framing. However, this view 
could be a dangerous justification for misbehaviour. Strong contexts can no 
doubt facilitate the rise of a corrupt corporate culture and therefore influence 
members’ behaviour, but it is difficult to believe that the relevant agents are 
entirely unaware of the immorality of their actions. We are rather confronted 
with an ethical rationalization526 or a normalization of dishonest behaviour,527 as 
																																																								
518 See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases’, Science (1974), 185, 1124–31. 
519 Michael Gonin, Guido Palazzo & Ulrich Hoffrage, ‘Neither Bad Apple Nor Bad Barrel: How 
the Societal Context Impacts Unethical Behaviours in Organizations’, Business Ethics: A 
European Review (2012), 21, 1, 31–46. 
520 Sims, n 420; Stead, Worrell & Stead, n 420, 233–42. 
521 Gonin, Palazzo, & Ulrich Hoffrage, n 519. 
522 Albert Bandura, ‘Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency’, Journal of 
Moral Education (2002), 31, 2, 101–19. 
523 Gonin, Palazzo, & Hoffrage, n 519.  
524 Palazzo, Krings, & Hoffrage, n 515. 
525 ibid. 
526 John M Darley, ‘How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing’ in D Messick and A 
Tenbrunsel (eds), Codes of Conduct: Behavioral Research into Business Ethics, Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1996, 13–43. 
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described by Ashforth and Anand:528 moral concerns are suppressed to prioritize 
other interests, which are more direct, urgent, or advantageous. ‘Ethical short-
sightedness’, rather than ‘ethical blindness’ should be cautiously referred to.  
It should also be considered that, notwithstanding the influence of 
organizational and situational factors, there is always space for individuality and 
virtues training when it comes to ethical decision making. Trevino and 
Youngblood found that individual differences as to locus of control determine 
variances in the probability for an individual to act unethically. Based on these 
findings, they conclude that selection and training are important for 
organizations that want to be ethical.529  
To draw some preliminary conclusions, group pressures may induce 
individuals to put aside their moral concerns to benefit other priorities. However, 
priority rules are designed, sometimes unconsciously, by the way those in charge 
of the organization communicate and behave. To change the culture of 
compliance of the organization, collective pressures, far from being thoroughly 
repressed, should be reshaped by senior management and board members to 
address employees to virtuous behaviour. For instance, based on the need for 
acceptance in the group, individuals tend to attribute great value to the risk to be 
disapproved by their peers. As a result, if the probability of disapproval in case of 
rule-breaking is high, the likelihood of illicit conduct then automatically 
decreases. The correct enforcement of internal sanctioning measures is therefore 
by no means a key factor, as the way punishment and the underlying values it 
involves are perceived as just or unfair, may determine the collective way to deal 
with compliance. From regulators’ and supervisor’s perspective, communication 
should be focused on salient and vivid instances of detection and punishment, in 
order to change people’s perception of the expected costs of wrongdoings.530  
																																																																																																																																																							
527 According to Ashforth and Anand, this normalization process consists of three main phases: 
institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization. 
528 Ashforth & Anand, n 200. See also Gellerman’s model, which identifies four beliefs leading to 
unethical decisions: (i) the activity is is not ‘really’ illegal or immoral; (ii) the activity is in the 
company’s best interest; (iii) the activity will never be found out; and (iv) the company will 
protect the person engaging in the activity, since he perform it in its interest: Gellerman, n 191. 
529 Linda Klebe Trevino and Stuart A Youngblood, ‘Bad Apples in Bad Barrels: Causal Analysis 
of Ethical Decision-Making Behaviours’, Journal of Applied Psychology (1990), 75, 4, 378–85. 
530 FCA, n 480. 
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However, the organizational values should be communicated also by means 
of other tools, such as incentives (see Chapter IV) and codes of conduct (see 
Section 2.3.3.4) . 
 
 
2.3.3.4 Codes of conduct and ethics  
 
(i) A Global Practice 
 
Over the years, professional associations and individual firms (both 
financial and non-financial)531 have drafted many ‘codes of conduct’, ‘codes of 
ethics’, ‘statements of business principles’, and ‘charters’ 532  modelling the 
organizational culture of corporations in order to prevent future misbehaviour. 
Most firms have been pressured to adopt codes of conduct by legislation, the 
media, their shareholders and/or stakeholders.533 The Corporate governance 
principles for banks issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) in 2015 exhort banks to adopt internal codes of conduct and practice 
guidelines.534 At the EU level, the EBA recommend the board to “develop, adopt, 
adhere to and promote high ethical and professional standards, taking into 
account the specific needs and characteristics of the institution, and should 
ensure the implementation of such standards (through a code of conduct or 
similar instrument)”.535 The main purpose of the standards, according to the 
																																																								
531 These include, for example: the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) Institute Code of Ethics 
and Standards of Professional Conduct; the Chartered Institute for Securities and Investment 
Code of Conduct; the Alternative Investment Management Association Guides to Sound 
Practices; the European Code of Good Conduct for Microcredit Provision; the United Nations 
Global Compact; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises; and the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 
environmental management system standards. 
532 For a brief review of the terms used to indicate this kind of codes and of how variations in the 
usage of the terms could lead to methodological deficiencies, see Muel Kaptein and Mark S 
Schwartz, ‘The Effectiveness of Business Codes: A Critical Examination of Existing Studies and 
the Development of an Integrated Research Model’, Journal of Business Ethics (2008), 77, 111–27. 
533 See Sandra A Waddock, Charles Bodwell, and Samuel B Graves, ‘Responsibility: The New 
Business Imperative’, Academy of Management Executive (2002), 16, 132–47; and Mark S Schwartz, 
‘Effective Corporate Codes of Ethics: Perceptions of Code Users’ Journal of Business Ethics (2004), 
55, 323–43. 
534 BCBS, n 72, 30, 135. 
535 EBA, n 137, 99. 
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EBA, is the reduction of risk exposure, with special attention to operational and 
reputational risks. 
To measure the level of diffusion of the codes of conduct worldwide, I 
analysed the data published by the thirty systemically important banks (G-SIBs) 
identified by the FSB on their websites and found (Table 2) that almost all banks 
based in Europe and the United States have adopted either a code of ethics or a 
code of conduct. 536 Asian banks, especially in China, are less compliant with this 
requirement. However, ethical issues and concerns are obviously not ignored by 
banks in these countries. The China Banking Regulatory Commission, in 
particular, issued a Guidance on Professional Conducts for Staff of Banking and 
Financial Institutions in 2009 and the Banking Sector Financial Institution 
Professional Conduct Administration Guideline in March 2018.537 CSR and 
ethical issues are usually considered in Chinese banks’ CSR reports.538 
 
Table 2 G-SIBs: Codes of Conducts and Ethics  
Bank Country Code of conduct or Code of Ethics Waivers/ 
exceptio
ns 
1) Citigroup US Code of Conduct 
Code of Ethics for financial Profession 
Yes 
2) JP Morgan Chase US Code of Conduct 
Code of Ethics 
Yes 
3) Bank of America US Code of conduct 
Code of Ethics 
Yes 
4) BNP Paribas France Code of Conduct No 
5) Deutsche Bank Germany Code of Business Conduct and Ethics No 
6) HSBC UK Statement of Business Principles and Code of 
Ethics 
No 
7) Barclays UK Code of Conduct Yes 
																																																								
536 FSB, ‘2016 list of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs)’, November 2016, available at 
http://www.fsb.org/2016/11/2016-list-of-global-systemically-important-banks-g-sibs/, 
accessed 10 September 2018. 
537 William Blair, ‘Reconceptualising the role of standards in supporting financial regulation’, in 
Ross P Buckley, Emilios Avgouleas, and Douglas W Arner (eds), Reconceptualising Global Finance 
and its Regulation, Cambridge University Press, 2016, 419–41. 
538 Jingchen Zhao, Corporate Social Responsibility in Contemporary China, Elgar, 2014, 192 et seq. 
 
Shanshan Zhu 105 
Code of Ethics 
8) Credit Suisse Switzerland Code of Conduct No 
9) Goldman Sachs US Code of Business Conduct and Ethics Yes 
10) Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of 
China Limited 
China Annual CSR Report (the issuance of a Code 
of Ethics is mentioned in a 2012 Statement) 
N/A 
11) Mitsubishi UFJ 
FG 
Japan Principles of Ethics and Conduct No 




Bank of China 
China 2017 Annual CSR Report N/A 
14) Bank of China China 2017 Annual CSR Report N/A 
15) Bank of New 
York Mellon 
US Employee Code of Conduct Yes 
16) China 
Construction Bank 
China 2017 Annual CSR Report N/A 
17) Groupe BPCE France “Being responsible” Annual Report N/A 
18) Groupe Crédit 
Agricole 
France Code of Ethics No 
19) ING Bank Netherlands Ethical Principles No 
20) Mizuho FG Japan Code of Conduct No 
21) Morgan Stanley US Code of Ethics and Business Conduct Yes 
21) Nordea Baltic States Code of Conduct No 
23) Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
UK Code of Conduct No 
24) Santander Spain General Code of Conduct No 
25) Société Générale France Group Code of Conduct No 
26) Standard 
Chartered 
UK Code of Conduct No 
27) State Street US Code of conduct for employees 
Code of conduct for directors 




Japan CSR Policy No 
29) UBS Switzerland Code of Conduct and Ethics No 
30) Unicredit Group Italy Code of Ethics 





Shanshan Zhu 106 
The relevant codes are generally structured as written statements in which 
the bank expresses its culture and vision, specifies its main values, and prescribes 
the rules of conduct that top managers and employees have to comply with.539 
The adoption of these codes generally benefits the firm’s reputation and image, 
since it communicates a focus on CSR issues to customers and other 
stakeholders.540 Codes are also considered as tools able to make wrongdoings 
less frequent,541 and reduce consumer claims and the need for government 
regulation,542 in addition to providing guidance to decision makers facing a 
moral dilemma.543 
There is also strong empirical evidence on the relationship between the 
quality of codes of conduct and CSR performance, measured on the basis of the 
presence of a company in CSR and ethical ranking systems (such as Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index, 100 Best Corporate Citizens, World’s Most Respected 
Companies, and Covalence Ethical Rankings).544 Companies listed in top CSR 
ranking systems were found to have ‘significantly higher quality codes on 
average compared to the population of all companies’.545 In the United States, a 
study reported that the adoption of codes of ethics pursuant to section 406 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, addressed to top financial and accounting officers of public 
																																																								
539 Johan Graafland, Bert van de Ven, and Nelleke Stoffele, ‘Strategies and Instruments for 
Organising CSR by Small and Large Businesses in the Netherlands’, Journal of Business Ethics 
(2003), 47, 45–51. 
540 Ibid, and Gary R Weaver et al, ‘Integrated and Decoupled Corporate Social Performance: 
Management Commitments, External Pressures, and Corporate Ethics Practices’, Academy of 
Management Journal (1999), 42, 539–52. 
541 Mark John Somers, ‘Ethical Codes of Conduct and Organizational Context: a Study of the 
Relationship between Codes of Conduct, Employee Behaviours and Organizational Values’, 
Journal of Business Ethics (2001), 30, 2, 185–95. 
542 Janelle Diller, ‘A Social Conscience in the Global Marketplace? Labour Dimensions of Codes 
of Conduct, Social Labelling and Investor Initiative’, International Labour Organization (1999), 
138, 2, 99–129; Harvey L Pitt and Karl A Groskaufmanis, ‘Minimizing Corporate Civil and 
Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct’, Georgetown Law Journal, 
(1989–1990), 78, 1559–654. 
543 John M Stevens et al, ‘Symbolic or Substantive Document? The Influence of Ethics Codes on 
Financial Executives’ Decisions’, Strategic Management Journal (2005), 26, 2, 181–95. 
544 Patrick M Erwin, ‘Corporate Codes of Conduct: The Effects of Code Content and Quality on 
Ethical Performance’ (2010) Journal of Business Ethics 99, 535–548. 
545 Ibid. 
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companies in their financial reporting activities, promoted the integrity of the 
financial services industry in terms of better scrutiny on financial reports. 546 
 
(ii) The limited effectiveness of codes of conduct 
 
However, many scholars have criticized the effectiveness of codes of 
conduct. Blair et al 547  examined the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) 
Institute’s Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct, arguing that 
information asymmetries and lack of credibility in the enforcement of 
disciplinary sanctions represent limitations to a meaningful influence of the code 
on members’ behaviours. The effectiveness of reputational sanctions too seems to 
be low because of the lack of information within the marketplace. Empirical 
studies also show mixed results. Kaptein and Schwartz548 found that out of 
seventy-nine empirical studies on the effectiveness of companies’ codes, 35 per 
cent reported that they played a positive effect, 33 per cent found no significant 
effect, 16 per cent considered their effectiveness to be weak, 14 per cent reported 
mixed results and one study found codes of conduct to be counterproductive. 
Several circumstances can explain this failure. Firstly, adopting a code of 
conduct is the norm today. As a result, adoption may become a mere formality, if 
not a ‘greenwashing’ practice intended to cover companies’ less than ethical 
business.549 Secondly, codes of conduct and ethics frequently contain waiver 
clauses formally in compliance with regulation. In the analysis of the documents 
published by the G-SIBs (Table 16.1), this was found to be a common practice 
for US banks.550 However, waiver clauses in ethical codes are a questionable and 
																																																								
546 Saurabh Ahluwalia et al, ‘Sarbanes–Oxley Section 406 Code of Ethics for Senior Financial 
Officers and Firm Behaviours’, Journal of Business Ethics (2016), 1–13. 
547 Dan Awrey, William Blair, and David Kershaw, ‘Between Law and Markets: Is There a Role 
for Culture and Ethics in Financial Regulation?’ LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No 14/2012. 
Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2157588, accessed 30 September 2018, or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2157588, 30 September 2018. 
548 Kaptein & Schwartz, n 532, 111–27. 
549 Erwin, n 544 535–548. 
550 However, in response to the clamorous ratification by Enron’s board of waivers of conflict-of-
interest provisions of its code of ethics (Christopher J Gyves, ‘The Enron Failure and Corporate 
Governance Reform’, Wake Forest Law Review (2003), 38, 3, 855–84) most codes now require a 
prompt disclosure of the waiver to shareholders. See Reed Abelson, ‘Enron’s collapse: the 
directors. One Enron Inquiry Suggests Board Played Important Role, The New York Times, 18 
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dangerous practice, which compromises the seriousness of the values declared in 
them.551 Thirdly, the level of internalization of the codes’ values and rules within 
the organization is low for lack of sufficient knowledge.552 
Internalization of values, based on an Aristotelian approach, could be 
enhanced through education and training,553 ethics and compliance programs,554 
morally oriented conversation, 555  and slower decision-making processes. 556 
Recalling values established in the code of ethics can also induce executives to 
take moral issues into account in their decision-making processes.557 In fact, 
some experimental researches proved that students tend to cheat less in 
performing tasks when they are asked to recall moral considerations and 
principles, whether it is the Ten Commandments or a code of honour.558 Codes 
should be enforced, which means that any wrongdoing should immediately be 
reported and measures taken, 559  and senior managers should demonstrate 
commitment to the code by supporting its diffusion and enforcement.560 
Stakeholders’ pressure, especially from customers, shareholders, suppliers, 
and employees, also turned out to be beneficial to incorporate the ethical 
principles mentioned in a code in the managers’ strategic decision-making,561 
																																																																																																																																																							
January 2002; Note, ‘The Good, the Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron, Sarbanes-
Oxley, and the Problems with Legislating Good Behaviours’, Harvard Law Review (2003), 116, 7, 
2123–41. 
551 See Gregory Unruh, ‘Why Code of Ethics “Safety Valves” Are Big Mistakes’, The Huffington 
Post (14 July 2010), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gregory-unruh/why-code-of-
ethics-safety_b_645913.html, accessed 30 October 2018. 
552 Patrick E Murphy, ‘Corporate Ethics Statements: Current Status and Future Prospects’, The 
Journal of Business Ethics (1995), 14, 727–40; Isaac D Montoya and Alan J Richard, ‘A 
Comparative Study of Codes of Ethics in Health Care Facilities and Energy Companies’, Journal 
of Business Ethics (1994), 13, 713–17. 
553 Susan L Harrington, ‘What Corporate America is Teaching About Ethics’, Academy of 
Management Executive (1991), 5, 1, 21–33; John Thomas Delaney and Donna Sockell, ‘Do 
Company Ethics Training Programs Make a Difference? An empirical Analysis’, Journal of 
Business Ethics (1992), 11, 9, 719–27; Stevens et al, n 543, 181–95; Schwartz, n 533, 323–43; 
Stead, Worrell & Stead, n 420, 233–42. 
554 Ethics Research Center, ‘Global Business Ethics Survey 2016’, Ethics & Compliance Initiative. 
555 Max Messmer, ‘Does Your Company Have a Code of Ethics?’ (2003), Strategic Finance 84, 10, 
13–14; Dan Awrey, Blair & Kershaw, n 547.  
556 Stevens et al, n 543, 181–95. 
557 FCA, n 480. 
558 Nina Mazar, On Amir, and Dan Ariely, ‘The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-
Concept Maintenance’, Journal of Marketing Research (2008), 635–637. 
559 Messmer, n 555 13–14; Schwartz, n 533, 323–43; Pitt & Groskaufmanis, n 542, 1559–654. 
560 Montoya & Richard, n 552, 713–17. 
561 See, e.g., Kaptein & Schwartz, n 532, 111–27; and Stevens et al, n 543, 181–95. 
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while pressure from non-market stakeholders (regulatory agencies, public 
institutions, and government bodies) proved to have no influence. 562  The 
development phase of the code is also crucial for shaping personnel conduct. The 
drafting of the code should include managers 563  and employees’ active 
participation564 and the provision of many behavioural examples in order to offer 
the employees real-life examples of ethical/unethical conduct.565 Codes should 
also be tailored specifically to the culture of the company, avoiding simply 
copying codes already issued by other companies.566 Codes should be periodically 
revised 567  and the company should establish a monitoring system over 
compliance with them,568 including effective reporting channels for employees. 
The ways in which reports of violations are coped with and how disciplinary 
procedures are carried out should also be carefully and seriously designed. In the 
Wells Fargo scandal, for example, an ethics hotline was established, but calling 
this number or trying to contact the human resources department would have 








562 Murphy, n 552 727–40; Stevens et al, n 543, 181–95. 
563 Stead, Worrell & Stead, n 420, 233–42. 
564 Earl A Molander, ‘A Paradigm for Design, Promulgation and Enforcement of Ethical Codes’, 
Journal of Business Ethics (1987), 6, 619–631; Montoya & Richard, n 552, 713–17; Messmer, n 555, 
13–14; Kaptein & Schwartz, n 532, 111–27; Schwartz, n 533, 323–43.  
565 Ahluwalia et al, n 546; Murphy, n 552, 727–40; Schwartz, n 533, 323–43. 
566 Pitt & Groskaufmanis, n 542, 1559–654. 
567 Patrick E Murphy, ‘Implementing Business Ethics’, Journal of Business Ethics (1988), 7, 907–
15. 
568 Alan Doig and John Wilson, ‘The Effectiveness Of Codes Of Conduct’, Business Ethics (1998), 
7, 3, 140–9. See also Geneviève Helleringer & Christina Skinner, ‘Conflicts of Interest: 
Comparing Compliance and Culture in the United States and the United Kingdom’, in D. Busch, 
G. Ferrarini and G. van Solinge (eds), Governance of Financial Institutions, Oxford University 
Press, 2019, Forthcoming. 
569  See, e.g., http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/21/investing/wells-fargo-fired-workers-
retaliation-fake-accounts/index.html, accessed 7 October 2018 and 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/12/business/dealbook/at-wells-fargo-complaints-about-
fraudulent-accounts-since-2005.html?_r=0, accessed 7 October 2018. 
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As I explained before (see Section 1.1.3), bad compensation policies and 
incentives schemes were identified among the major failures of corporate 
governance of banks during the crisis. In fact, distorted incentive schemes 
conducted to excessive risk-taking, exacerbating bankers’ moral hazard, 570 even 
though they succeeded in aligning CEOs’ interests with shareholders’ interests, 
as most of CEOs had large equity stakes in their own institutions.571 And this 
can be easily explained, since banks shareholders’ are more prone to high risk-
taking and the application of traditional corporate governance best practices – 
requiring the alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ interest – reveals itself 
to be inadequate to banking industry, since it drove managers to focus only on 
short-term returns.  
However, other scholars recall how executives at troubled banks such as 
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers were also “able to cash out large amounts of 
bonus compensation that was not clawed back when the firms collapsed, as well 
																																																								
570  See, for example, Kirkpatrick, n 54; Associacion of Chartered Certified Accountants, 
‘Corporate Governance and the Credit Crunch’, November 2008, 4, 
https://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/PDF-technical/corporate-
governance/cg_cc.pdf; Hopt, n 25, 10-14. 
571 See, for example, the empirical study conducted by Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, 
who found ‘some evidence that banks led by CEOs whose interests were better aligned with 
those of theirs shareholders had worse stock returns and a worse return on equity’. Fahlenbrach 
& Stulz, n 62, 1. Similarly, a study by Cheng et al. on the relationship between compensation and 
risk-taking showed that “aggressive firms who did well in the 1990s and were ‘yesterday’s 
heroes’ were the largest risk-takers and are today’s outcasts in the crisis’, Ing-Haw Cheng et al., 
‘Yesterday’s Heroes: Compensation and Creative Risk-Taking’ 7’, NBER Working Paper No. 
16176/2010, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16176.pdf, accessed 25 October 2018. 
See also Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, ‘Financial crisis and bank executive incentive 
compensation’, Journal of Corporate Finance (2014), 25(C), 313-341. 
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as to pocket large amounts from selling shares”, suggesting that they were not 
just doing the best interests of their shareholders, but rather were blameworthy 
of opportunistic behaviour. 572 Obviously, incentive compensation cannot be 
blamed as the single factor that led to short-termism and excessive risk taking. 
As we have already seen (see Section 2.2.5), these are also caused by 
psychological traits – such as over optimism and overconfidence - and 
sociological bias - such as authority and conformity pressures. In this chapter, I 
first analyse compensation from a traditional corporate governance perspective, 
especially focusing on the EU framework for bankers’ pay and on the 
institutional and doctrinal debate on the necessary regulation of bankers’ 
compensation. It follows an analysis of remuneration from the perspective of 
psychologists and sociologists, aimed at revealing the cultural and behavioural 
factors explaining the relationship between incentives and motivation. 
 
 
2.4.2 Bankers’ compensation between supervision and regulation 
 
After the crisis, many called for regulating banks managerial remuneration 
to prevent further excessive risk-taking and short-termism.  
According to Bebchuk and Spamann,573 regulating bankers pay would not 
lead to excessively intrusive interference of banking regulation in business 
decisions. According to the authors, given the strong impact financial 
institutions have on the economic development and growth and the systemic 
risks they face, they generally have to be subject to a tougher regulation – 
especially in relation to capital and liquidity requirements - compared to non-
financial institutions. In particular, the authors propose that executive pay 
should be tied to the aggregate value of a basket of securities (common shares, 
preferred shares and bonds) instead of equity alone, since the suggested 
‘compensation structure would expose executives to a broader fraction of the 
																																																								
572 Lucian Bebchuk et al., ‘The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearnsand 
Lehman 2000–2008’, Yale Journal on Regulation (2010), 27, 257, 257–82. 
573 Lucian Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, ‘Regulating Bankers’ Pay’, The Georgetown Law Journal 
(2010), 98, 247, 247–87. 
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negative consequences of risks take' and ultimately ‘reduce their incentives to 
take excessive risks’.574 However, some commentators argue that this model does 
not take into consideration creditors’ interest and work as to avoid excessive risk 
tanking.575 
Similarly, Bolton et al576 propose a CEO compensation model tied not only 
to equity, but, at least partially, also to a measure of default riskiness of the firm, 
such as a bank’s credit default swap (“CDS”). The authors argue that regulation 
is the only way optimal incentives can be established in banks, since the 
traditional theory of executive compensation does not apply and since 
“shareholders suffer from a commitment problem in the model, which may be 
exacerbated by either the renegotiation of compensation contracts, deposit 
insurance, or naive debtholders”.577 
Tung agrees with the idea that CEOs should be paid not only with equity 
but also with debt, in particular with public subordinated debt securities, in order 
to prevent excessive risk-taking and align their interests more closely with those 
of debtholders578. Moreover, the author considers strict regulatory mandates 
‘inadvisable’ and suggests that regulators should “offer guidelines and regulatory 
incentives to encourage appropriate amounts of subordinated debt in bankers’ 
pay arrangements”, but “preserving the discretion of boards of directors to set 
pay”.  
Gordon, criticizing Bebchuck and Spamann’s model, builds a compensation 
mechanism based on convertible equity-based pay,579 in particular on equity that 
will convert into subordinated debt upon certain external triggering events 
concerning the decline in the firm performance. 
																																																								
574 Id., 236-37. 
575 Frederick Tung, ‘Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk 
Regulation’, Emory Public Law Research Paper No. 10-93 (2010); Jeffrey Gordon, ‘Executive 
Compensation and Corporate Goverance in Financial Firms: The Case for Convertible Equity-
based Pay’, Columbia Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 373, 2010.  
576 Patrick Bolton et al., ‘Executive Compensation And Risk Taking’, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.C 
Staff Report No. 456/2010, available at 
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff_reports/sr456.pdf, accessed 26 October 2018. 
577 Id., 3. 
578 Tung, n 575. 
579 Gordon, n 575  
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Recently, Thanassoulis and Tanaka proposed a new compensation model580 
based on the imposition, by the regulators, of malus and clawback measures, 
integrated by mandatory restrictions on pay convexity. In fact, shareholders may 
use convex pay to circumvent the regulation imposing the enforcement of malus 
and clawback (but also but also of debt-linked pay and bonus caps), therefore 
undermining the efficacy of these compensation solutions in reducing excessive 
risk-taking. 
On the contrary, Baghat and Romano581 suggest that incentive pay should 
be based on restricted stocks and restricted stock options, that means that 
executives would be able to sell or exercise their stock option only after from 
two to four yeas following their retirement. However, the deferred award would 
weaken incentive, but also push executives to retire earlier.582 
All the described models more or less explicitly lean towards a regulatory 
approach to incentive pay. However, this position is not unanimously shared by 
scholars. Ferrarini and Ungureanu, 583  for example, argue that bankers’ 
managerial incentives should be monitored by supervisory authorities, whereas 
the design of the same should be left to board determination. In the authors’ 
opinion, the designing of compensation schemes needs a certain level of 
flexibility – required by the different characteristics of financial firms and of 
circumstances – and competence that regulators is not able to fulfil. 584 
Regulators should offer a ‘menu’ of choices that however “could hardly cover all 
situations that may exist in practice’ and that would in any case ‘dilute the 
impact of regulation”. Moreover, this would provoke a migration of managerial 
talents who would move to other more attractive countries where compensation 
is less regulated. I personally disagree in respect to this last point, or, at least, I 
think that ways to attract and retain talents is not only based on financial terms 
(see Section 2.4.5). The authors conclude that regulators should take into 
																																																								
580 These are ex post compensation adjustments made in the event of poor performance caused by 
misconduct or failure in proper oversight and risk management.  
581 Sanjai Bhagat and Roberta Romano, ‘Reforming Executive Compensaion: Focusing and 
Committing to the Long-Term’, Yale Journal on Regulation (2009), 25, 361. 
582 Tung, n 575. 
583 See Ferrarini &Ungureanu, n 51, 432-502. 
584 Id., 451. 
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account managerial incentives, but ‘this should be done in ways that are 
appropriate for prudential regulation, which typically established conditions and 
limits to risk taking, rather than by fixing the incentive structures directly’. 585 
In addition, regulating corporate governance of banks, including compensation 
governance, is a better choice than imposing pay structures, especially if 
complemented with a stronger prudential supervision. Finally, the board itself 
should be left with a strong discretionary power in designing bankers’ pay, since 
it can better understand their firm conditions.  
 
 
2.4.3 Bankers’ Pay in EU Framework 
 
In line with the regulatory approach adopted by the EU regulators in 
designing the corporate governance of banks already described (see 1.2.3.1.), 
compensation too has been subject to detailed rules that do not only reflect FSB 
principles and standards but impose also stricter rules on variable compensation, 
all aimed at discouraging risk-taking that exceeds the level of institutions’ 
‘tolerated risk’. In particular, the EU intervened by establishing: (a) limits to 
compensation as a proportion of capital;586 (b) cap on variable compensation;587 
(c) limits on bonus structure; 588  (d) restriction and deferral of variable 
compensation589; and (e) clawback of variable compensation.590 The current EU 
approach, based on these strict requirements – especially in relation to the cap on 




586 CRD IV, Article 94(c).  
587  Variable compensation should respect a 1:1 ratio with respect to fixed compensation. 
However, with shareholder approval by a super majority, a ratio 1:2 will be permitted. See CRD 
IV, Article 94(g)(i)-(ii).  
588 CRD IV, Article 94(iii).  
589 CRD IV, Article 94(l)(m). 
590 CRD IV, Article 94(n). 
591 Guido Ferrarini and Fabio Recine, ‘The Single Rulebook and the SSM. Should the ECB have 
More Say in Prudential Rule-making?, in D. Busch and Guido Ferrarini (eds), European Banking 
Union, Oxford University Press, 2015, 134-135. 
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Interestingly, the EU initially adopted a supervisory approach to 
remuneration in the 2009 ‘Commission Recommendation on remuneration in the 
financial sector’. 592 At the meantime, the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors (CEBS) issued high-level principles for remuneration policies at 
banks.593 However, the shortcomings encountered in the implementation of such 
standards, together with public pressure, lead to a change in the approach,594 as 
shown with the adoption of CRD III in 2010 (revised in 2013 with the CRD IV 
package) 595 that laid down the foundations for the current legislation.596  
In relation to the most discussed provision – the introduction of a cap on 
variable compensation – some commentators warned that it may have 
detrimental effects, especially in terms of risks. Murphy,597 for example, argued 
that even though the bonus cap was introduced in order to avoid excessive risk 
taking, this limitation could hardly fulfil the objective, since, first of all, the 
introduction of the cap would simply translate into an increase in the amount of 
fixed pay that would make banks more vulnerable to business cycles and subject 
to risk failure. This prediction was confirmed by the increase in fixed 
remuneration registered by EBA in a report published in 2016.598 Secondly, if the 
traditional bonus system at investment banks – characterized by below-market 
salaries and high bonus opportunities – provided incentives to avoid bad risks 
and take good risk, the new capped bonus system would lead bank managers to 
take “bad” risks and avoid the “good” ones.599 Moreover, a compensation policy 
less related to performance would push away high talented investment bankers, 
																																																								
592 See Commission Recommendation on remuneration policies in the financial sector, [2009] OJ 
L 120/22. 
593 See CEBS, ‘High-Level Principles for Remuneration Policies’, 20 April 2009 (available at 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/16094/High-
level+principles+for+remuneration+policies.pdf, accessed 23 October 2018. 
594 Ferrarini & Recine, n 591, 134-135. 
595 Directive 2010/76/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010 
amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the 
trading book and for re-securitisations, and the supervisory review of remuneration policies. 
596 For a detailed history on regulation of bankers’ compensation both in US and E, see Kevin J 
Murphy, ‘Regulating Banking Bonuses in the European Union: A Case Study in Unintended 
Consequences’, European Financial Management (2013), 19, 631.  
597 Id. 
598 EBA, Report Benchmarking of remuneration practices at the European Union level and data 
on high earners (30 March 2016), EBA-OP-2016-05. 
599 Id. 
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who would have better employment opportunities in non-EU banks or non-bank 
financial operators. Ultimately, a ‘one-size-fits all’ approach for all credit 
institution, regardless of size and risk exposure, is undoubtedly too rigid, and 
does not respect the proportionality principle. Accordingly, the EBA suggested 
that the European Commission shall introduce legislative amendments on 
‘specific exemptions…for certain institutions that do not rely extensively on 
variable remuneration and, if confirmed by further analysis, also for identified 
staff that receive only a low amount of variable remuneration’.600 
By agreeing with Ferrarini and Ungureanu’ position, I consider regulation 
alone inadequate to ‘adjust’ bankers misconduct and high risk-taking. Bankers 
themselves, in particular members of the boards, are in the best position to 
encourage a more responsible risk management, since, as claimed by Hill and 
Painter, “even where law is able to specify what banks should not be doing, 
enforcement is often exceedingly difficult” as “banks have many ways to obscure, 
if not conceal, what they are doing”. 601  Hence, regulation should be 
complemented with a strong supervisory activity on bankers behaviour and 
culture. Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that incentive compensation was 
originally designed to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders, 
in my opinion even this attempt to re-address their interests towards the long-
term interests of debt holders cannot change the risk prone attitude of bankers 
that may be willing to risk losing part of their compensation. The hiring and 
training functions are again in charge of choosing and coaching responsible 
bankers.  
In this regard, a study of the main determinants of motivation and of the 





600 See EBA Consultation Paper on Draft Guidelines on sound remuneration policies, n 35, Title 
II, chap 8, No 72; and EBA press release of 4 March 2015, available at 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/-/eba-reviews-guidelines-on-remuneration-policies), accessed 30 
October 2018. 
601 Claire A. Hill and Richard W. Painter, Better Bankers, Better Banks. promoting Good Business 
through Contractual Commitment, University of Chicago Press, 2015, 7. 
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2.4.4 Rethinking Incentives: Employing Motivational Theories from 
Psychology 
 
Remuneration is a complex issue, which needs a trans-disciplinary 
approach in order to be thoroughly understood and tackled. However, most of 
the studies mentioned above are largely based on the common assumptions of 
the agency cost theory.  
According to the agency cost theory, 602  incentive compensation is 
traditionally regarded as the fundamental means for aligning the interests of 
shareholders and managers, on the assumption that individuals are rational and 
mere self-interested utility maximisers. However, there are limitations to this 
approach. Firstly, this usually focuses on executive remuneration, without 
considering the compensation of ‘non-boardroom’ or less senior employees, 603 
who are however taken into account by financial regulation to the extent that 
they are risk-takers, since – as we have already seen (see 1.2.3.2.1) – they were 
frequently responsible for misbehaviour.604 In addition, agency theory tends to 
overlook that compensation might be influenced by group dynamics and social 
context.605 For instance, O’Really and Main606 argue that CEOs may influence 
the board of directors when determining their compensation through two 
psychological mechanisms. The first is reciprocity, as shown by the evidence that 
CEOs receive higher cash compensation when the Chairman of the compensation 
committee is remunerated more. The second mechanism is social influence, as 
																																																								
602 Michael C Jensen and William H Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics (1976), 3, 305–60; 
Eugene Fama, ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’, Journal of Political Economy 
(1980), 88, 288–307; Eugene Fama and Michael C Jensen, ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’, 
Journal of Law and Economics (1983), 26, 327–49. 
603 See Armour et al., n 2.; and Ian Larkin, Lamar Pierce, and Francesca Gino, ‘The Psychological 
Costs of Pay-For-Performance: Implications for the Strategic Compensation of Employees’, 
Strategic Management Journal (2012), 33, 1194–214. 
604 See Guido Ferrarini, ‘Compensation in Financial Institutions’, in D. Busch, G. Ferrarini and 
G. van Solinge (eds), Governance of Financial Institutions, Oxford University Press, 2019, 
Forthcoming. 
605 See Larkin, Pierce and Gino, n 120, 1194–214; and John Roberts, Terry McNulty, and Philip 
Stiles, ‘Beyond Agency Conceptions of the Work of the Non-Executive Director: Creating 
Accountability in the Boardroom’, British Journal of Management (2005), 16, 5–26. 
606  Brian G Main, Charles A O’Reilly, and James Wade, ‘Economic and Psychological 
Perspectives on CEO Compensation: A Review and Syntheses’, Industrial and Corporate Change 
(2010), 9, 3, 675–712. 
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shown by the fact that CEOs’ compensation is higher when they also serve as 
board chairmen (a practice which is however open to criticism).607 According to 
Pepper, another crucial factor is represented by subjective fairness: executives 
are more concerned about the perceived fairness of their incentive pay in 
comparison to their peers instead of the total amount of it.608 And as for deferred 
incentive remuneration – provided in FSB standards and now mandatory within 
CRD IV framework – the author argues that executives are “very high time 
discounters”, which means that they are not motivated by the expectation of 
receiving an award in a very distant future, as this tends to lose its value.609 This 
argument is confirmed also by a global survey conducted among financial 
services executives by PWC and the London School of Economics in 2011.610 As 
a consequence, if deferring the award may be more effective in preventing short-
termism and excessive risk-taking, at the meantime it might lose its very first 
function as motivating employees working somehow harder or better. The 
illogical outcome is that “companies are paying people in a currency they don’t 
value”.611 
In other words, under the agency cost theory, culture and psychological 
dynamics of the firm are not considered, even though culture represents ‘the 
connector between incentive and actions’.612  
Agency theory also overlooks the fact that the link between money, 
motivation, and performance does not always work in the direction that might be 
expected. Economists, with the exception of behaviourists, often do not consider 
the psychological mechanisms that limit rationality and therefore the reaction to 
																																																								
607 Ibid. 
608 Alexander Pepper, ‘Applying economic psychology to the problem of executive compensation’, 
The Psychologist-Manager Journal (2017), 20, 4, 195-207. This study found empirical support 
by the global survey conducted jointly by PWC and the London School of Economics that 
involved 1,106 executives. See PWC, ‘Pay: what motivates financial services executives? The 
psychology of incentives’ (2012), and by the study conducted Marco van Herpen, Marco and 
Mirjam van Praag & Kees Cools, Kees, ‘The Effects of Performance Measurement and 
Compensation on Motivation: An Empirical Study’, De Economist (2005), 153, 3,available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=417355, accessed 1 November 2018. 
609 Pepper, n 608. 
610 PWC, n 608. 
611 Pepper, n 608. 
612 Andreas Dombret, ‘Why Focus on Culture?’, in Patrick S Kenadjian and Andreas Dombret 
(eds), Getting the Culture and the Ethics Right—Towards a new age of responsibility in banking and 
finance, De Gruyter, 2016, 15. 
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economic incentives.613 In other words, the pay-for performance equation may 
not work in many cases. Even behaviourists, who are supporters of incentive pay 
model, underestimate the fact that incentives “do not create an 
enduring commitment to any value or action”614 but just alter behaviour, therefore 
leading only to a temporary compliance to a stimulus, not a change in a firm 
culture.  
Kamenica, by reviewing experiments in social psychology, identified four 
situations in which the idea that monetary incentives lead to better performance 
may fail. 615 Motivation and performance may decrease when: (i) the task is 
inherently interesting, but monetary incentives are introduced after a certain 
period of time;616 (ii) the task is noble and money is paid;617 (iii) the salary is 
either too high;618 or (iv) too low.619 
The experimental studies on which these findings are based often focused 
on tasks of a kind very distant from those usually performed in the financial 
sector. They nonetheless show the complex relationship between monetary 
incentive and motivation. Besides, empirical evidence confirms these 
psychological findings by showing that monetary incentives are not always 
associated with increased effort and, therefore, better performance. For example, 
Bonner et al, by reviewing 131 laboratory studies on incentives, found that 
incentives improved performance only in half of the studies and that the positive 
effect of monetary incentives decreased as the complexity of the task increased, 
																																																								
613 Christopher Hodges, Law and Corporate Behaviour, Hart, 2015, 25. 
614  Alfie Kohn, ‘Why Incentive Plans Cannot Work’ (1993), available at  
https://hbr.org/1993/09/why-incentive-plans-cannot-work, accessed 24 October 2018. 
615 See Emir Kamenica, ‘Behavioural Economics and Psychology of Incentives’, Annual Review of 
Economics (2012), 4, 13.1–13.26. 
616 Through some laboratory experiments, Deci found that when money is used as an external 
reward for an intrinsically interesting activity, people’s intrinsic motivation for performing that 
activity decreases: Edward L Deci, ‘The Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic 
Motivation’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (1971), 18 (1), 105–115. 
617 In an experiment, Titmuss found that when the task is noble (in the experiment, the task 
represented was to undergo some exams to become blood donors), under some circumstances the 
introduction of monetary incentive decreased women’s inclination to perform the task. See 
Richard Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy, Allen & Unwin, 1970. 
618 ‘Paying a very high wage contingent on the successful completion of a task can lead the 
worker to become so nervous that she is unable to get the task done’, see Kamenica, n 614. 
619 Many experiments suggested that offering no money is better than too little. See ibid. 
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where good cognitive strategy skills instead of strong motivation was 
required.620 
Bénabou and Tirole similarly stress that, because of the ‘forbidden fruit’ 
psychological principle, high rewards are associated with less attractive tasks 
and that offering rewards can be counterproductive in the long run, even though 
it can boost performance as an immediate effect. 621 Other scholars confirm this 
assumption that is based on the simple fact that when an activity is presented as 
a means towards something else, then it becomes less desirable, since individuals 
“infer that the activity must be difficult, tedious, risky or unpleasant in some 
way”.622 
Similarly Deci, on the basis of several experiments, showed that certain 
external monetary rewards, at given stages, decrease the intrinsic motivation, in 
opposition to other non-monetary rewards, such as social approval, because of 
people’s perception of the locus of control (the rationale) of their behaviours. 623 
In particular, receiving a reward would send an unconscious message to our 
brain, that is that our behaviour is controlled. And from the fact that the more 
we perceive being controlled, the less we will be interested in what we are doing, 
it derives that getting a bonus for our job won’t make us work better.624 This 
‘overjustification effect’ was further analysed and other studies specified how 
money can have a positive or negative effect, depending on the moment it is 
offered and the related information to agents.625 As intrinsic motivation is built 
on the need for self-determination and competence/mastery, monetary 
																																																								
620 See Sara E Bonner et al, ‘A Review of the Effects of Financial Incentives on Performance in 
Laboratory Tasks: Implications for Management Accounting’, Journal of Management 
Accounting Research (2000), 13, 19–64. See also Colin F Camerer and Robin M Hogarth, ‘The 
Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital Labor Production 
Framework’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (1999), 19, 7–42; Karl Duncker, ‘On Problem 
Solving’, Psychological monographs (1945), 58. 
621 Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole, ‘Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation’, The Review of 
Economic Studies (2003), 70, 3, 489–520. 
622 Jonathan L. Freedman, John A. Cunningham & Kirsten Krismer, ‘Inferred Values and the 
Reverse-Incentive Effect in Induced Compliance’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
(1992), 62, 357-368. 
623 Deci, n 616, 105–115. 
624 Edward Deci & Richard Ryan, ‘Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human 
Behavior’, Contemporary Sociology (1985), 3, 2, 231-242. 
625 Uco J Wiersma, ‘The Effects of Extrinsic Rewards in Intrinsic Motivation: A Meta-Analysis’, 
Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology (1992), 65, 2, 101–14. 
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incentives can either increase intrinsic motivation, if perceived as providing 
information about the agents’ ability, or be counterproductive if seen as a means 
of control.626 
 
2.4.5 A broader perspective 
 
Motivational processes, therefore, should be at the core of studies on 
incentive schemes, especially with reference to non-boardroom and non-
executive employees. In 1943, Maslow had already developed a motivational 
theory according to which human beings satisfy three related sets of personal 
goals, in the following order: basic (physiological and safety) needs; 
psychological (esteem and belongingness) needs; and self-fulfilment needs. 627 In 
this hierarchical model, based on the Aristotelian approach,628 the necessities at 
the top cannot be satisfied without first realizing those on lower levels. When 
applied to compensation issues, this theory suggests that employees should be 
paid fairly and that the working environment should enhance security and a 
culture of respect and dignity for all team members, rather than promoting 
aggressiveness and sense of danger. In addition, employees should receive 
periodic feedback concerning their work and be motivated through a prospect of 
self-potential achievement. 
Similarly, Herzberg’s Two-Factors Theory 629  specifically addressed 
employees’ motivational strategies. Herzberg viewed basic needs (such as those 
related to working conditions, status, job security, salary, and fringe benefits) as 
simple hygiene factors, the absence of which may create dissatisfaction, but the 
increase of which does not boost motivation. Being indispensable, they are 
different from other factors (such as recognition, good relationships, and growth 
potential) that provide extra-motivation. In simple terms, once people get paid 
																																																								
626 Bruno S Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, ‘The cost of price incentives: an empirical analysis of 
motivation crowding-out’, The American economic review (1987), 87, 746-755. 
627 Abraham H Maslow, ‘A Theory of Human Motivation’, Psychological Review (1943) 50, 370–
96. 
628 Maslow often cited Aristotelian moral philosophy in his studies. See Abraham H Maslow, 
Motivation and personality, Harper and Row, 1987, 3, 270–71. 
629 Frederick Herzberg, Bernard Mausner, and Barbara Bloch, The Motivation to Work, Wiley, 
1959. 
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enough, money stops being a substantial driver of engagement. Moreover, 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction are not necessarily interrelated. Getting 
promoted, for example, does not decrease the dissatisfaction deriving from bad 
working conditions, and an increase in salary does not translate into job 
satisfaction when there is great deal of tangible tension among colleagues. 
Furthermore, several factors – in addition to and sometimes more 
effectively than money and rewards – can be decisive in inducing people to act in 
a given way, such as making a desired behaviour the default option or 
performing priming interventions.630 Delegating and giving more autonomy can 
boost the agents’ intrinsic motivation, self-confidence, and self-determination, if 
perceived as an expression of trust in the agents’ professional skills and 
competence.631 Providing good and immediate feedback may also help employees 
to better internalize certain practices.632 Of course, whether similar steps are 
successful also depends on the nature of the tasks and may be more effective in 
jobs involving creative skills.633 In addition, modifying situational factors can 
influence decision-making processes under so-called ‘choice architecture’.634 
As a consequence, those who criticise certain remuneration models that 
would create problems in attracting and retaining managerial talents (see 
Section 2.4.2) should take into consideration also non-monetary criteria that are 
usually evaluated for choosing a job. A clear example is offered by the recent 
competition between banks and tech firms. Indeed, MBA high-potential 
graduates seem now to be keener to choose a job in the high-tech sector instead 
of joining the financial industry. 635 Money is of course taken into consideration, 
but other elements such as innovation, a deeper sense of purpose, better working 
																																																								
630 Through a priming intervention a person’s behaviour can be influenced by exposing him to a 
particular stimulus, in an explicit, implicit, or subliminal way. See Kamenica, n 614. 
631 See Bénabou & Tirole, n 621, 489–520. 
632 Richard H Thaler and Cass R Sunstein, Nudge, Yale University Press, 2008, 82. 
633 David M Kreps, ‘Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives’, The American Economic 
Review (1997), 87, 2, 359–64. 
634 FCA, n 480. See also, e.g., Robert B Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion, William 
Morrow, 1993. 
635 See Laurence Fletcher and Pat Minczeski, ‘Why Banks Are Losing the Battle for M.B.A. 
Talent’, The Wall Street Journal, 6 June 2018, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-
banks-are-losing-the-battle-for-m-b-a-talent-1528277402, accessed 24 October 2018; Jonathan 
Moules, ‘Banks try to lure MBA graduates away from Big Tech’, The Financial Times, 15 
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24 October 2018. 
 
Shanshan Zhu 123 
environment and flexibility are relevant incentives, especially for Millenials.636 
Undoubtedly, the high number of financial scandals could have played a role in 
lowering the reputation and promoting distrust towards banking career. 
The history and values of each national culture also interferes with the way 
in which motivation and economic incentives determine individual behaviour. In 
China, for example, people have weak trust in government and politics, which 
makes some indirect and long-term benefits (such as life insurance, education 
subsidy and vacation leave) less attractive and motivating to Chinese people637 
than short-term compensation in cash, bonuses, or housing.638 Further examples 
of how compensation structures are linked with the diverse social values 
engrained in national cultures were offered by other scholars639 based on the 
cultural dimensions theory developed by Hofstede.640 Organizations in high 
power distance countries, such as France, have higher CEO pay and a lower 
proportion of variable pay over total compensation than low power distance 
countries such as Sweden. Similarly, more individualistic countries, such as the 
United States, show higher CEO pay and higher proportion of variable 
compensation to total CEO compensation than collectivist countries, such as 
Taiwan. Societies high in uncertainty avoidance, such as Japan and Germany, 
present a lower proportion of variable compensation to total compensation than 
countries with weaker compliance to rules and authority, such as the United 
States. Consistently with these findings, Herkenoff found that a rather strong 
collectivist culture in Zanzibar drove local employees of a Swiss-owned company 
to prefer an hourly wage rather than the pay-for-performance compensation 
																																																								
636 See PWC, n 608. 
637 Randy K Chiu, Vivienne Wai-Mei Luk, and Thomas Li-Ping Tang, ‘Retaining and motivating 
employees. Compensation preferences in Hong Kong and China’, Personnel Review (2002), 31, 4, 
402–31. 
638 Martin J Conyon & Lerong He, ‘CEO Compensation and Corporate Governance in China’, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review (2012), 20, 575–92; and Chiu, Luk, & Tang, n 
637, 402–31. 
639 Henry L Tosi & Thomas Greckhamer, ‘Culture and CEO Compensation’, Organization Science 
(2004), 15, 6, 657–70. 
640 Hofstede, n 275. 
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offered to them. 641 In addition, every week they pooled all wages earned and 
divided them up equally amongst all employees. 
Motivation varies within groups working at different levels of an 
organization too, and in different historical periods.642 Surveys conducted for 
1946, 1980, 1986, and 1992 on motivational factors in the work environment 
revealed how motivational determinants change over the years643 and vary 
especially in relation to the gender, income, and occupational position of 
individuals.644 
To draw a preliminary conclusion, remuneration and incentives are 
multifaceted concepts. Far from suggesting a radically new model of 
compensation, it is recommended that firms in general and financial institutions 
in particular start abandoning the outdated model of executive agency, and 
follow an approach where the actual psychological mechanisms and the cultural 
factors influencing people’s motivation and decision making are duly taken into 
account. Is monetary reward itself the best way to motivate people doing high-
quality work? Or is it not so different from punishment as a manipulative 
mechanism, where the threat of “no reward” is implied?645 How can it be that 
economic studies on incentive pay have for decades paid attention only to how to 
create the most effective composition of pay packages without never questioning 
the fact that adding quantitative rewards to increase the quality of job 
performance may not work? What I suggest is that economists should start 
integrating the last thirty years of empirical psychological research in their 
analyses and begin to consider alternative and more effective ways to motivate 
people. Future practices will also benefit from advances in neurosciences, given 
that brain scanning methods and other techniques are already showing the 
																																																								
641 Linda Herkenhoff, ‘Culture: The Missing Link Between Remuneration and Motivation’, 
World at Work Journal Third Quarter (2014), 6–15. 
642 Carolyn Wiley, ‘What Motivates Employees According to Over 40 Years of Motivation 
Surveys’, International Journal of Manpower (1995), 18, 3, 263–80. 
643 In 1946, the most important factor among employees was represented by appreciation for the 
work done; in 1980 and 1986, having interesting work was decisive; and in 1992, a good wage 
became the factor of major concern. 
644 In the 1992 survey, results showed that women gave more importance to appreciation than 
males, who were more concerned about interesting work; sympathy in understanding personal 
problems was particularly significant for low income groups and plant employees. 
645 Kohn, n 614. 
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biases on which current reward policies are built646 and the reasons why an 
evidence-based approach would be preferable. Also, regulation in this sector 
should be reviewed, starting from the international principles, since motivational 
factors depend on national cultures, gender, and occupation of the individuals 
concerned, and time in history. Finally, deferred incentive pay, even though can 
prevent executives from taking too high risks, might not work as incentive at all.  
																																																								
646 Shan Luo et al, ‘Behavioral and Neural Evidence of Incentive Bias for Immediate Rewards 
Relative to Preference-Matched Delayed Rewards’, The Journal of Neuroscience : The Official 
Journal of the Society for Neuroscience (2009), 29, 47, 14820, available at 
http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4261-09.2009, accessed 2 December 2018.  
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Chapter V 
 
The Role of Institutional Investors and Supervisory Authorities 
 
2.5.1 Introduction. - 2.5.2 Supervisory authorities. – 2.5.2.1 The DNB example. – 2.5.2.2 The 





As suggested in the previous chapters, the board plays a fundamental role 
in the design, implementation and monitoring of the organizational culture 
within the bank. However, since culture is a multi-layered concept that develops 
across the entire institution and interacts with strong internal and external 
pressures, the board alone cannot ensure a cultural change, but rather should be 
supported and guided by its shareholders – especially by the so-called 
institutional investors – and by financial supervisory authorities. 
This Chapter describes the role of institutional investors and financial 
supervisors in the implementation of an effective culture in financial institutions, 
that is to say a culture stimulating practices and behaviours that would allow 
each firm to reach its own goals in a responsible manner and with a long-term 
view.647 
 
2.5.2 Supervisory authorities 
 
The distrust towards banks caused by the financial crisis had negative 
effects on the relationship between boards and supervisors. However, since the 
trust in the financial sector is key to its current and future soundness, “firms and 
supervisors need to work together to leverage and reinforce sound industry 
																																																								
647 Graham et al, n 239. 
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practices. There needs to be a culture of cooperation throughout the firm and 
industry”.648 
According to a recent study from the G30,649 a new style of interaction is 
needed. In particular, ‘boards and supervisors should adopt a paradigm of trust-
based interaction built on clear mutual expectations and recognition of areas of 
mutual interest, with a focus on examining business model vulnerabilities, 
governance effectiveness, and culture.’650 Supervision should not be limited to the 
assessment of compliance with rules, but it should rather deal with behaviours 
that regulation cannot control and shape. This requires the use of both formal 
and informal channels between senior supervisors and the supervised 
institutions.651Indeed, an excessive focus on formal requirements risks leading to 
a supervisory approach focused only on box-ticking.652  
With specific reference to culture, the G30 study suggests that supervisors 
should identify the cultural profile of the specific bank, avoiding imposing a 
unique approach, since there is not only one right corporate culture for major 
banks. Once the board has itself identified the culture of its organization, 
especially its risk culture, supervisors should share their observations with the 
board, and detect potential culture issues that need rectification.653 Developing 
better communication skills and attracting high-level staff should be priorities 
for supervisors. Moreover, in order to identify and assess culture, soft skills are 
needed both for board members and supervisors.  
In 2015, the G30 specifically addressed financial cultural restoration by 
issuing the study ‘Banking Conduct and Culture: A call for sustained and 
comprehensive reform’.654 The study, based on about 500 post-crisis policy 
documents, found that supervisors approach culture in three distinct ways: (a) ‘a 
default approach through conduct of business rules and standards’; (b) an 
approach based on the ability of supervisors to make useful observations about 
																																																								
648 Institute of International Finance, ‘Achieving Effective Supervision: An Industry Perspective’ 
(2011), 28.  
649 G30, 97. 
650 Id., 12. 
651 Id., 21. 
652 Id., 44. 
653 Id., 19. 
654 G30, n 102. 
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the bank culture; and (c) a proactive approach formally integrating cultural 
consideration within the supervisory duties.655 The third attitude, adopted by a 
few supervisory systems, is the only one directly dealing with cultural aspects of 
financial institutions. In any case, the lack of expertise and an enforcement-led 
approach focused more on sanction imposition than preventive supervision 
undermined any chance of creating a trust-based dialog between supervisors and 
supervised institutions. On the contrary, a clear distinction and a proper balance 
between supervision and enforcement is needed.656 
However, the G30 does not suggest that supervisors should develop “a 
formal add-on to their methodology in order to deal with cultural issues”, since 
this would set higher expectations than they can achieve.657 Supervisors should 
rather identify bank cultural weaknesses by using various indicators (compliance 
failures, customer complaints, internal or external surveys, and internal) and 
best practices. 
Following the report, the G30 registered impressive progresses in banks 
attitude towards conduct and culture, but also a high level of employees’ 
scepticism and exhaustion towards cultural initiative, which risks to bring all the 
efforts to nothing.658 Regulatory and supervisory authorities from may countries 
(i.e. United Kingdom, EU, US, Canada, Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore and 
China) launched a series of initiatives focusing on culture and conduct in the 
financial market industry.659 Some supervisors also started to consider AI and 
machine learning technologies to better assess and monitor conduct risk, even 
though many technical and ethical issues should still be solved.660 
Undoubtedly, the De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) anticipated the G30 
instructions by adopting a new interactive approach to banking supervision. As 




655 Id., 43.  
656 Ibid. 
657 Id., 54. 
658 G30, n 237. 
659 Id., 27. 
660 Id., 23. 
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2.5.2.1 The DNB example 
 
In the EU, both the ECB and the EBA released many guidelines focusing 
on governance arrangements, addressing also cultural and conduct-related 
issues.661 However, the most representative example of supervisory integration 
of cultural aspects and conduct assessment is by no means embodied by the DNB 
case. 
As already mentioned in Chapter II, since 2010 the DNB has become the 
first banking supervisor globally to treat culture and behaviour as risk factors in 
supervision, as it established a DNB’s Expert Centre on Governance, 
Organizational Behaviour and Culture.662 In particular, the Dutch central bank 
moved from the belief that an effective financial supervision “needs to combine 
‘structural’ perspectives with insights into the behavioural and cultural drivers of 
firm performance, in order to become more effective in fostering firm and 
financial stability”.663  
Since 2010 to 2017, DNB has conducted more than 100 assessments 
targeting banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and trust offices, that 
revealed how the main risks related to board culture concerned the lack of 
awareness – by board members - of their own behaviour and group dynamics, 
the presence of a dominant CEO insufficiently challenged by other board 
members, an ineffective adherence to strategic objectives, and an informal 
decision-making system.664  
The DNB built its supervisory strategy on three basic assumptions: (1) 
strengthening regulation is not enough to avoid another financial crisis; (2) 
behaviour and culture are relevant for prudential supervision to the extent they 
																																																								
661  Consider, for example: EBA, n 137; ESMA and EBA, n 100, ESMA71-99-598 
EBA/GL/2017/12; EBA, n 152; ECB, n 99; ECB, n 469. 
662 See AFM and DNB, n 103. Actually, the idea originated earlier, in the aftermath of Lehman’s 
collapse. The first policy paper (DNB, ‘The Seven Elements of an Ethical Culture, Strategy and 
approach to behaviour and culture at Financial institutions 2010-2014’, available at 
https://www.dnb.nl, accessed 17 December 2018), was issued in 2009. For an historical overview 
of the origins and development of the Dutch supervision of conduct and culture, see Wijnand 
Nuijts, ‘Public Supervision of Behaviour and Culture’, in D. Busch, G. Ferrarini and G. van 
Solinge (eds), Governance of Financial Institutions, Oxford University Press, 2019, Forthcoming. 
663 See also Nuijts, n 662. 
664 DNB, ‘Leading by Example – conduct in the board rooms of financial institutions’ (2013), 19.  
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contribute to the construction of public trust in the financial sector, that is vital 
to the soundness of the financial system as a whole; and (3) behaviour and 
culture are part of sound business operations.665 
As a result, according to the Dutch banking supervisor, traditional 
supervisory activities should be integrated with new tools for a complete 
assessment of financial and non-financial risks. In detail, the new model of 
supervision should focus on areas such as business models, board effectiveness, 
behaviour and culture (see Figure 1).666 
Figure 1: DNB Supervisory Approach. Source: DNB (2015) 
 
The monitoring of institutions’ organizational culture is mainly carried out 
by means of on-site inspections. Each on-site inspection consists of the four 
phases: (1) context analysis, (2) risk identification, (3) risk assessment, and 4) risk 
mitigation.667 For the risk identification phase, the DNB uses a triangular 
approach, based on a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods retrieved 
																																																								
665 Nuijts, n 662. 
666 DNB, ‘Supervision of Behaviour and Culture Foundations, practice & future developments’ 
(2015), 11.  
667 DNB, n 666, 74. 
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from social sciences, such as surveys, self-assessments, semi-structured 
interviews, employee surveys, and board observations668. 
However, the most relevant innovation of this composite approach is the 
integration of psychological assessments, based on the conviction that culture – 
especially leadership, decision-making, communication and group dynamics – 
influences organisational performance. In particular, the DNB approaches 
culture by focusing on group behaviour and the interaction between certain 
individual roles and the group. Moreover, the DNB hired organizational 
psychologists to assess whether candidates are fit for executive office in banks 
and occasionally, during the board observation phase, to take part in board 
meetings and analyse directors’ behaviour.669 Specifically, they “…observe verbal 
behaviour, such as the way the board members speak to each other, the amount 
of time someone speaks up and the frequency, the impact of the comments made 
and non-verbal behaviour, such as facial expressions, posture, listening 
behaviour”.670  
Interviews are collected, recorded, transcribed and categorized, then 
triangulated with other sources of information. Throughout the entire analysis 
process, a continuous challenge is carried out, first amongst the experts, then 
between the experts and line supervisors, and finally through an independent 
view by experts not involved in the evaluation.671 
After the finalization of a risk assessment, the findings are presented and 
discussed with the institution in a so-called challenging dialogue.672 Then, the 
DNB findings, the expectations and the risk mitigation strategy are included in a 
written report. The risk mitigation strategy is mainly based on multiple (i.e. 
conditional,673 social learning674 or modelling, cognitive learning,675 dual system 
																																																								
668 Id., 77. 
669 See John M Conley and Cynthia Williams, ‘Fixing Finance 2.0’, in Bertram Lomfeld, 
Alessandro Somma, and Peer Zumbansen (eds), Reshaping Markets. Economic Governance, the 
Global Financial Crisis and Liberal Utopia, Cambridge University Press, 2016, 222. 
670 DNB, n 666, 83. 
671 Nuijts, n 662. 
672 Id. 
673 A learning method in which a biological stimulus – such as food – is associated to a netutral 
stimulus – such as a bell. This learning strategy was first theorized by Pavlov. See Ivan P 
Pavlov, Conditioned Reflexes: An Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral 
Cortex (translated by G.V. Anrep), Oxford University Press (1927). 
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approach676) and multilevel (conscious and unconscious) interventions based on 
the risk category identified.677 Interestingly, instead of focusing on indirect 
communication through reports and letters, direct challenging dialogue is at the 
core of every mitigation strategy, as it is involves feelings and emotions in 
addition to the rational cognitive approach that would prove inadequate for real 
change.678  
Also, the DNB contributed to the development of the supervision of 
behavior and culture at the Dutch market conduct regulator, the AFM.679 The 
DNB is also assisting other international banking authorities in introducing the 
assessment of culture and behaviour in their monitoring activities. Some 
examples are the Central Bank of Thailand, the Central Bank of Ireland and the 
New York Federal Reserve Bank.680 The ECB also contributed to the integration 
of behavior and culture supervision in the context of the European banking 
supervision – which is performed by the SSM under the coordination of the ECB 
– with specific relation to the creation of a methodology relating to board 
effectiveness and change effectiveness, which were field tested at a number of EU 
significant banks.681Finally, it supported the ECB in the development of a 
methodology for fit and proper interviews within the fit and proper 
																																																																																																																																																							
674 Behavior is learned from the environment through the process of observational learning. See 
Albert Bandura, Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory, Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
(1986). 
675 This theory implies that the different processes concerning learning can be explained by 
analysing the mental processes (e.g. beliefs, thoughts, attitudes, feelings), based on three main 
variables: behavioural factors, environmental factors (extrinsic), and personal factors (intrinsic). 
Edward Tolman was one of the main contributors to the theory. See Edward C Tolman, 
‘Cognitive maps in rats and men’, Psychological review (1948), 55, 4, 189.  
676 A learning model based both on implicit and explicit processes. See Robert C. Mathews, Ray 
Buss, William B. Stanley, Fredda Blanchard-Fields, Jeung Ryeul Cho, Barry Druhan, ‘Role of 
implicit and explicit processes in learning from examples: A synergistic effect’, Journal of 
Experimental Psychol- ogy: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (1989), 15, 1083–1100.  
677 DNB, n 666, 88. 
678 DNB, n 666, 92. 
679 Nuijts, n 662. 
679 Id. 
680 Id. 
681 In particular, the DNB chaired an SSM Task Force on Behaviour and Culture. See ECB, ‘Good 
governance - an asset for all seasons’, Keynote speech, Danièle Nouy (Chair of the Supervisory 
Board of the ECB), ‘From Lehman to Bitcoin - trends and cycles in financial supervision’, at the 
farewell seminar of Jan Sijbrand, (21 June 2018), available at 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2018/html/ssm.sp180621.en.
html, accessed 17 December 2018. 
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assessment.682  
However, the new Dutch supervisory model was not the only novelty 
introduced in the Netherlands. Indeed, the amendment of the Dutch Financial 
Supervision Act made in 2015 established the so-called ‘banker’s oath’, an oath 
akin to the physician’s Hippocratic Oath,683 by which all bank employees are 
bound by the rules of conduct for the ethical and careful practice of their 
profession.684 In 2012, the proposal by the Minister of Finance required to all 
employees to take the oath but, due to public criticism, in January 2013 the oath 
was legally required only to board members and supervisory board members. In 
2015, the Minister of Finance finally extended the legal requirement to all bank 
employees, notwithstanding the opposition made by the Council of State.685 To 
date, the oath has been taken by 87,000 Dutch bank employees.686 In the event of 
refusal to take the oath or of break of the inherent duties, bank employees (but 
only those working in banks registered in the Netherlands) can be punished by 
the Banking Disciplinary Committee (Tuchtcommissie Banken),687 that can impose 
one or more of the following measures: (i) a compulsory training order; (ii) a 
reprimand; (iii) a fine of to 25,000 euros (to be paid to the FBEE); or (iv) a 
professional ban for a maximum of three years.688 
Below is the text of the legally required Banker's Oath, taken by the 
approximately 87.000 bank employees in The Netherlands. Aside from 
personally signing the oath's form, employees committed themselves personally 
by participating in a special ceremony arranged by their employers.  
																																																								
682 Id. 
683 Actually, the proposal of introducing a mandatory moral and ethical declaration for bank 
directors was introduced among the recommendations included in the report entitled ‘Towards 
restoration of trust and confidence’, issued by the Board of the Dutch Banking Society in 2009. 
See Danny Busch and Peter Laaper, ‘The Dutch Banker’s Oath and the Dutch Banking 
Disciplinary Committee’, in D. Busch, G. Ferrarini and G. van Solinge (eds), Governance of 
Financial Institutions, Oxford University Press, 2019, Forthcoming. 
684 See Tom Loonen and Mark R. Rutgers, ‘Swearing to be a good banker: Perceptions of the 
obligatory banker’s oath in the Netherlands’, Journal of Banking Regulation (2016), 18, 1. 
685 Id. 
686  ‘The Banker’s Oath’, Tuchtrecht Banken, Amsterdam; 
https://www.tuchtrechtbanken.nl/en/vragen/is-the-bankers-oath-voluntary, accessed 26 
December 2018. 
687 See Dutch Financial Supervision Act (Wet op het nancieel toezicht ), Article 3:17c . 
688 Disciplinary Regulations, Article 3.9.2.. For the complete text of the Disciplinary Regulations 
(Tuchtreglement Bancaire Sector) (version 1 September 2016). See Busch & Laaper, n 683. 
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I swear / promise that, within the boundaries of my function in the banking 
sector, I will: 
- Execute my function ethically and with care; 
- Draw a careful balance between the interests of all parties associated with the 
business, being the customers, shareholders, employees and the society in 
which the business operates; 
- When drawing that balance, making the customer’s interests central; 
- Will comply with the laws, regulations and codes that apply to me; 
- Will keep confidential that which has been entrusted to me; 
- Will not abuse my knowledge; 
- Will act openly and accountably, knowing my responsibility to society; 
- Will make every effort to improve and retain trust in the financial sector. 
So help me God! / This I pledge and promise!689 
The Code of Conduct, enshrined in the Banker's Oath, specifies the following 
principles: 
1. The bank employee works with care and integrity. This means, among other 
things, that the bank employee: 
• is honest and reliable; 
• prevents the conflict of his/her interests with the interests of others; 
• prevents the appearance of conflicts of interests. 
2. The bank employee carefully balances interests. This means that the bank 
employee carefully balances the interests of the bank’s customers, its 
shareholders, its members, its bond holders and other creditors of the bank, 
its employees and society as a whole. 
3. The bank employee puts the customer’s interests first. This means, among 
other things, that the bank employee:  
• offers customers the best possible information about products and 
services, and their associated risks; 
• does not offer customers products or services that do not suit them; 
• helps to ensure that a products do not expose customers to irresponsible 
risks; 
• helps to ensure that products are understandable for customers. 
																																																								
689 See https://www.tuchtrechtbanken.nl/en/the-bankers-oath, accessed 17 December 2018.  
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4. The bank employee abides by legislation and other regulations that apply to 
the bank. This means, among other things, that when carrying out his or her 
duties the bank employee abides by the legislation, regulations, rules of 
conduct and instructions that apply to working at the bank. 
5. The bank employee does not disclose confidential information. This means, 
among other things, that the bank employee does not provide any 
confidential information about customers to third parties without the 
customer’s permission. The employee only discloses information about 
customers when required to do so by law, a judge or the supervisory body. 
The certified employee is also prohibited from misusing the information that 
he or she has access to. 
6. The bank employee is open and honest with regard to his or her behaviour 
and is aware of his or her responsibility to society. This means that the bank 
employee allows his or her behaviour at work to be tested for adherence to 
these rules of conduct. 
7. The bank employee contributes to promoting society’s trust in the bank. 
This means, among other things, that when carrying out his or her duties the 
bank employee does not take any risks that may endanger the bank or 
others.690 
 
At the current stage, Netherlands is the first country to have imposed such 
a legal requirement on the financial sector. In the UK and US, even though the 
introduction of a mandatory banker’s oath has been proposed and discussed, it 
did not reach sufficient support.691 In Australia, an oath has been introduced but 
on a voluntary basis.692 
By introducing the oath, the Dutch legislator aimed at increasing the 
consumer trust on financial sector, especially in the light of the 2008 scandals. 
Notwithstanding the good intentions, the oath was subjected to wide scepticism, 
as well as many critics, especially in relation to its efficacy in increasing moral 
																																																								
690 Ibid. 
691 See, for the UK, ‘Bankers should swear oath of good service, says thinktank’ (28 Jul 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jul/28/bankers-swear-oath-good-service-
thinktank-respublica, accessed 22 December 2018, and for the US John R Boatright, ‘Swearing to 
be Virtuous: The Prospects of a Banker's Oath’, Review of Social Economy (2013), 71, 2, 140-165. 
692 See Loonen & Rutgers, n 685. 
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judgement and ethical behaviour.693 Moreover, it remains doubtful if bankers can 
be considered and treated as a uniform professional group, considered the broad 
range of financial products and end consumers each banker has to deal with 
depending on its specific role.694 Indeed, contrary to physicians, bankers’ clients 
cannot be unified under a category such as patients, neither they share a limited 
range of interests to be satisfied.695 The issue is even more crucial in terms of 
liability, as there is not certainty on who should be deemed responsible for the 
end consumer in each complex banking procedure. Considered this difficulty in 
applying the ethical code in practice, some commentators even suggested that 
the oath could be dangerous by as it would create “a false sense of confidence 
that the challenge of ensuring ethical conduct has been met”.696 
In my opinion, such a oath could prove effective to a certain extent, 
depending on the cultural and legal framework in which it is established, but in 
any case as a complementary tool. Like codes of conduct and ethics (see 2.3.3.4), 
the main risk is that its adoption becomes a mere formality externally imposed, 
while only well internalized principles and practices may prove effective. 
Another risk is that, considered the lack of behavioural examples provided by the 
code and the difficulty in fully understand the liability boundaries of the oath, 
bankers could be disincentivised to take any risk, or simply lead to be more 
reluctant keeping their role in the bank, especially where a similar oath is not 
required in other commercial sectors. 
 
 
2.5.2.2. The future of supervision on culture and conduct 
 
The Dutch example shows how a less regulation-based approach to 
supervision should be encouraged. Some commentators even suggest that 
excessive regulatory burden might be the cause of misconduct, as it would force 
																																																								
693 See, for example, Boatright n 691, 140-165. Moreover, a survey carried out 2014 show that the 
trust in oath effectiveness is rather low, especially among bank employees. See Loonen & 
Rutgers, n 685. 
694 See Loonen & Rutgers, n 684. 
695 See Boatrigh, n 691, 140-165. 
696 Id.  
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employees to break the rules and choose short cuts in order to shorten long and 
complex procedures.697 
Of course, changing organizational behaviour at banks and other financial 
institutions will take time and perseverance, as cultural change requires a deep 
transformation that involves not only behaviour, but also intrinsic beliefs, basic 
assumptions and core values. Moreover, monitoring culture and conduct 
requires a combination of both financial skills and social competences, as well as 
experience that supervisory generally do not have and that take time to develop 
and integrate. The financial supervisor itself should then carry out a cultural 
self-assessment in the first place.  
The UK seems to follow the same track as the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) – that protects consumers and promotes competition amongst 
more than 56,000 financial institutions in the United Kingdom -698 has published 
several papers dealing with issues concerning the culture of compliance in the 
financial industry from the perspective of behavioural economics,699 sociology, 
and psychology.700 Moreover, in 2016 the FCA – directly targeting culture –701 
introduced the Senior Managers and Certification Regime (Accountability 
Regime), that replaces the UK Approved Persons Regime (APR) with a regime 
that is more focused on senior managers and individual responsibility. The 
Accountability Regime is composed of three key parts: (i) the Senior Managers 
Regime, (ii) the Certification Regime, and the (iii) Conduct Rules.702 The Senior 
																																																								
697 For instance, Nuijts notices how, in order to meet too high procedural requirements, some 
employees at ABN AMRO decided to copy the customer’s signature. See Nuijts, n 662. 
698 https://www.fca.org.uk/about/the-fca, accessed 30 October 2018. 
699 FCA, ‘Applying behavioural economics at the Financial Conduct Authority’, Occasional Paper 
No 1/2003, available at https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/occasional-papers/occasional-
paper-1.pdf, accessed 15 November 2018. 
700 FCA, n 480; FCA, ‘Incentivising Compliance with Financial Regulation’, Occasional Paper No 
25/2016; and FCA, ‘From advert to action: behavioural insights into the advertising of financial 
products, Occasional Paper No 26/2017 https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/occasional-
papers/op17-26.pdf, accessed 15 December 2018. 
701 Indeed, similar to the DNB, the FCA identified two main root causes for financial crises: 
strategy/business model and culture. See Speech, Jonathan Davidson ‘Culture and conduct - 
extending the accountability regime’, City and Financial Summit, London. (20 Sep 2017), 
available at https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/culture-conduct-extending-accountability-
regime accessed on 17 Dec 2018. 
702  FCA, ‘Senior Managers and Certification Regime: banking’, 
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/senior-managers-certification-regime/banking accessed on 18 
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Managers Regime requires that each and every senior manager have clear 
accountabilities set out in an individual Statement of Responsibility, to prove 
he/she took reasonable steps to ensure that the decisions made by the people 
they lead are appropriate. The Certification Regime applies to all employees in 
positions that significantly affect conduct outcomes. Firms are responsible to 
ensure that people who are in significant positions of conduct are fit and proper 
to perform their role, by performing a specific check at least once a year. The 
conduct rules are a set of minimum standards that apply to almost everyone in 
the banking sector. However, there are also some Conduct Rules that only apply 
to senior managers. 
The SM&CR has been in force for banks, building societies, credit unions 
and PRA-designated investment firms (Relevant Authorised Persons) since 
March 2016. The SM&CR is due to be extended to cover all FCA (Financial 
Conduct Authority) solo-regulated financial services firms from 9 December 
2019. 
Moreover, other Accountability Regimes have emerged in other 
jurisdictions, including Hong Kong Manager-in-Charge (effective October 
2017); the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority’s Banking Executive 
Accountability Regime (effective July 2018); and the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore’s proposed Individual Accountability and Conduct Regime and 
guidance from the US Federal Reserve Bank.703 
In order to avoid a purely formal tick-box approach by financial 
institutions, a certain level of certainty on the practical implementation of the 
same should be ensured, as well a sufficient level of flexibility on the adoption of 
the more suitable regime considered the specific characteristic of the institution, 
as has been already provided by the FCA.  
In the light of the considerations above, it is clear how the role of financial 
supervisors is already evolving and trying to research alternative ways to better 
monitor financial institutions. However, only future outcomes will tell us 
whether the new path is going to make an effective change or new techniques 
should be established.  
																																																								
703 Group of Thirty (G30), n 237, 28. 
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2.5.3 Institutional Investors 
 
Over the last decades, the rise of institutional investors as major owners of 
corporate shares704 reversed the trend towards the Berle-and-Means dispersed 
corporations,705 often characterized by conflicts of interests between managers 
and shareholders.706 By typically owning larger blocks than individual dispersed 
shareholders, institutional shareholders have stronger incentives but also 
specialized expertise in monitoring their investments, and therefore could lead to 
a reduction of shirking phenomenon and of the related agency costs. 707 
Interestingly, the institutionalization of ownership covered also control-oriented 
countries such as Germany and Italy, where blockholders, including families, the 
state or banks used to dominate most of the large companies.708 
Notwithstanding the beneficial effects that this phenomenon have on the 
governance landscape – some of which have been confirmed by empirical studies 
- 709 some scholars argue that other peculiar cost-agency problems may still 
																																																								
704 Gilson and Gordon argue that this ownership change was caused by “(i) political decisions to 
privatize the provision of retirement savings and to require funding of such provision and (ii) 
capital market developments that favor investment intermediaries offering low-cost diversified 
investment vehicles”. See Ronald J Gilson & Jeffrey N Gordon, ‘The Agency Costs of Agency 
Capitalism Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights’, Columbia Law Review 
(2013), 113, 863. 
705 Bernard S Black, ‘Shareholder Passivity Reexamined’, Michigan Law Review (1990), 89, 3, 
520-608. 
706 For cost-agency theory, see Berle & Means, n 4. 
707 Since the issuance of the Cadbury Report in 1992 policy makers and corporate governance 
experts advocated stronger shareholder involvement in invested companies’ affairs, as a solution 
to high agency costs. For an historical review, see Brain R Cheffins, ‘The Stewardship Code’s 
Achilles’ Heel’, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 28/2011, available 
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1837344, accessed 18 December 2018. 
708 See Iris Chiu & Dionysia Katelouzou, ‘From Shareholder Stewardship to Shareholder Duties: 
Is the Time Ripe?’, Nordic & European Company Law Working Paper No. 18-10/2016, available 
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2731241, accessed 18 December 2018. 
709 Empirical studies found that the presence of institutional investors strongly influences 
governance settings, especially with reference to executive compensation, election of board 
members, innovation, but also management disclosure. See, for instance, Jay C Hartzell & Laura 
T Starks, ‘Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation’, Journal of Finance (2003), 58, 6, 
2351–74; Philippe Aghion, John Van Reenen & Luigi Zingales, ‘Innovation and Institutional 
Ownership’, American Economic Review (2013), 103, 1, 277–304; Kee H Chung & Hao Zhang, 
‘Corporate Governance and Institutional Ownership’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis (2011), 46, 1, 247-273; and Audra L Boone & Joshua T White, ‘The effect of 
institutional ownership on firm transparency and information production’, Journal of Financial 
Economics (2015), 117, 3, 508-533. See contra: Andres Almazan, Jay C Hartzell & Laura T Starks, 
‘Active Institutional Shareholders and Costs of Monitoring: Evidence from Executive’, Financial 
Management (2005), 34, 4, 5-34. 
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occur, 710  giving rise to the so-called ‘Agency Capitalism’, defined as an 
“ownership structure in which agents hold shares for beneficial owners”.711 
Indeed, as institutional investors are controlled by investment managers, they 
suffer from the agency problems deriving from the conflicts between these 
investment managers and their own beneficial investors. Moreover, institutional 
investors differ largely in terms of investment style, time horizon, size and 
cannot be treated as a homogeneous class. 
To deal with these issues, some jurisdictions, such as the UK,712 Japan,713 
Israel714 and the European Union,715 started requiring institutional investors to 
comply to a new set of best practices – generally under the name of ‘stewardship’ 
duties - in order to act in the interest of their beneficiaries. The term 
‘stewardship’ refers to the “constructive shareholder engagement and 
monitoring of investee companies, in order to overcome the agency problems 
between institutional shareholders and corporate directors”.716 According to the 
UK Stewardship Code, stewardship activities are not limited to vote exercise, but 
include “monitoring and engaging with companies on matters such as strategy, 
performance, risk, capital structure, and corporate governance, including culture 
and remuneration”.717 In line with this approach, institutional investors should 
also ensure that an effective leadership is established.718 
																																																								
710 See Lucian A Bebchuk, Alma Cohen& Scott Hirst, ‘The Agency Problems of Institutional 
Investors’, Journal of Economic Perspectives (2017), 31, 89-102, available 
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2982617, accessed 20 December 2018.  
711 See Gilson & Gordon, n 704 
712  See FRC, ‘The UK Stewardship Code’ (2012), 6, available at 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/d67933f9-ca38-4233-b603-3d24b2f62c5f/UK-
Stewardship-Code-(September-2012).pdf, accessed 20 December 2018. 
713  Principles for Responsible Institutional Investors (“Japan’ Stewardship Code”) (English 
translation of the revised Code), available at 
https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/stewardship/20170529.html, accessed 30 December 
2018.  
714 See Principal Recommendations of the Committee on Enhancing Competitiveness (Isr.), 
available at http://www.mof.gov.il/lists/list26/attachments/291/2011-1111.pdf.  
715 Directive 2007/36/EC (recently amended in 2014 and 2017), commonly known as the 
“Shareholders’ Rights Directive”(SRD). 
716 Chiu & Katelouzou, n 708. 
717 See FRC, n 712, 1. For a critical analysis of stewardship initiatives, see Cheffins, n 707. The 
author detects many deterrents to institutional shareholders’ engagements, such as the comply 
or explain enforcement, investors’ insufficient expertise, and high costs for activism. 
718 See FRC, n 712, 7. 
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The EU as well gave formal recognition to the active engagement of 
institutional investors in Directive 2007/36/EC – amended in 2014 and 2017 – 
commonly known as the “Shareholders’ Rights Directive”(SRD), that encourages 
long-term shareholder engagement. The Directive, in particular: (a) aims at 
strengthening shareholders' rights and facilitating cross-border voting, (b) 
requires from institutional investors and asset managers more transparency in 
investment policies, encouraging long-term engagement, (c) requires more 
transparency of proxy advisors, (d) gives to shareholders a "say on pay” on 
directors’ remuneration policy, and (e) requires more transparency and a 
reinforced role of shareholders in related party transaction.  
However, as I have already observed, shareholder centricity might be 
dangerous in banking and – more in general – financial sector, as it could lead 
financial institutions to take high risks for profit maximization at any costs, 
unless some proper adjustments are made. For this reason, the SRD specifies 
that the “effective and sustainable shareholder engagement […] can help 
improve the financial and non-financial performance of companies, including as 
regards environmental, social and governance factors […].719 To complement 
this framework and facilitate shareholders approach towards long-term 
engagement, Directive 2014/95/EU on disclosure of non-financial and diversity 
information requires large undertakings and public-interest entities to disclose 
certain information about how they operate in regular reports with reference to 
environmental, social and employee matters, respect of human rights, anti-
corruption and bribery issues, and diversity on company boards (in terms of age, 
gender, educational and professional background). 
The main assumption underlying these recent directives is that 
institutional investors may still play a beneficial role in determining corporate 
culture, as they can shape corporate governance, but only if they engage in the 
promotion of both the financial and non-financial performance of the investee 
companies.720 And the current trend seems to adhere to this assumption, since a 
																																																								
719 Directive (EU) 2017/828, Recital 14. 
720 The OECD itself, in 2011, highlighted the role played by institutional investors in corporate 
governance See OECD, The Role of Institutional Investors in Promoting Good Corporate 
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Eurosif Study recently found an increased engagement and voting propensity by 
institutional investors in 2017 compared to 2015 in the sustainable finance 
market. 721  Indeed, institutional investors are increasingly considering the 
sustainability impact produced by the firms in which they invest. Interestingly – 
against reasonable criticism moved in relation to the enforcement stewardship 
duties -722 an empirical study conducted across 41 countries found a positive 
relationship between E&S performance – based on data obtained from the 
Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG database – and institutional ownership.723 
Indeed, to contribute to the establishment of a sound culture institutional 
investors began to push board of directors to pursue value on the long-term in 
combination with environmental, social and governance consideration. 724 
However, this new trend will be further developed in the next Chapter in 
connection to the rise of sustainable finance movement.   
																																																																																																																																																							
Governance (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovern 
anceprinciples/49081553.pdf, accessed 30 December 2018. 
721 The survey, which covers 13 distinct markets (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Po- land, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) was 
based on data collected from March to July 2018 from 263 asset managers and asset owners. See 
Eurosif, ‘European 2018 SRI Study Launch’ (2018). 
722  Winter, for instance, defined shareholder engagement and stewardship an “illusion”, 
considered the structure and realities of capital markets and institutional investment (in 
particular, he refers to the dominant Modern Portfolio Theory, the intermediation by asset 
managers, the increased distance between the institutional investors and investee companies, the 
remuneration model for portfolio managers, the trends in solvency and accounting regulation, 
and the persistent pressure from the investment industry to trade shares rather than hold them). 
See Jaap W Winter, ‘Shareholder Engagement and Stewardship: The Realities and Illusions of 
Institutional Share Ownership’ (2011), available https://ssrn.com/abstract=1867564, accessed 
30 December 2018. See also Simon C Y Wong, ‘Why Stewardship is Proving Elusive for 
Institutional Investors’, Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 
(July/August 2010), 406-411. 
723 Alexander Dyck, Karl V Lins, Lukas Roth & Hannes F Wagner, ‘Do Institutional Investors 
Drive Corporate Social Responsibility? International Evidence’, Journal of Financial Economics 
(2018), 000, 1-22.  
724  Shareholders pressure for green resolutions is becoming the biggest challenge for oil 
companies such as Chevron Corp., Royal Dutch Shell, BP Plc and Exxon Mobil Corp.. See, for 
example, ‘The elephant in the atmosphere. Managers at the biggest oil firms clash with investors 
over climate change’ (19 July 2017), available at 
https://www.economist.com/business/2014/07/19/the-elephant-in-the-atmosphere, accessed 
28 December 2018; Kelly Gilblom, ‘BP, Shell to Face New Shareholder Challenge Over Climate 
in 2019’ (10 Dec 2018), available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-10/bp-
shell-to-face-new-shareholder-challenge-over-climate-in-2019, accessed on 28 Dec 2018; and 
David French, ‘Shareholders call on ExxonMobil to set greenhouse gas reduction targets’ (16 
Dec 2018), available at https://it.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1OF0T8, accessed 28 Dec 2018.  
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The promotion of sustainable and long-term oriented finance is one of the 
core objectives to be achieved in the next two years within the CMU framework. 
Building sustainable finance means not only promoting green financial 
instruments and socially responsible investments, but implies also the 
integration of sound and sustainable processes and skills across the whole 
structure and governance of financial institutions. Consequently, I believe that it 
is appropriate here to provide an overview of the most recent regulatory trends 
in the financial sector. In fact, sustainability – a phenomenon destined to re-
shape the entire EU economy – concerns the banking sector in many ways, from 
redesigning the composition requirements of boards, strengthening investor care 
and protection within the MiFID II framework, to promoting even more 
personalized financial products and, if well addressed, partially restoring the 
trust in the banking sector by making it serve directly the real economy. 
This chapter starts by briefly analysing the recent developments of 
sustainable finance at the global level, to then give a more detailed view on the 
establishment of a common regime on sustainable finance in the EU, with 
particular reference to the Action Plan “Financing Sustainable Growth”. The 
Action Plan, based on the recent HLEG final report, establishes a strategy for 
the strengthening of cooperation of the entire financial industry towards a 
sustainable economy. The chapter then examines the recent proposals for 
regulation on sustainable finance, and finally considers the consequences in 
terms of the corporate governance of banking institutions. 
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2.6.1 The UN 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris 
Climate Agreement and EU Sustainable Development Strategy 
 
Nowadays, sustainability is one of the most challenging global issues, 
affecting not only individuals but also organizations, both those operating in the 
financial and non-financial sector, from small & medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) to large commercial companies and governmental institutions. Climate 
change, wildlife extinction, poverty, illnesses and discrimination are only few of 
the destructive environmental and societal effects deriving from human business 
activities, and which have to be readdressed in order to “meet the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own”.725 Accordingly, by building on the previous Millennium Declaration and 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)726, in 2015 the UN Global Agenda 
2030 set 17 sustainable goals to be reached by 2030727, covering issues from 
ending poverty and hunger to ensuring access to sustainable and modern energy 
and clean water to all.  
To combat the detrimental consequences of climate change phenomenon, 
in 2016, by signing the Paris agreement,728 governments from around the world 
established specific environmental targets to reduce the level of green-house gas 
emissions released in the atmosphere and to limit global warming to well below 
2°C. In the same year, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda729 and the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction730 were also adopted. 
Recent trends in the industrial and financial sectors reveal the renewed 
attention for the creation of an alternative economic system, which include the 
																																																								
725 This is the first given definition of ‘sustainable development’, developed by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), known also as the Brundtland 
Commission, which was established by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in December 
1983. See World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), ‘Our Common 
Future’, 1987.  
726 UN General assembly, ‘United Nations Millennium Declaration’, 18 September 2000 
A/RES/55/2. 
727 UN General Assembly, Transforming our world : the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, , 
A/RES/70/1 (21 October 2015). 
728 UN, Paris Agreement on Climate Change, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (12 
December 2015). 
729 UN Resolution A/RES/69/313. 
730 Adopted at the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai, Japan, 
on March 18, 2015. 
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launch of sustainable financial products (such as Green Bonds, Social Bonds, 
Project Bonds, ESG Bonds), financial indexes (such as the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Indexes and the Financial Times Stock Exchange’s FTSE4Good), 
social and environmental impact evaluation systems (such as the Global Impact 
Investing Rating System) and international guidelines (such as the UN 
Principles for Responsible Investment). 
With specific reference to the financial sector, in 1992 a partnership 
between the United Nations Environment Programme and the global financial 
sector (UNEP FI) was launched with a mission to promote sustainable finance. 
The UNEP FI nowadays counts more than 200 financial institutions as 
members, committed to respecting sustainable finance principles by adhering to 
the backbone of the initiative, the UNEP Statement of Commitment by Financial 
Institutions on Sustainable Development. Subsequently, a multitude of other 
sustainable finance initiatives were launched or supported by UN agencies731, or 
other international bodies, such as the Financial Stability Board,732 the Global 
Green Finance Council (GGFC), 733  and the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).734 At the Paris ‘One Planet Summit’ in December 
2017, many central banks and banking supervisory authorities gathered in the 
Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System 
(NGFS) with the aim to promote best practices in the banking sector for the 
transition to a sustainable world economy. 
Since the launch of the EU Sustainable Development Strategy in 2001,735 
which was revised in 2006736 and 2009,737 the EU Commission has made a clear 
																																																								
731 Such as the 2006 Principles for Responsible Investment, the 2012 Principles for Sustainable 
Insurance and the 2017 Principles for Positive Impact Finance. 
732 In particular, the FSB in 2015 established the Task Force on Climate-related Financial 
Disclosures, which published its final recommendations in June 2017. See https://www.fsb-
tcfd.org/publications/final-recommendations-report/, accessed 28 December 2018. 
733 The GGFC was established in 2017 and in March 2018 it supported the Loan Market 
Association (LMA) in the publication of the ‘LMA Green Loan Principles’, available at 
https://www.lma.eu.com/news-publications/press-releases?id=146, accessed 28 December 2018. 
734 This has recently held a consultation on an issues paper on climate change risk for the 
insurance sector. Available at www.iaisweb.org, accessed 3 January 2018. 
735 European Commission, Communication from the Commission A Sustainable Europe for a 
Better World: A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development, COM/2001/0264 final. 
736 European Council DOC 10917/06. 
737 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - 
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commitment to contribute to promoting sustainable development in key cross-
sectorial projects, by intervening in all environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) areas. The introduction of the Europe 2020 Strategy in 2010738 and the 
explicit link made to the UN Sustainable Development Goals in the 2016 
Commission Communication on the next steps for a sustainable European 
future739 confirmed the EU's role as frontrunner in the implementation of the 
UN Agenda.  
 
2.6.2 The EU Action Plan for Sustainable Finance 
 
Financial institutions, as key providers of funding, play a major role in the 
transition to a new sustainable and circular economy. As also highlighted by the 
EU Commission in the Action Plan, “Financing Sustainable Growth” published 
in March 2018,740 change is possible only by reorienting private capital to more 
sustainable investments. In fact, it was estimated that more capital flows should 
be oriented towards sustainable investments to close the €180-billion gap of 
additional investments needed to meet the EU’s 2010 targets of the Paris 
Agreement.  
As a consequence, at the end of 2016, the EU Commission appointed a 
High-Level Expert Group (HLEG) on sustainable finance to advice it on 
developing a comprehensive EU strategy on sustainable finance and 
development. The HLEG final report,741 issued in January 2018, stresses the 
importance to promote sustainable finance through a systemic review of the 
																																																																																																																																																							
Mainstreaming sustainable development into EU policies: 2009 Review of the European Union 
Strategy for Sustainable Development, COM(2009) 400 final. 
738 EU Commission, Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, 
COM(2010) 2020 final. 
739 EU Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Next 
steps for a sustainable European future European action for sustainability, COM(2016) 739 final. 
740 EU Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Wconomic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth, 
COM(2018) 97 final (March 2018). 
741 HLEG, ‘Final Report’, 2018, available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/180131-
sustainable-finance-final-report_en.pdf, accessed on 3 October 2018. 
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financial framework, and proposes eight recommendations, 742  as well as 
crosscutting recommendations and actions addressed to specific financial sectors.  
In March 2018, on the basis of the Final Report published by the HLEG, 
the Commission adopted the Action Plan, “Financing Sustainable Growth” 
(‘Action Plan’), 743 which establishes a strategy for enhancing the connection 
between the financial industry and sustainable development. The Action Plan 
specifically pursues three objectives: (i) reorienting capital flows towards 
sustainable investment, in order to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth; (ii) 
managing financial risks stemming from climate change, environmental 
degradation and social issues; and (iii) fostering transparency and long-termism 
in financial and economic activity. The EU strategy specifically develops around 
ten key actions to be fully implemented by the end of 2019, and which are: (a) 
establishing an EU classification system for sustainable activities; (b) creating 
standards and labels for green financial products; (c) fostering investment in 
sustainable projects; (d) incorporating sustainability when providing financial 
advice; (e) developing sustainability benchmarks; (f) better integrating 
sustainability in ratings and market research; (g) clarifying institutional 
investors' and asset managers' duties; (h) incorporating sustainability in 
prudential requirements; (i) strengthening sustainability disclosure and 
accounting rule-making; and (l) fostering sustainable corporate governance and 
attenuating short-termism in capital markets.  
 
2.6.3 The First (proposed) Regulatory Package On Sustainable Finance 
 
The EU Commission has already taken concrete steps in the enactment of 
the Action Plan, and in May 2018 it adopted a package of measures, which 
																																																								
742 The recommendations are: (i) establishing a common sustainable finance taxonomy; (ii) 
clarifying investor duties to extend time horizons and bring greater focus on ESG factors; (iii) 
upgrading EU disclosure rules, especially in relation to climate change; (iv) improving citizens’ 
access to information on sustainability performance and promoting financial literacy; (v) 
developing EU sustainable finance standards, starting with one on green bonds; (vi) establishing 
a ‘Sustainable Infrastructure Europe’ facility to expand the size and quality of the EU pipeline of 
sustainable assets; (vii) reform governance and leadership of companies in order to integrate 
sustainable finance competencies; and (viii) enlarging the role and capabilities of the ESAs to 
promote sustainable finance as part of their mandates. 
743 EU Commission, n 740. 
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include: (i) the Regulation on the establishment of a framework to facilitate 
sustainable investment; 744  (ii) the Regulation on disclosures relating to 
sustainable investments and sustainability risks and amending Directive EU 
2016/2341 (‘IORP II’); 745  (iii) the Regulation amending Regulation EU 
2016/1011 on low carbon benchmarks and positive carbon impact 
benchmarks746 . Moreover, in order to ensure that investors’ sustainability 
preferences are taken into account in the suitability assessment, the Commission 
proposed to amend delegated acts under MiFID II and IDD (with respect to 
investment-based insurance products).747  
 
(i) Regulation on the establishment of a framework to facilitate 
sustainable investment 
 
The first proposal for regulation748 specifically addresses both the first 
recommendation by the HLEG and the first key action listed in the Action Plan 
aiming at gradually establishing a unified EU classification system to determine 
which economic activities are considered sustainable, and then to provide unified 
standards, labels and sustainability benchmarks based on the same. Setting out a 
clear taxonomy for sustainable finance is by no means the most urgent need for a 
successful implementation of the entire Action Plan, as the different labels and 
interpretations given by each Member State as to what can be defined 
sustainable undoubtedly discourage investors from investing by making 
comparison too expensive and raising the risk of greenwashing practices.749 
																																																								
744  Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, COM(2018)353/978670. 
745 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on disclosures 
relating to sustainable investments and sustainability risks and amending Directive (EU) 
2016/2341, COM(2018)354/978576. 
746 Proposal for a regulation - COM(2018)355/978587. 
747 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) …/.. of XXX, amending Delegated Regulation 
(EU) 2017/2359 with regard to environmental, social and governance preferences in the 
distribution of insurance-based investment products, Ref. Ares(2018)2681527 - 24/05/2018, and 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) …/... of XXX amending Regulation (EU) 2017/565 
supplementing Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards 
organisational requirements and operating conditions for investment firms and defined terms for 
the purposes of that Directive, Ref. Ares(2018)2681500 - 24/05/2018. 
748 Proposal for a regulation, n 744. 
749 Id., Explanatory Memorandum, 1,2. 
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The proposal establishes uniform criteria for determining whether an 
economic activity is environmentally sustainable, and it further sets out a 
process involving a multi-stakeholder platform to establish a unified EU 
classification system based on a set of specific criteria.750 However, it does not 
establish a label for sustainable financial products, but it only sets out the criteria 
to be taken into account when setting up sustainability labels at national or EU 
level. The specific uniform technical criteria will be developed at Level 2 in 
delegated acts.751 To this end, in July 2018, the EU Commission set up a 
Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance (TEG) to assist it in further 
developing an EU classification system. 
The proposal, though specifically addressing only environmentally 
sustainable investments, also provides for a review clause to possibly extend the 
scope of the regulation to include social objectives,752 as the urgency to act 
against climate change and meet energy targets convinced the EU Commission 
to address social sustainability in a second phase.753 
 
(ii) Regulation on disclosures relating to sustainable investments and 
sustainability risks  
The second proposal for regulation754 aims to increase transparency on the 
integration of ESG risks in investment decision-making and advisory processes, 
therefore responding to both the seventh - concerning the clarification of 
institutional investor’s and asset manager’s duties – and the eighth concrete 
action included in the Action Plan concerning disclosure of information in 
relation to ESG factors. 
The regulation is addressed to financial market participants – insurance 
undertakings, managers of venture capital funds and social entrepreneurship 
funds, and UCITS – and investment firms. The regulation requires them to 
properly disclose how they consider ESG risks in their decision-making and 
																																																								
750 Id., Explanatory Memorandum, 1. 
751 Id., Explanatory Memorandum, 11. 
752 Id., Article 17. 
753 EU Commission, n 740, 11-12. 
754 Proposal for a regulation, n 745. 
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advisory processes. Imposing consistent disclosure criteria is deemed necessary 
since ‘divergent disclosure standards and market-based practices make it very 
difficult to compare different financial products and services, create unfair 
conditions for different financial products and services, manufacturers and 
distribution channels, and erect additional barriers to the internal market’.755 
However, more detailed requirements will be further specified through 
Delegated Acts, which will be adopted by the Commission at a later stage. 
Even though the integration of ESG factors by institutional investors and 
asset managers is deemed rather weak,756 the feedback statement accompanying 
the proposal suggests that an increasing majority of respondents already take 
into account sustainability factors in their investment decision-making,757 as also 
highlighted in other recent surveys.758 In fact, a number of studies show how 
traditional investment strategies do not outperform socially responsible 
investment ones, 759  but sometimes even underperform them; 760  a cautious 
optimism however is suggested with respect to social value creation.761 
Even though I cannot fully analyse the content of the proposal here, an 
objection must be raised with reference to the given definition of ‘sustainable 
																																																								
755 Proposal for a regulation, n 745, Explanatory Memorandum, 5.  
756 Proposal for a regulation, n 745, Explanatory Memorandum, 7. 
757 Feedback Statement, Public Consultation on Institutional Investors' and Asset Managers' 
Duties regarding Sustainability page 23, https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/2017-investors-duties-
sustainability-feedback-statement_en, May 24, 2018. 
758 EY Climate Change and Sustainability Services (CCaSS), ‘Is your nonfinancial performance 
revealing the true value of your business to investors?’ (2017); CFA Institute, ‘Environmental, 
Social and Governance (ESG) Survey’, 2017.  
759  Gunnar Friede, Timo Busch & Alexander Bassen, ‘ESG and financial performance: 
aggregated evidence from more than 2000 empirical studies’, Journal of Sustainable Finance & 
Investment (2015), 5, 4, 210-233; Morgan Stanley, Institute for Sustainable Investing, 
Sustainable Reality: Understanding the Performance of Sustainable Investment Strategies (Mar. 
2015), available at https://www.morganstanley.com/sustainableinvesting/pdf/sustainable-
reality.pdf, accessed 3 January 2018; Lloyd Kurtz & Dan di Bartolomeo, ‘The Long-Term 
Performance of a Social Investment Universe’, J. INVESTING (2011) 95, 100; Timo Busch, Rob 
Bauer & Marc Orlitzky, ‘Sustainable Development and Financial Markets’, Business & Society 
(2016), 55, 3, 303-329. 
760 Mozaffar Khan, George Serafeim & Aaron Yoon, ‘Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence 
on Materiality’, The Accounting Review (2016), 91, 6, 1697-1724, available 
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2575912, accessed 30 December 2018.  
761 Paul Brest, Ronald J Gilson & Mark A Wolfson, ‘How Investors Can (and Can't) Create 
Social Value’, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 
394/2018; Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 583; Stanford Law and Economics 
Olin Working Paper No. 520; Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper 
No. 18-23.  
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investment’. The proposal defines ‘sustainable investments’ as “any of the 
following or a combination of any of the following: (i) investments in an 
economic activity that contributes to an environmental objective […]; (ii) 
investments in an economic activity that contributes to a social objective […]; 
(iii) investments in companies following good governance practices […]”.762 
However, I find this definition troublesome since it seems too broad and risks 
not to functionally help identify sustainable investment – in terms of ESG 
criteria. Defining ‘sustainable’ those investments made only by considering the 
performance of one or two of the three ESG aspects, at the cost of the other one 
or two, seems to be in stark contradiction to the definition of ‘sustainable 
investment’ itself, since all three pillars (economy, society and environment) are 
necessary for the stability of the system.  
If we especially consider the recent scandals involving companies – such as 
Wells Fargo – with ‘good governance’ in place, we easily conclude that defining 
‘sustainable companies’ those with only good governance performance appears 
senseless. This definition could have sounded more reasonable only in the event 
governance requirements for business activities took into account social and 
environmental issues, which means, however, that current corporate governance 
standards should be totally revised or, at least, some “sustainable corporate 
governance standards” should be established first.   
 
(iii) Regulation on low carbon benchmarks and positive carbon impact 
benchmarks  
 
The third regulation 763  aims at introducing rules establishing and 
governing the provision of low carbon and positive carbon impact benchmarks, 
consistent with the fifth action included in the Action Plan. Stakeholder 
consultation revealed that most institutional investors do not use a low-carbon 
index because: (i) current methodologies do not reflect all sources of carbon 
emissions; (ii) their clients (investors) have no confidence in the methodology 
																																																								
762 Proposal for a regulation, n 745, Article 2(o). 
763 Proposal for a regulation, n 746. 
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employed by available low-carbon indices; and (iii) there is an absence of low-
carbon indices that reflect their investment approach and style.764  
In contrast to initial aims, the new framework will not introduce a fully 
harmonized regime for the methodology of the new benchmarks categories on 
the basis of a comprehensive set of rules, but rather will provide for the 




2.6.4 Fostering Sustainable Corporate Governance in Banks 
 
2.6.4.1 The EU Approach to Sustainable Corporate Governance 
 
The tenth and final concrete action included in the Action Plan concerns 
the fostering of sustainable corporate governance and attenuating short-termism 
in capital markets. In other words, in order to promote sustainable finance, 
according to the EU Commission, banks should establish a sort of ‘sustainable 
board’ and ‘sustainable processes’.  
The Commission argues that corporate governance “can significantly 
contribute to a more sustainable economy, allowing companies to take the 
strategic steps necessary to develop new technologies, to strengthen business 
models and to improve performance”, but also “improve their risk management 
practices and competitiveness”.765 However, corporate governance excessively 
focused on short-term performance may lead managers to take risks that are 
unsustainable in the long-term.  
In this regard, the HLEG Report suggests: (i) updating the fit and proper 
tests; (ii) extending the Stewardship Principles for institutional investors, as well 
as (iii) strengthening director duties related to sustainability. In relation to the 
first suggestion, the HLEG recommends that fit and proper tests should include 
an assessment of the individual and collective ability of the members of boards 
																																																								
764  Proposal for a regulation, n 746, Explanatory Memorandum, 6.  
765 EU Commission, n 740, 11. 
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“to address sustainability risks, to understand the broader stakeholder context 
and to take into account client’s sustainability preferences”.766 Both ECB 767‘ and 
ESMA and EBA Guidelines768  should be therefore revised in order to integrate 
new requirements in terms of skills, competence and experience by board 
members required for the evaluation of sustainability risks.  
Moreover, the EBA Guidance769 should be emended in order to clarify that 
‘risk strategy’ under article 88 of the CRD includes long-term risks including 
sustainability risks. 
With reference to the second suggestion, the HLEG recognized the key 
role of institutional investors in the promotion of sustainable finance.770 ESG and 
long-term investing, as well as active engagement – consistent with the ICGN 
Global Stewardship Principles771– should be concretely fostered in the EU 
legislative framework by means of an amendment of the Shareholder Rights 
Directive.772 New requirements should be inspired by the six Principles for 
Responsible Investment (PRI),773  according to which institutional investors 
assure to: (i) incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-
making processes; (ii) be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into 
ownership policies and practices; (iii) seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues 
by the entities in which they invest; (iv) promote acceptance and implementation 
of the Principles within the investment industry; (v) work together to enhance 
the effectiveness in implementing the Principles; and (vi) report on activities and 
progress towards implementing the Principles. 
In relation to the last suggestion, the report invites the Commission to 
explore ways to enhance director duties and incorporate sustainability in 
corporate practice, by taking into account the interests of all stakeholders, 
																																																								
766 See n 56, 39. 
767 ECB, n 99. 
768 ESMA and EBA, n 100. 
769 EBA, n 137.  
770 See n 56, 40, 41. 
771 See International Corporate Governance Network, ‘ICGN Global Stewardship Principles’, 
2016. In particular, Principle 6 states that “Investors should promote the long-tem performance 
and sustainable success of companies and should integrate material environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) factors in stewardship activities”. 
772 See Directive 2017/828 amending Shareholders’ Rights Directive.  
773 These were issued in 2006 by a UN-supported international network of investors, in 
partnership with UNEP Finance Initiative and the UN Global Compact. 
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employees included, and the likely consequences of any decision in the long term 
(which means beyond three or five years) on the community and environment. 
The HLEG Report also suggests that boards should verify the integrity of the 
most significant business partners in the company’s supply chain.774 Directors 
should be adequately trained in order to exercise reasonable care, skill and due 
diligence in relation to the company’s affairs, including the direct and indirect 
impact of the company’s business model, production and sales processes on 
stakeholders and the environment. Board nomination processes should consider 
also competence in material sustainability matters, and regular reporting about 
sustainability strategy should be carried out. Moreover, company management 
should develop a climate strategy aligned with climate goals, and remuneration 
should be aligned with long-term and sustainability goals. 
This recommendation seems to give a definitive answer to the concerns 
that arose in the 1990s as to the infringement of breach of the duty of loyalty by 
institutional investors who practice socially responsible investing (SRI)775or the 
most recent ESG investing.776 In fact, some commentators have considered 
inconsistent with the duty of loyalty any investment activity that entails the 
sacrifice of the interests of beneficiaries in favour of social causes.777 On the 
contrary, on the basis of the HLEG recommendations, integrating ESG risks 
into investment strategies has become a fiduciary duty.  
Interestingly, the EU strategy for corporate governance partially follows 
																																																								
774 See n 56, 41. 
775 Socially responsible investing (SRI) emerged as a new institutionalized investment strategy 
in the 1960s, and at the beginning identified a negative screening investment strategy for the 
promotion of ethical values, with no consideration of investment returns. In 1970s with the Pax 
World Fund - the first ethical mutual fund - and the “Sullivan Principles", the new ethical 
movement gained global importance. Only in the late 1980s the concept developed into other 
modern forms, as investment strategies both employing negative and positive screening 
techniques to maximize financial return with an attention to ethical values. See Russell Sparkes & 
Christopher J Cowton, ‘The maturing of Socially Responsible Investment: A Review of The 
Developing Link With Corporate Social Responsibility’, Journal of Business Ethics (2004), 52, 
45-57. 
776 This can be defined as the investment strategy that integrate material environmental, social 
and governance (ESG) factors into traditional financial metrics, in order to identify both 
opportunities and risks. Contrary to SRI, ESG investing does not imply negative screening and 
includes ESG factors to identify companies with higher investment potential on the long-term. 
See Lauren Caplan, John S Griswold & Jarvis F Williams, ‘From SRI to ESG: The Changing 
World of Responsible Investing’, Commonfund Institute (2013).  
777 Uniform Prudent Investor Act, Par. 5 cmt. (1994).  
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the HLEG recommendations, as it seems to prefer a more cautious path by only 
planning, by mid-2019, to carry out analytical and consultative work with 
relevant stakeholders to assess: (1) the possible need to require corporate boards 
to develop and disclose a sustainability strategy, including appropriate due 
diligence throughout the supply chain, and measurable sustainability targets; 
and (2) the possible need to clarify the rules according to which directors are 
expected to act in the company's long-term interest.778 The Commission invites 
the ESAs to collect evidence of undue short-term pressure from capital markets 
on corporations and consider, if necessary, further steps based on such evidence 
by March 2019. More specifically, the Commission invites ESMA to collect 
information on undue short-termism in capital markets, including: (1) portfolio 
turnover and equity holding periods by asset managers; (2) whether there are 
any practices in capital markets that generate undue short-term pressure in the 
real economy.779 No direct intervention on corporate governance is therefore 
provided in the Action Plan, which can be explained by the necessity to first 
respond to the most urgent actions – such as establishing a EU taxonomy and 
harmonizing low-carbon benchmarks.  
However, as culture and behaviour is the direct expression of short-term 
and long-term orientation, these aspects should not be overlooked. An integrated 
social-ecological system perspective is the only reasonable response to the 
dynamic and interlinked environmental, societal and economic challenges.780 
 
 
2.6.4.2 Creating Long-term Value with Investment: A Critical Approach 
 
The concept of responsible investing, which is nowadays spreading 
throughout the entire financial sector as the new frontier of investment 
strategy,781 has its roots in the stakeholder theory introduced in the 1980s,782 or 
																																																								
778 European Commission, n 740, 11. 
779 Ibid. 
780 Albert V Norströmet al., ‘Three necessary conditions for establishing effective Sustainable 
Development Goals in the Anthropocene’, Ecology and Society (2014), 19, 3, 8. 
781 Evidence suggests that the market share of sustainable investments has been growing in 
recent years. See Eurosif, n 721.  
 
Shanshan Zhu 156 
better in the so-called “enlightened shareholder theory” of corporate governance 
created by Jensen in the early 2000s. 783  According to Jensen’s model, 
shareholders primacy and stakeholder theory are not systematically 
incompatible, since in his view “we cannot maximize the long-term market value 
of an organization if we ignore or mistreat any important constituency” and, in 
particular, “we cannot create value without good relations with customers, 
employees, financial backers, suppliers, regulators and communities”.784 More 
recently, the concept has developed into the new notion of long-term value 
creation involving the aim of a company “to optimise its financial, social and 
environmental value in the long term”,785  as well as to pursue not only 
shareholder value but instead shareholder welfare, which means that 
shareholders should internalize the externalities that usually stakeholders have 
to hold.786 This definition seems to integrate the concept of long-term value 
focused on firms' stakeholders with the definition of sustainable development 
given in the Brundtland report (see 1.4.1), which highlights the importance of 
the impact of business operations not only on the direct stakeholders, but on 
society and environment at large, so putting into question the role of 
corporations in society and enlarging their liability. Interestingly, following this 
line, a legislative proposal has been made in France to amend the civil code in 
order to reinforce the consideration of social and environmental issues in the 
strategy and operations of companies, which means that directors and boards 
																																																																																																																																																							
782 Edward Freeman introduced the concept of stakeholder theory. He notoriously argues that 
managers bear a fiduciary relationship to stakeholders (specifically suppliers, customers, 
employees, stockholders, and the local community, since “each of these stakeholder groups has a 
right not to be treated as a means to some end, and therefore must participate in determining the 
future direction of the firm in which they have a stake”. See Freeman, n 10. 
783 This theory (Jensen, n 305, 8-21.) is the clear response to the criticism moved against 
traditional stakeholder theory, where directors are asked to serve simultaneusly two masters, 
posing a serious agency problem (see Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, The Economic 
Structure of Corporate Law, Harvard University Press, 199, 38. 
784 Jensen, n 305, 16. 
785 Schoenmaker & Schramade, n 306. See also Dyllick and Muff, n 306; Tirole, n 306; and 
Schoenmaker, n 306. 
786 Hart & Zingales, n 307. 
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would have to integrate sustainability considerations in all decision-making 
processes.787 
This theoretical model recently extended to financial operations, and now 
institutional investors are increasingly required to engage actively in promoting 
ESG-aligned businesses. 
To do that – regardless of the reasons justifying the trend –788 they have to 
rely on specific ESG data and ratings providers for the measurement and 
assessment of companies’ ESG performance. However, the lack of reliable 
information concerning companies’ ESG performance makes it difficult for 
professional investors to identify in which companies they should invest in order 
to promote a sustainable economy. A recent study by Busch et al. even claims 
that though sustainable concerns are integrated in investment processes, the 
shift towards more sustainable business seems rather weak, or at least has failed 
to effectively produce beneficial effects on the environment and society.789 The 
authors claim that a major cause for this failure is the lack of trustworthy ESG 
data and clarity regarding how such data are taken into account in investment 
policies. 
Schoenmaker and Schramade identified four main reasons why ESG are 
not fully reliable.790 First, ratings have little focus on material issues, and 
negative material issues can be easily cancelled by positive non-material ones. 
Second, the nature of most of the information on which they are built is 
																																																								
787 ‘Project De Loi relatif à la croissance et la transformation des entreprises’, Article 61. Available at 
https://www.actu-environnement.com/media/pdf/news-31994-projet-loi-pacte-
gouvernement.pdf, accessed 5 November 2018. 
788 Bénabou and Tirole hypotisize three conceptual views leading to individuals and firms to 
sustainability concerns: (i) the ‘win-win’ view (‘being a good corporate citizen can also make a 
firm more profitable’; (ii) the ‘delegated philanthropy’ (the firm as a channel for the expression of 
citizen values (the company/investor acts as a channel for the expression of citizen values), and 
(iii) the ’insider initiated philanthropy’ (the inclusion of sustainability consideration reflects the 
management’s or the board members’ own values). See Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 
‘Individual and corporate social responsibility’, Economica (2010), 77, 305, 1-19. Gibson and 
Krueger applied the framework to institutional investors. See Rajna Gibson Philipp Krueger, 
‘The Sustainability Footprint of Institutional Investors’, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper 
No. 17-05; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 
571/2018, available 
at  https://ssrn.com/abstract=2918926 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2918926, accessed 30 
December 2018. 
789 Busch, Bauer &Orlitzky, n 759, 303-329. 
790 Schoenmaker, n 306; and Schoenmaker & Schramade, n 306. 
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voluntarily-based and hard to verify, and this also tends to favour only large 
companies that can afford to spend substantial amounts of money for 
sustainability communication. Third, scores are usually focused on operations 
instead of the products of the companies, and this leads to the absurd result of 
awarding unsustainable businesses in, for example, the coal and tobacco 
industries. Fourth, in-depth assessment is excluded by the fact that each analyst 
should cover about 70 stocks at the same time. 
Moreover, the results of studies investigating the link between ESG and 
performance are mixed, and differ in respect to the different models of 
sustainable investment strategy implied. 791 As for Socially Responsible 
Investment (SRI) funds, studies found that, in comparison with non-SRI funds, 
their performance generally does not substantially differ,792  and sometimes 
shows better results.793 However, some SRI funds mainly focused on negative 
screening - and therefore passively managed – show negative results compared 
to non-SRI funds, 794  suggesting that more actively-managed SRI funds – 
focused on best-in-class selection processes –generally perform better than those 
passively managed.795 As for specific ESG investing, some studies have shown 
that ESG based investments – which are actively managed – perform as well 
as796 or better than non-sustainable investment strategies.797 As for impact 
																																																								
791 Susan N Gary, ‘Best Interests in the Long Term: Fiduciary Duties and ESG Integration’ 
University of Colorado Law Review (2018), 90, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3149856 
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3149856, accessed 30 November 2018. 
792 Luc Renneboog, JenkeTer Horst & Chendi Zhang, ‘The price of ethics and stakeholder 
governance: The performance of socially responsible mutual funds’, Journal of Corporate Finance 
(2008), 14, 3, 302-322; Jeroen Derwall  Kees Koedijk, ‘Socially responsible fixed-income funds’, 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting (2009), 36, 1–2, 210–229; Meir Statman, ‘Socially 
responsible indexes’, Journal of Portfolio Management (2006), 32, 3, 100–109; Christophe Revelli 
JeanLaurent Viviani & Revelli, ‘Financial performance of socially responsible investing (SRI): 
What have we learned? A meta-analysis’, Business Ethics: A European  Review (2014), 24, 2, 
158–185.  
793  See Deutsche Bank Group, ‘Sustainable Investing/Establishing Long-Term Value and 
Performance’, 2012; David M Blanchett, ‘Exploring the Cost of Investing in Socially Responsible 
Mutual Funds: An Empirical Study’, Journal of investing (2010), 19: 102. 
794 The Asset Management Working Group Of The United National Environment Programme 
Finance Initiative And Mercer, ‘Demystifying Responsible Investment Performance’, (2007), 
available at 
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/Demystifying_Responsible_Investment_Performa
nce_01.pdf, accessed 6 January 2018. 
795 Blanchett, n 793. 
796 Friede, Busch & Bassen, n 259. 
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investment,798 a study by Cambridge Associates and the Global Impact Investing 
Network showed that, by analysing the data collected by the Impact Investing 
Benchmark created by the same, impact investments did not underperform their 
(non impact investment-based) competitors, except for the impact investments 
launched in recent years, which is easily understandable given that impact 
investments usually grant financial returns in the long term.799  
The idea of using only traditional quantitative methods implied in passive 
investing to investigate qualitative issues poses many limitations. The authors 
suggest a new investment paradigm that involves an increase in active 
engagement with investee companies, and therefore one that requires investors 
to manage more concentrated portfolios,800 in order to get a more exhaustive 
view of the actual integration of a sound and sustainable culture in the firm.801 
This is in direct opposition to the Modern Portfolio Theory, currently the most 
popular model at the base of investment strategies, which suggests high 
diversification as well as passive investment strategies.802 The authors also 
suggest that investment chains should be shorter and simpler, since much of the 
relevant information tends to be lost during the investment chain process.  
As we have seen, an increasing number of academics and financial 
associations strive to measure the financial performance of sustainable and 
responsible investment strategies in comparison with traditional ones. However, 
they all seem to ignore crucially the non-financial return on the investment (by 
																																																																																																																																																							
797  See e.g. Alez Edmans, ‘Does the Stock Market Fully Value Intangibles? Employee 
Satisfaction and Equity Prices, Journal of Financial Economics (2011). 
798  Impact investments have been defined as the “investments made into companies, 
organizations, and funds with the intention to generate a measurable social and environmental 
impact alongside a financial return”. See https://thegiin.org/impact-investing/need-to-
know/#s7.  
799 Cambridge Associates & GIIN, ‘Introducing the Impact Investing Benchmark’, available at 
https://thegiin.org/assets/documents/pub/Introducing_the_Impact_Investing_Benchmark.pdf.  
800 The idea of less diversified portfolios is shared also by Warren Buffet who stated that “....If 
you are a know-something investor, able to understand business economics and to find five to ten 
sensibly-priced companies that possess important long-term competitive advantages, 
conventional diversification makes no sense for you. It is apt simply to hurt your results and 
increase your risk”. Buffet then quotes Keynes, who said that: “As time goes on, I get more and 
more convinced that the right method in investment is to put fairly large sums into enterprises 
which one thinks one knows something about and in the management of which one thoroughly 
believes”. See Warren Buffett, The Essays of Warren Buffett, edited by Lawrence A. Cunningham, 
2009, 99, 104. 
801 Schoenmaker, n 306; Schoenmaker & Schramade, n 306. 
802 Harry Markowitz, ‘Portfolio Selection’, Journal of Finance (1952), 77, 7. 
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applying, for example, social return on the investment, SROI), represented by 
the positive social or environmental impact produced by the investment. Since 
sustainable finance, especially impact investment, aims at both financial and non-
financial returns, they should be both taken into consideration in their 
evaluation, especially with reference to impact investments. However, the 
systems to measure the social and environmental impact produced by such 
investments are so far not fully developed and harmonized, and therefore they 
are not completely reliable. As a consequence, I argue that instead of continuing 
to carry out studies to compare the financial performance of sustainable and non-
sustainable investments, efforts should be better focused on the development of 
consistent systems to measure the SROI in impact investments. As for SRI and 
ESG investment strategies, since these do not provide specific expectations of 
social and environmental impacts, new methodologies should be put in place that 
reflect the way ESG criteria have been integrated in the decision-making. 
In the light of the above considerations, we can easily understand why the 
EU reforming proposals, though admirable, risk oversimplifying a complex issue 
that cannot be easily solved solely by establishing better disclosure or the 
harmonization of ESG taxonomy and benchmarks. These are undoubtedly the 
most direct responses to urgent issues such as climate change, and will lay the 
foundation for the next steps of sustainable economic transition. However, time 
is required to make the new apparatus work, and to spread the new sustainability 
principles so that they become common values. Moreover, all pro-ESG 
initiatives seem to be carried out without taking a clear position on the role 
companies should play, or at least without distinguishing where the role of 
corporations should end and the role of governments should start. Recognising 
the social and environmental liabilities of corporations should not be a 
justification for national governments not to exercise their political powers to 
enhance the economic transition towards a more sustainable system based on the 
principles of comprehensiveness, connectivity, equity, prudence and security.803 
The fact that product demand ultimately derives from societal needs – which is 
																																																								
803 These five principles were defined by Thomas N Gladwin, James J Kennelly & Tara-
Shelomith Krause, ‘Shifting paradigms for sustainable development: Implications for 
management theory and research’, Academy of Management Review (1995), 20, 4, 874-907. 
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the main justification moved by Friedman for companies not to take care of 
sustainability – makes both national governments and corporations - which 
nowadays are partially creating the demand themselves – responsible for a 
change in production-consumption philosophy. If capitalism has to stay, it 
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Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I did not limit my analysis to the recent reforms that 
reshaped the corporate governance of banks, but I also investigated several 
cultural aspects that structure behaviour and character in financial institutions, 
and reinterpreted governance mechanisms in the light of psychological and 
sociological studies. The main assumption on which the thesis is based is that 
inadequate rules, bad corporate governance and lack of public enforcement 
cannot fully explain the widespread malpractice in the financial sector. The 
nature of the determinants of misconduct is behavioural and cultural, and given 
that regulation per se cannot be expected to promote good corporate culture, I 
argue that the role of corporate governance should be enhanced so as to 
reinforce sustainable conduct within financial institutions. However, following 
the traditional lawyerly approach to corporate governance based on the 
standards and procedures described in the previous chapters may not be 
sufficient, while the risk of adding costs and bureaucracy within financial 
institutions is high. Governance models should be instead analysed with a focus 
on the organizational and cultural aspects of institutions. Scholars in this area 
should therefore undertake in-depth studies on the determinants of human 
behaviour, the relevant processes, and the motivations leading people to act the 
way they do. 
Moreover, I argue that in order to change culture – due to its multi-
layered nature - a combination of practical values, norms, and formal institutions 
is required. As explained in the previous sections, the board is key to developing 
an organizational structure based on ethical values which should shape every 
decision-making process, guide managers and employees to behave with 
integrity, and, to a certain extent, take into consideration stakeholders’ interests 
(in order to prevent substantial costs of future litigation). 
However, the organizational framework may prove effective only when it 
is set in a good institutional framework. Supervisory authorities, firm’s 
shareholders — in particular, institutional investors — and the entire financial 
community should support the board in this new path for sustainable 
development and finance. Indeed, external pressure by revealing the benefits of 
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ethicality and sustainability can incentivize a long-term view in managing the 
firm.  
To conclude, without entirely rejecting the idea of financial capitalism, this 
thesis claims that finance should be a functional science that exists to support the 
goal of constructing a good society.804 For this to be achieved, a new path needs 
to be taken towards an evolution in terms of “democratizing and humanizing and 
expanding the scope of financial capitalism”805 and, therefore, to further study 
what factors induce financial operators to  crime and misbehaviour and what is 




804	Robert Shiller, Finance and the Good Society, Princeton University Press, 2012, 5–9.	
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